INFANTRY

The Professional Journal for Infantrymen

OCT-NOV 1960

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

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THE FRONT COVER

As a lone Infantryman surveys the ruins of a mythical American community, this issue's cover (as well as "This Was a City," in this issue) points up the growing importance of the Army's role in the event of a hostile nuclear attack. *Illustration by Sp 4 John S. McLachlin.*

"The Infantryman" Statuette. See "Letters to the Editor."

INFANTRY

The Professional Journal for Infantrymen

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Infantry's Mission—As an official publication of the United States Army Infantry School, *Infantry* provides current doctrinal information on Infantry organization, weapons, equipment, tactics and techniques. Further, it provides, through controversial and thought-provoking articles, a forum for progressive military thinking. Publication of material, however, does not necessarily indicate official thinking or indorsement by the United States Army Infantry School.

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DEAR INFANTRYMEN:

From The Commander In Chief, USAREUR

This letter was prepared by General Clarke prior to his assuming his new duties this month as Commanding General, USAREUR.

In past wars our nation has been blessed with a period of time in which to prepare and train our military forces. Historically, we have required this period of time, for our philosophy has been to demobilize and disarm during times of peace. On the occasions where we have not had the time to prepare, such as in Korea, we have suffered early losses of advantages and positions which were regained only through costly and bitter fighting.

During the past decade scientific achievements and technological progress have all but eliminated this period of preparation. Today all of our thinking and planning must be geared to this reality. In total war, *we will have no second chance*. In limited war, we must be prepared to fight anywhere at anytime. Clearly then, combat readiness is our biggest problem. The principal solution lies in our ready forces, modernly equipped and realistically trained.

We can be proud of the progress we have made in our training during the past several years. We have learned well from the results of past wars. Today our active Army units are engaged in realistic field training to an unprecedented degree. The state of readiness of our Reserve Components is the best it has ever been in the history of the peacetime Army. Units which were only paper units a few years ago can now be mobilized and combat ready in a minimum amount of time. Our tactical training is sound and has been accomplished in accordance with improved and modern concepts. This training progress has paralleled the giant steps of progress made in technical and scientific fields.

But we cannot and will not rest on our laurels. We must continue to improve our training at all levels. Our service schools must continue to devise better means to improve our training progress. However, in the final analysis the effectiveness of the training program rests upon the small unit leader and the commander in the field. Even the most up-to-date program is a mere piece of paper unless it is effectively implemented by those at unit level.

The world situation demands that we in the Army keep these thoughts foremost in our minds. If war comes we must be ready to respond instantaneously with what we have in being. The stakes are obvious. If we are not fully prepared and ready, we risk the loss of everything that we in the free world exemplify.

Bruce C. Clarke

BRUCE C. CLARKE
General, USA

As YOU can determine from our cover and from the story of "Webber City," we are publishing in this issue a catalyst which, we trust, will serve to stimulate serious thought on a deadly serious matter, civil defense. Too many Americans, military and civilian, have given little more than lip service to this problem, largely because of two widely subscribed, but patently erroneous, schools of thought. One is the *it-can't-happen-here* school, and the other is the *our-military's-job-is-elsewhere* school. Neither could be more diametrically out of step with reality.

The Army, by virtue of its very proximity (to say nothing of Federal directive), *will* have a major role to play at home prior to any wartime overseas deployment. We're going to be caught with our proverbial pants down if we fail to tackle the problem of civil defense with more sincere effort than in the past. This is easy to say, but there are many answers required and steps to be taken that are not easily accomplished.

"This Was a City" does not resolve any problems; instead, it poignantly reiterates them for your contemplation. Too dramatic? Perhaps, but not nearly as dramatic as a demolished New York or Chicago. If any reader feels compelled to propose a workable and useful training system, then this article has been successful. In passing, and for such stimulus as it may provide, the Canadian Army, which occupies a homeland adjacent to our own, believes in civil defense to the extent that most of their ready forces exercise the option to suspend all other training for two weeks annually in order to train in this activity. In Canada it is called by the term "National Survival." Chances are they'll be ready, too. Will we?

FROM AN EYEWITNESS

• Thanks for sending me a copy of the [August-September] issue which I read through last evening. Dr. Kleber's article, "A Quiet Warning," immediately took my eye. I remember that attack very well. The 89th was directly on our flank and the battalions which took the worst punishment held positions plainly visible to us across the valley. We were alerted at the same time they were, and we were gas-shelled over the same period. (I was gas officer at the time, responsible for alerting, sounding all clear, etc.) The 89th was a good division . . . greenness really had nothing to do with its losses in that attack. I would say it was more bad luck than all else. You see, on that part of the front we were getting gas-shelled almost every day or night, and we got into the habit of rolling with the punch, fighting our personal equipment, and not taking alerts (or even the presence of gas) too seriously. It happened that against the two battalions of the 89th, the enemy got in extremely good concentrations (this a matter of topography and accident) quite late in the barraging when the attack was dropping off elsewhere. Local "all clears" were already being sounded in sectors close to them. That Manonville-Manoncourt-Gezonville area was very hilly and tricky when it came to gas. Things could be perfectly clear among the splinterproofs half way up a reverse slope, and wholly deadly at the foot of the same slope.

I would say, also, that in World War I our gas drill and gas combat discipline were not "skeptical and apathetic." To the contrary, they were far higher than the standards in World War II, which were never tested.

S. L. A. Marshall
Brig Gen, USAR (Ret.)
The Detroit News
Detroit, Michigan

PROFITABLE WORDS

• . . . Regarding General Gray's article [*Training Infantry Leaders*, June-July 60], I would be glad to contribute $5.00 toward a pool of funds to pay the authors of such articles as he describes.

Col H. W. Lange
Office of the U. S. Army Attache
APO 230, New York, N. Y.

DON'T FORGET THE RESERVES

• . . . The many members of the Reserves and National Guard numbered among your readers would certainly welcome future stories on successful inactive duty training programs, recruiting projects, making the most of summer camp, or any number of topics of general military nature with especially pressing interest to "weekend warriors. . . ."

2d Lt. Fred F. Yoder, USAR
Co D, 337th Regt (BCT)
Des Plaines, Ill.

We would particularly like to receive manuscripts dealing with ideas for improving Active Duty for Training (ACDUTRA) activities.—Ed.

MORE INGENUITY

• . . . I was interested in . . . "Yankee Ingenuity in the Deep Snow" [*Infantry*, Apr-May 60.] However, I feel that a member of my rifle platoon demonstrated even more ingenuity. . . .

Sp4 William F. Fontaine modified a rucksack frame by adding only a strip of wood and two salvaged toe bindings from a set of skis in such a manner that the machinegun could be carried on his back . . . he needed only to drop the frame in the snow where desired and fire at once--the gun still mounted on the frame. Further, the frame with the machinegun attached could be mounted and fired from the ahkio! If the ahkio bogged down in heavy woods, as was often the case, we had an excellent method of keeping the machinegun with us and operative.

2d Lt Darryl E. Sparling
Co B, 1st BG, 12th Inf
Ft. Lewis, Wash.

INFANTRYMAN STATUETTES

• . . . I would appreciate very much your sending me [a copy of] the back cover of your June-July 1960 issue of *Infantry* with the statue of "The Infantryman." . . . Please advise if you have desk-size miniatures of The Infantryman for sale. . . .

Capt John R. Lathram Jr.
2057 21st Ave. S.
Birmingham, Ala.

The Book Department, USAIS, will have a limited number of "The Infantryman" statuettes in early November for about $5.50. See photo, Page 1.—Ed.

(Continued on page 20)

THIS WAS A CITY

by CAPT FRANCIS J. WALDMAN

THIS was a city . . .

Thirteen hours ago, on this otherwise uneventful spring day, a flash of light broke through the early morning calm, and a large mushroom cloud hovered over what had been the north end of Webber City.

A milkman on his morning route on Spring Mill Road later reported that ". . . there was a blinding flash of light . . . and a tremendous thunderclap that shook the pavement. . . ."

An office worker travelling west on Harvey Avenue (several miles from the detonation) also reported "the intense heat and shock shattered my windshield and forced me to drive into the path of an oncoming automobile. . . ."

Neither of these workers survived long enough to tell the whole story. They, and thousands of other inhabitants of Webber City, fell victim to the first nuclear attack on American soil.

As the newspapers later reported it, Webber City—and more than a hundred other American communities—remained in a state of chaos for the better part of that day.

The fires and the rubble and the dead and wounded made a nightmare for officials attempting to restore order. The water system was out, as was the electric power; ruptured gas mains exploded and added to the other hazards. There were also reported cases (fortunately, they were isolated) of looting in the business district.

This was Webber City—population 84,000—on D-Day, World War III.

If you had talked to any of its remaining inhabitants on that or subsequent days, these phrases would ultimately have crept into the conversation:

" . . . We just didn't think it could happen. . . ."

". . . I thought we would have a warning. . . ."

". . . How could this happen to us? . . ."

Of course, it would be hard to answer these hypothetical questions, just as it is hard to admit that *it could happen to us—and without warning*. It is even harder to realize that destruction and chaos could

come to Webber City just as we have described.

What is most startling is that we are doing very little to meet the eventuality of such a nuclear attack. When I say "we" I am not referring to the Civil Defense organizations, but to the United States Army. More specifically, I am referring to the individuals in the Army who may be faced with the chaos of a Webber City in the event of a nuclear attack.

And if you dispute or doubt this statement, consider this: How well are *you* prepared to command a unit to move into Webber City? What problems would you anticipate? Would "three-up, two-back, and feed 'em a hot meal" work in the nuclear rubble of an American city? How would your soldiers react to the misery and destruction—and how would they enforce discipline upon the Webber City population?

The answers to these questions are, I believe, quite evident—and the questions are not just hypothetical. The basic fact is that we are *not* prepared to the extent that we should be to assume these missions. But rather than accept this as a bald statement of fact, let us delve into the entire problem a little further.

From a practical standpoint, we must recognize that potential aggressors have the capability of launching a ballistic missile attack on our country. They have the missiles, and their use of them is a distinct possibility. Moreover, under present circumstances, we do not have any air defense means to counter or destroy such missiles, and we probably will not have such a destruction capability until 1965.

If such an attack should come, we could expect considerable chaos and destruction. Furthermore, the Army would logically play a great part in picking up the pieces and restoring order in the devastated areas. This is the case, since, *under DOD and JCS directives, the Army is charged with planning, coordinating and administering all military aid of all services in a civil defense emergency*. So we have the mission—and it is a vital one.

But what are we doing about it? At the installation and major unit level, the Army has prepared detailed plans for implementation of its civil assistance mission. In addition, civil authorities and Civil Defense organizations have been made aware of the Army's capabilities and intentions. Unfortunately, however, this is as far as it goes. The keys to the successful accomplishment of the military's civil defense mission—the soldier and the small unit leader—are neither aware of nor fully trained for the tasks which will fall to them in the event of a nuclear attack on U. S. cities.

As a good case in point, instruction in civil defense (to include martial law) is directed by Department of the Army to the extent of 10 to 20 hours each year for all officers. These subjects are also included in the formal instruction at Army service schools. Unfortunately, however, this instruction falls far short of the desired goal. It is not of sufficient duration and does not include the psychological and political ramifications of military aid to civil authorities. More important, the training does not touch on many of the practical problems that will confront a troop commander in a "Webber City" situation.

For example, what would be the specific relationship of the Army commander to other agencies engaged in Webber City recovery operations? If martial law is declared, the relationships are clear-cut, but how many of these agencies (or the cities' inhabitants) are aware of the relationships or the authority contained in martial law? And what techniques or procedures are used to establish and publicize the commander's authority? Further, what happens to recalcitrant inhabitants who deny the Army's authority in such a case? And what are the legal liabilities which a troop commander may incur if he forcibly enforces martial law against resisting members of the populace?

What of the situations where martial law will not apply and help will be required of the Army? In such instances, local civil officials will have no authority over the troop commander and they will not be responsible to either the Federal military authorities (to whom the local commander must respond) or to the Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization, which is the Federal government's coordinating agency for civil defense affairs.

The local military commander may thus be faced with the dilemma of responding to Federal directives while rendering all possible assistance to civil authorities who are not responsible to the Federal agencies under whose control he is operating. In such an instance, the probability of overlapping lines of authority, misunderstanding and resentment is more than a remote possibility.

To further complicate such problems, our city governments are organized in many different ways. In some cities, for instance, there is a city manager; in others a council; in still others there is a mayor and no council. The combinations and permutations are almost innumerable—and with each different type of government you could logically anticipate different problems.

As you can expect, a troop commander moving into Webber City would have to "play it by ear" until he had learned what type of government the city had, who was in charge (and surviving), and what their responsibilities in civil defense were. At the same time he would have to be coordinating with civil defense officials to ascertain what their plans and capabilities were. The urgency of the situation would undoubtedly be such that the commander could not wait for the niceties of protocol or find a guided tour of the city to establish what his role would be and what relationships would exist vis-a-vis the city officials. Nor can the troop commander expect detailed guidance as to what he must do. The initiative—and the fate of a city—may rest in *his* hands.

Amidst all of the confusion following a nuclear attack, the commander would also have to determine what missions his troops should be performing. Should they be used in restoring communications, aiding the wounded, removing rubble, guarding against looting, etc? And in which priority should these tasks be accomplished?

"Play *that* by ear," you say?

The recovery of an American city is too vital a problem to be "played by ear." The plans, the coordination and the training should be accomplished well in advance of the assignment of such a mission.

One thing that cannot be planned for—and this is perhaps the most significant problem which area commanders will face—is the breakdown of the normal social structure of the communities located in target areas. During World War II, cities which suffered mass bombings experienced this breakdown in the immediate post-attack period; after a nuclear attack, we can logically expect the same result.

To effectively assist civil authorities in re-establishing law and order, the local commander will have to gain the cooperation and support of a civil populace which is dazed, disorganized, lacking in discipline and totally unfamiliar with the authoritative leadership typified by the military chain of command. Additionally, analysis of the attitudes of German and Japanese civilians who experienced mass bombings (including the atomic attacks in Japan) in World War II shows that the people of the target area may harbor resentment toward their own government and deep suspicion of the military. Admittedly, we should not expect that our citizens will react in exactly the same way. However, we must not completely discount the possibility of such a happening. At least it should be considered. And certainly the problem of how to make such a group, immersed in a sea of confusion and chaos, respond to military leadership cannot be solved by training in martial law, riot control and the principles of leadership. Much more is needed.

Just as the officer going into combat must know both his own men and the enemy, the commander of troops giving aid to the civilian population of a devastated city must know what hostile reactions to expect and how he may counter them—both in the interest of his mission and in the cause of simple humanity.

Therefore, Combat Arms troops who are used to re-establish law and order after a nuclear attack must also be given, in addition to riot control training, the necessary instruction which will prepare them psychologically for the conditions under which they will operate. A look at World War II will again bear this out. Many Japanese military units brought into Hiroshima and Nagasaki immediately after the atomic attacks were unable to function effectively because the men were overwhelmed by the chaos and misery they saw.

It is only logical, therefore, that we should attempt to give the soldier some understanding of the sights to which he will be exposed following a nuclear attack. Only if he is aware of the suffering brought about by nuclear strikes on civilian communities—and has steeled himself for the horror of the situation—will be the soldier be fully capable of carrying out his mission. Further, there must must also be an extension of riot control training to bring willing acceptance among the troops of the fact that riot techniques may have to be employed against fellow citizens, friends, and even neighbors. Riot training today carries the connotation of imposing control measures upon lawless elements of society or upon civilians of a hostile power in time of military occupation. Neither set of conditions will fit the probable use of riot control measures in a U. S. city after nuclear bombing.

In such a situation, the U. S. soldier may find himself ordered to employ against U. S. citizens techniques of force required in order to open vital evacuation routes or designed to prevent the overrunning of emergency food and supply depots. Thus, if we are to expect willing and effective troop response to orders which will, on the surface, seem harsh and misdirected, we must give our men, in advance, a true picture of the situation to be faced and the reason for actions which (under ordinary circumstances) would seem uncalled for.

Essentially, that's about it. The suggestions made here may be summarized as a call for psychological preparation of Army personnel for a job which has had no parallel in true military operations. But it goes beyond that. What is fundamentally necessary is the awareness on the part of the military as to what nuclear attack will bring to U. S. civilian communities. Only by knowing what they can expect in a bombed city will the officers and men of the Army be fully prepared to accomplish this vital mission—to render effective and compassionate aid to people who have never experienced the horrors of the battlefield.

We cannot prepare for this mission with our head in the sand, ostrich-like, hoping that the danger will go away. We must face up to the sobering reality that a Webber City could well be our next area of operations—and *we must* be prepared for that possibility.

CAPT FRANCIS J. WALDMAN, a 1951 graduate of the United States Military Academy, attended the Advanced Infantry Officers Course at Fort Benning. In Korea he was a rifle platoon leader and company commander with the 160th Regiment and later was aide-de-camp to the assistant Division Commander, 40th Infantry Division. In 1956 he received a Master of Public Administration degree from Harvard University and for the next three years was an instructor in the Department of Social Studies, United States Military Academy. Captain Waldman is currently assigned to the Organization and Training Branch, Operations Division, Headquarters, USAREUR.

IS IT TRUE?

by Lt Col R. H. Kaddatz

As you leave the KD range after a long day in the hot sun, the ammunition truck in the column ahead grinds to a halt with an unpleasant air of finality. Your worst suspicions are confirmed when the driver reports "Transmission, sir. She's been giving me trouble all day."

What to do? The convoy ahead has gone bowling merrily on its way all unaware of your trouble. You have no radio or phone and you can't leave a truck half-loaded with live ammunition while you make the long trip for a replacement.

Your platoon sergeant, however, is quick with an answer and flags down the following ambulance just as it pulls out to pass. In no time the ammunition is transloaded and you are on your way. Your problem is solved—or is it? Have you violated a regulation? What does the Geneva Convention say about transporting ammunition in an ambulance? Check your knowledge of the Convention by answering true or false to the following statements:

1. If red cross markings on an ambulance are completely covered, Infantry replacements may be transported in the vehicle.
2. Medical personnel of the Armed Forces, wearing the distinctive medical arm brassard, may be legally armed with a rifle or pistol.
3. Field medical ambulances with protective markings may be interspersed in a tactical convoy and still receive protection under the Geneva Convention.
4. When Infantrymen are employed in a medical role they are entitled to the same respect and protection, under the Geneva Convention, as are medical troops.
5. Medical soldiers may be used as members of an armed area guard.
6. Cargo helicopters which deliver troops and supplies should not display a red cross during their return flight even though casualties are aboard the aircraft.
7. A medical ambulance helicopter, although correctly marked, may be legally forced down and subjected to inspection by the enemy.
8. A distinctive marking for medical personnel appears on the reverse side of the regular Armed Forces Identification Card.
9. The red cross is the only distinctive sign used for the protection of military medical units.
10. Both the United States and the USSR are bound by the Geneva Convention.

For answers turn to page 17.

DID'YA HEAR 'DA LATEST, MOIVEN?

The next issue of *Infantry* will encompass the months of December, January, *and February,* and will be mailed in January 1961. Thereafter, the regular bi-monthly schedule will resume with the March-April issue. This is being done to avoid the split calendar and fiscal years. And remember, your next issue will not be mailed until *January* 1961. You will automatically receive, of course, the same number of issues for which your subscription was contracted, plus a bonus in an extra-large copy for the three-month issue. Pass me a cracker, please.

OBJECTIVE: POLNA

COULD YOU PLAN A BATTLE GROUP AIRMOBILE OPERATION? HERE'S A CHANCE TO FIND OUT...

MAJ. WILLIAM A. BROWN
CAPT. GEORGE A. MILLENER JR.

THERE it is, big as life, you tell yourself . . . an objective over six miles behind enemy lines—and your battle group is going to take it. . . .

How was it the G3 described the attack? ". . . The first large-scale airmobile operation of the war." (with emphasis on the *first.)*

You hoped it wouldn't be your last. As the S3 of the battle group, you would have a lot to say about that.

You look around the division war room and notice that most of the commanders and staff officers have already cleared the building after the division plans briefing. Then you decide to take a final look at the division situation map.

It all looks so simple, you tell yourself, glancing at the large map board —just a few goose eggs, a few lines and arrows and we're there—almost.

The division G3 interrupts your train of thought as he walks up on your left. "The general wanted to get fancy and call your assault 'Operation Touchdown' . . . but we talked him out of it. . . ."

You reply: "I'm glad you did, Colonel . . . after what happened to the 93d Infantry last week, I can see where this could turn into an 'Operation Fumble.' "

"Yeh," the G3 answers, "I heard about that . . . they had a lot of tough luck."

He pauses for a moment to light a well-chewed cigar. Then he continues: "I have a friend over in the 55th Division, and he says that the 93d lost their shirt. . . . They landed two companies near the Tronda River to seize a couple of bridges . . . from what I understand, they lost eight choppers and the better part of a company and then got kicked out of the bridgehead."

You are tempted to ask the division G3 how this could happen to a good battle group, but before you can ask the question, he speaks again: "Their companies landed almost a half-mile from the objectives and they had to fight their way to the bridges. Then an enemy armored

unit that the 93d hadn't counted on showed up . . . they didn't have enough AT weapons, and that was the end of that."

As you make a motion to leave the war room, the G3 adds a parting shot: "I also understand that three of their choppers didn't show up at the loading area and there was a foul-up in the loading plans. Then one of the planes broke radio silence on the way in and the fire support protecting the air corridor didn't pan out. It was a real *soiree,* but I'm sure your people won't run into anything like that."

You leave the division war room and mull over the G3's parting remark. You hope he's right about not running into anything. Then you try to remember how much experience *your* battle group (the 1st BG, 87th Inf) has had in airmobile operations . . . and the thought is far from encouraging.

Since you have been with the battle group as the S3, there have only been a few maneuvers in the States (where you air-landed a platoon) and one company-size landing over here. Outside of that—nothing. At any rate, this should make your next few hours very interesting.

As you climb into your helicopter to return to your battle group CP, you hear the sound in the distance of the division artillery softening up the enemy for tomorrow's attack. If the situation is anything like the G2 pictured it, the enemy will need a lot of softening.

Your chopper is quickly airborne and you find yourself beginning to put the pieces of the planning puzzle together. Your first step is to compute the amount of time you will have to put this airmobile assault plan in good order. With the attack coming off at 0510 tomorrow, you figure that you will have a little better than 17 hours to do the job—not much time, but adequate.

Shortly after your chopper clears the division CP area, your attention is directed to the rugged hills passing beneath your view. You wonder what the terrain in the objective area will be like.

As you look down at the operations map in your lap, it is evident that terrain will be a major factor in deciding where you land tomorrow, and what happens after that. Your eye then falls on the overlay showing the division's scheme of maneuver (Map A).

Considering the terrain and the relative combat power, you figure that the division *should* get its objective (Obj 101) without too much difficulty. The three battle groups abreast in the attacking echelon should make good progress, and with your battle group (1/87) seizing crossings over the ORVAY River, the way should be clear for Task Force STARR (the motorized 2d BG, 15th Inf, and the 2d Med Tk Bn, 69th Armor, which are initially in reserve) to break out right to the division objective.

You then notice Objective 71, which is to be seized by the 2d BG, 7th Inf. It is near this objective that the 2/7 should link up with the 1/87 after you have seized the crossings over the ORVAY River. Immediately after this, Task Force STARR should pass through the 2d BG, 7th Inf, and the 1st BG, 87th Inf, to seize VOLTI.

On the surface then, it all sounds relatively easy. But as you look at *your* objective area and *your* mission, there are a few lingering doubts. Your battle group has to seize and defend bridges A, B, C and D at POLNA (the only good bridges available for crossing) until link-up with the 2d BG, 7th Inf. Then you are to assist elements of the division in crossing the river. It doesn't sound like much, but it could be touch and go.

Now all you have to do as S3 is plan how this airmobile operation will be accomplished. Fortunately,



Map A

you have the 132d Tactical Transportation Aviation Bn attached for operational control, and they have enough helicopters so that your battle group can make the operation in a single lift. Also, the weather will be on your side. You recall the G2's forecast for tomorrow: ". . . average temperature 65 degrees, estimated 1000 foot overcast, three miles visibility until 1000 hours daily, BMNT is 0500, EENT is 1844." At least you won't be plagued with a high humidity and temperature which could reduce the choppers' lift capability.

As you look more closely at the map of your objective area (Map B) and try to visualize your plan of maneuver, you realize that the terrain picture doesn't look quite as promising as the weather. Even though soil trafficability is good throughout the area (according to the G2) and the minor streams in the area are fordable to troops and vehicles, the HONETA and ORVAY Rivers are not fordable and will present somewhat of a problem in your plan of defense. To make matters worse, in the area surrounding POLNA (where the four bridges are located) there are a number of dominating hills which will probably have to be seized and held if the security of the crossing area is to be ensured. Apparently your selection of objectives and of the FEBA (forward edge of the battle area) will be considerably influenced by these hills.

As you continue studying the overlay on your map board, you realize that this will be almost a perimeter variation of the position defense—and not unlike the situation when your battle group was surrounded earlier in the war. You try to recall whether Benning had any guide figures for this type of maneuver. How far out should you go in setting up your defense of the bridges? And what about the town of POLNA? Will you have to seize all of it to secure the bridges? And if it takes all of the nine hours for link-up (as the G3 estimated), how far will you have to stretch your perimeter around this area to hold for this length of time? If the enemy uses nuclear weapons, will this affect your operation plan?



Map B

You know that once your unit lands in this area the enemy will throw a lot of pressure against whatever type of defense you set up. You also realize that the size and location of your reserve will be complicated by the fact that the enemy can hit you from either side of the ORVAY River. He has a regiment about 21 km to the north, an engineer platoon in POLNA, and a tank company and a rifle company a little over 3 km south of the objective area. Moreover, he is expected to continue his delay as he moves to the north, and this won't make your job any easier.

Of course, you always have to consider that there may be other enemy in the area, too. You can't count on G2's information as being infallible. In one area, though, you fervently hope that the G2 is right. This is relative to his estimate that "the enemy has nuclear weapons, but is not expected to employ them in this compaign." Well, you tell yourself, if he uses them, we can too—and with much greater effect.

Fortunately, there is another favorable aspect to this impending battle—your units are almost at full strength and they have been sitting in reserve for over a week, so they should be ready for a scrap. As you reflect on the status of the battle group, it is evident that there are few weak links in the unit. Your company commanders are generally good—Taylor (Co. A) is aggressive and likes a fight; Kovac (Co. B) had combat experience in World War II and Korea, and he can be counted on to produce; Walters (Co. C) has

had a lot of airborne experience, so this should be right down his alley; Smith (Co. D) is the big question mark. In the last fire fight, his company held up the attack and they also were stopped by a reinforced platoon roadblock; Herring (Co. E), Kreidinger (HQ Co.), and Bolton (Cmbt Spt Co.) are steady and reliable. Nothing spectacular, but they can do their job. This is all to the good.

As your chopper starts the descent to your battle group landing site, you suddenly feel better about the prospects. Your unit is battle tested (even though it isn't widely experienced in airmobile operations) and you have good leaders. The mission looks tough, but there have been tougher ones. The enemy will also be tough, but the terrain and the weather appear to be on your side—they can be made to work for you.

When the chopper touches down, you sit there momentarily pondering your important part in this operation. As the battle group S3, you are going to have to put all of the pieces of this puzzle together. The plan of assault, defense, choice of objectives, boundaries, FEBA, RSP and a dozen other matters are going to fall to you to recommend. But how will you prepare this plan? What will be your planning sequence? And what about the size and location of the reserve? How will your defense be conducted? What about the coordination for link-up? How about fire support?

All of these thousand-and-one loose ends will have to be tied together by you in the next few hours. Maybe that reference by the G3 to a "touchdown" was prophetic, you tell yourself, for you now have the ball and it's yours for the carrying.

From now on, S3, it's up to you.

After you have made your plan to accomplish this mission (to include selection of OBJECTIVES, BOUNDARIES, FEBA, RSP, LANDING ZONES, FLIGHT ROUTES AND PLANS FOR DEFENSE AND LINK-UP), turn to page 60 to see how the S3, 1st BG, 87th Inf, did the job.

MAJ WILLIAM A. BROWN was commissioned in 1945 through Infantry OCS after which he served as a platoon leader with the 33d Infantry in Panama and the 187th Airborne Infantry in Korea. Upon return to CONUS in 1951, he served as a company commander and Assistant Inspector General in the 11th Airborne Division. Major Brown has also served as a company commander in the 6th Infantry, as aide-de-camp and staff secretary to the US Commander of Berlin, and as assistant G3 in Second Army Headquarters. He has completed the Airborne, Marine Amphibious, Nuclear Weapons Employment and Infantry Officers Advanced Courses and the Regular Course, CGSC. He is presently assigned as an instructor in the Command and Staff Department, USAIS.

CAPT GEORGE A. MILLENER, JR., was commissioned upon graduation from the University of Maryland in June 1950 and received his Regular Army commission one month later. In Korea, from August to December 1950, he served as a platoon leader with Company B, 15th Infantry. He has served as a tactical officer and company commander with the Officer Candidate School, and as a company commander and battalion S3 with the 26th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division. Captain Millener has attended the Associate Infantry Officer, Advanced and Airborne Courses. At the present time he is an instructor with the Command and Staff Department, USAIS.

Don't Throw It Away

YOUR museum needs your help! The United States Army Infantry Museum, located at Fort Benning, needs contributions of historical Infantry equipment to expand and complete its present collection. The museum was founded in 1959 to preserve the history and traditions of the Infantry.

If you donate an item to the museum it becomes the property of the museum, and when the item is placed on display you are acknowledged as the donor. Loaned items remain yours and will be returned to you upon request. The museum assumes full responsibility for upkeep and protection of these items while they are in its possession.

Personnel desiring to loan or donate items may write to the Custodian, United States Army Infantry Museum, Fort Benning, Georgia.

by CAPT JOHN C. EVANS

Communication in the Night Attack

INFANTRYMEN have been told time after time that "communication is the voice of command" and that "a general without communication is not a commander." This is fine, and Infantrymen believe it. Now, what can they do about it?

First, they must use their equipment to its *fullest* capability. Second, they must find ways to use *all* their equipment in situations where its use does not, at first, appear feasible.

Although radio is without doubt our most flexible means of communication, it is also one of the most vulnerable. Perhaps a more careful search for possibilities would reveal areas in which we should place more dependence upon wire's capabilities.

Consider a non-illuminated night attack conducted by stealth. Unsuited for wire communication? Not so! Wire can be used to great advantage in this situation. Properly employed it will keep the commander rapidly informed of unit locations, it will keep radios nets free of casualty reports and equipment or ammunition resupply messages, and it will provide instant communication, even when enemy jamming efforts are successful. The problem, then, lies in "properly employed"—and here is how it works in a non-illuminated night attack.

Prior to moving from the company assembly area, each platoon is issued two donuts of wire (Wire dispenser, MX-306 A/G). This is sufficient wire to extend 1600 meters. (The actual amount of wire issued to each platoon is determined by the company communications chief. He receives guidance from the company commander on the distance each platoon will travel from the platoon release point to the objective. The company is authorized 18 dispensers.) If pack boards are available, the "donuts" are lashed to them. If not, they may be carried using an improvised handle tied to their "D" rings. The two donuts are spliced together and a telephone (TA-1/PT) is connected to the standing end of the wire. An adapter plug from the switchboard (SB-993/GT) is attached to the payout end to save time in completing the net later on. The TA-1 is the preferred telephone since it lights up to indicate incoming messages. (Everyone has heard of the unfortunate patrol leader whose EE-8 began ringing just as he was about to achieve tactical surprise or conduct a stealthy withdrawal.)

The company commander has two similar rigs and possibly a third man carrying two additional donuts of wire. The extra wire is needed since the "command group" will be laying wire from the company point of departure to the platoon release point and then on to the dominating terrain in the objective area. The donuts with the commander's wire are carried by the company armorer and by the wiremen from company headquarters.

Now that there are no authorized messengers in the rifle platoon headquarters, improvisation will be neces-

sary. Since the 81mm mortars won't displace until the objective is secured, one ammo bearer from each mortar squad could be used as the wireman. Alternatively, the assistant rocket gunner from the weapons squad might also be used.

With arrangements completed, the company moves out in a column of platoons. At the point of departure the communication chief connects the company commander's battle group line to the battle group wire line. (Note that the fullest application of this system requires battle group participation. However, even without a battle group wire line the system remains effective within the company.) The exact location of this connection is determined during a reconnaissance by the company communication chief and a representative of the battle group communication officer. The company executive officer and communication chief remain at this location until ordered forward. They also keep the payout end of the company wire and attach a TA-312/PT or TA-1/PT to it. The company commander's "command group" moves slightly to the flank of the column to keep his two wire lines, company and battle group, away from the marching troops. As the platoons move past their release point, the platoon member who is carrying the platoon leader's phone hands the wireman from company headquarters the payout end of each platoon's donut. (This end is previously connected to an adapter.) The wireman then interconnects the three platoon adapter plugs on the switchboard (SB-993/GT). After all three rifle platoons clear the platoon release point, the company commander's company wire is tied in. The company commander now has instant communication with his attacking platoons as they move forward, as well as with his executive officer to the rear. With this company wire net the commander can rapidly issue orders to offset any problem which might arise, such as one platoon's being delayed by an obstacle. The platoon leaders, in turn, are able to advise the commander quickly and quietly of their progress and observations.

When contact is made and there is no longer need for listening silence, the wire can still be used to advantage. Since call signs as well as radio security codes can be dispensed with, seconds are saved.

After the objective is seized, the normal reports can be given to the commander "in-the-clear" over the wire. They may even include the names of key personnel who have become casualties. With the rapid receipt of these "in-the-clear" messages, the commander can better reorganize and direct the resupply of his command. Once again, time is saved when it is critical.

Even before the platoons start digging in to defend what they have seized, the company wire net is operational without time loss or fatigue of communications personnel. The wireman at the platoon release point splices the platoon wires together with the commander's line, collects the components of his switchboard, and follows the commander's line to the new CP location.

In those night attacks with great distances to be covered, the TA-1 can be replaced with the TA-312. These battery-powered sets will give better communication than will the sound-powered sets over extended distances. The problem of the audible signal of the TA-312 is offset by a field expedient. An adapter plug from the SB-993 switchboard is connected to the binding posts on the TA-312 by short pieces of wire, and the volume of the audible signal is turned to "low." When an incoming message is received, the adapter plug will glow, alerting the man carrying the phone.

Consider another point. The executive officer is monitoring the messages between the company commander and the platoon leaders as well as those between all the company commanders and the S2/3 tent. He can relieve the commander of some of his reporting duties by tapping-in on the battle group wire line. He can also better estimate the ammunition resupply requirements and may even get the resupply started forward before it is requested. Should the company commander become a casualty, the executive officer is aware of the location of the attacking platoons, their situations, and the current tactical plan to include the last instructions issued by the commander. With this knowledge he can assume command with a minimum of time and confusion, and continue the mission. He too can follow the wire line to get into the proper location rapidly.

When the objective is secured and reorganization is completed, the commander can readily direct the displacement of his CP. Thus, with a minimum of effort, issued equipment has been made to play a full part. Telephones and wire which might otherwise have been gathering dust have helped smooth an operation.

Communication is, indeed, the "voice of command." Keep that voice loud and clear by using *all* your equipment to its fullest capability in *every* situation.

This article is in consonance with current doctrine as taught at the United States Army Infantry School.—Editor

CAPT JOHN C. EVANS served with the Marine Corps in the American and Asiatic-Pacific Theaters during World War II. He entered the US Army Reserve in April 1949 and received a reserve commission in November 1949. Captain Evans attended the 11th Airborne Division Jump School in 1954 and the Advanced Course in 1960. In Germany he served with the Military Police as a platoon leader, provost marshal, criminal investigations officer and operations officer, 481st Military Police Criminal Investigation Division, Mannheim. With the 11th Airborne Division he served as executive officer of the Military Police Company, as a company commander, battalion S3 and assistant battle group S3. At the present time Captain Evans is an Instructor with the Nuclear Weapons Committee, Special Subjects Department, USAIS.

THE SIEG RIVER INCIDENT



The fortunes of war sometimes demand that fateful decisions be made by men from the rear rank.

by MAJ THOMAS H. JONES

DECISIONS are made at all levels. Books have been written about the decision to invade Normandy in 1944, and volumes have also been written about the decision to drop the atomic bomb.

On the other hand, little has been said about the many decisions made at the lower echelons of command—at the so-called foxhole level. This is, of course, most unfortunate, since many of these foxhole decisions hold just as great a lesson for the student of military history as those on the strategic plane. A good case in point is the incident on the Sieg River, where a decision by an Army private first class took on great significance—at least to those who were involved in this true episode.

It was late in March 1945. The encirclement of German forces in the Ruhr by American troops neared completion. General Eisenhower's appeal for German surrender was disregarded, and forceful reduction of the pocket of resistance in the Ruhr became necessary. This promised to be a formidable task, for an estimated 150,000 German troops occupied the Ruhr area.

In preparing for the reduction of the Ruhr pocket, American forces needed information about German troop movements within the pocket. The collection plan of higher headquarters involved a series of patrols, each to reach a vantage point from which enemy road and rail traffic could be studied and reported.

This is the story of one of those patrols, sent out by an Infantry battalion, and of the decision that confronted the Pfc who led it.

The patrol's mission was to penetrate approximately six miles into enemy territory and reach a hill overlooking a major highway intersection. The pattern, intensity and nature of the traffic was to be noted and, radio range permitting, reported. Otherwise, the information would be delivered upon the patrol's return.

The schedule called for a movement of about four miles the first night, following which the patrol would hole up during the daylight hours. The second night the objective would be reached and the night traffic would be observed. Throughout

the second day, the traffic observation would be continued. On the third night, the patrol would return to friendly lines (expected to be somewhat closer at that time).

It was decided that a member of the battalion intelligence section would lead the patrol, since that section had considerable training and experience in patrolling. All four available members of the section volunteered, although one developed a suspiciously sudden hacking cough that caused the S2 to immediately disqualify him. The acting section leader, a Pfc, was ultimately selected to lead the patrol.

The other four patrol members were furnished by the reserve company. A requirement was that one of these four men speak German, and that another be experienced in operating the SCR 300 radio. The result was that a sergeant (German-speaking) and a corporal (radio-operator), plus two privates, were placed under the Pfc's command. However, the non-coms, upon volunteering, had accepted this situation.

The briefing for the patrol was conducted by the division G2 section using aerial photos projected on a large screen. German positions, possible approaches and obstacles were pointed out and discussed. The route finally selected by the Pfc led across the Sieg River where it formed a salient into American lines and was said to be lightly defended by the Germans. From there the route climbed to the high ground dominating the river valley; it then paralleled the river to a trail which could be followed to the objective area. A more direct return route was tentatively selected.

In addition to the radio, the patrol's equipment included a small boat to cross the Sieg, two "grease guns," two carbines, a pistol, a flashlight, knives and a garrotte. The men wore OD shirts and trousers, combat boots, field jackets and soft caps. They carried what food they could stuff into their pockets, principally D-ration chocolate bars. The Pfc carried the patrol's only map.

The patrol left at 2100 hours and carefully approached the river. Men from a forward rifle company followed with the boat. Upon reaching the river bank, the first three patrol members embarked and paddled silently across, covered by the men remaining on the near side. The boat was pulled back across the narrow river by a rope attached to the end and held by the other two patrol members. These two men then completed their crossing, and the boat was pulled back across and carried away by the rifle company men.

No enemy troops were encountered during the crossing. The patrol moved out in a diamond formation, the Pfc leading, along the route to the high ground. It was quite dark, with the cloud cover permitting only a faint glow in the sky. At one point, German voices in subdued conversation caused a deviation of the patrol route; at another point, faint lights were given a wide berth.

As the high ground was reached, the patrol swung left as planned. It was already behind the principal German positions pointed out in the briefing. The sergeant then whispered to the Pfc that their present course might skyline them to troops below, and the Pfc, agreeing, veered slightly downhill. The patrol's stealthy movement continued for several minutes when, very suddenly, and only a few yards ahead, a figure quickly darted toward a small bunker built into the side of the hill.

The figure was two or three steps down the dirt stairway of the bunker before the Pfc, leaping forward, was able to grasp his shoulder and yank him back onto the ground. Before the Pfc could draw his knife to kill, the German relaxed completely, said "Kamerad" and was a prisoner.

As the patrol closed in, the Pfc knew that he had a decision to make. What would he do with this man? And how would this affect his mission?

Interrogation of the German through the interpreter, and a brief reconnaissance by the two privates, revealed that the nearest enemy position was less than a hundred yards away. The German stated that he did not expect a relief that night, but that occasionally security patrols or wire teams passed his position. He added that since it was late (about 0200), there might not be any additional checks that night. He also stated that he was not required to make periodic reports from the telephone at his observation point.

The interrogation continued as the corporal and the two privates occupied local security positions.

The German revealed that he was an artillery observer, as was the neighboring German position a hundred yards away. Within the cramped bunker, by carefully shielded flashlight, the German pointed out on the Pfc's map the positions of the observation post and of his artillery battalion. He strongly expressed a desire to be taken captive and thus trade the danger of his present role in a war already lost for the relative security of an American prisoner of war camp.

Along with all of these factors, the Pfc considered the fact that the patrol had a mile or more to go before it reached the planned hideout area. He also knew that the area must be reached by 0400 to ensure time to find a suitable place to hide before daylight.

What to do? Whatever it was, it had to be done fast. Every moment in the present location was precarious. A visiting patrol, the neighboring German position, a phone call, a relief, an unexpected check by a wire team: any number of things might disclose the patrol's presence to the enemy.

Of course, he thought to himself, he could abandon his mission and take the prisoner back to American lines. But this went against the first duty of a soldier, and besides, forward area prisoners were a dime a dozen at this time. He could send the prisoner back with two of his men and continue the patrol mission

with the remainder; this was tempting, but there were severe disadvantages.

The Pfc felt that losing any of his patrol would seriously jeopardize his chances for successful accomplishment of the mission. What's more, it was doubtful that the men he sent back would be able to reach friendly lines before daylight. This course of action would also run the risk of having the prisoner escape. Guarded by only two men, in the dark, in a position where a shot could scarcely be risked, the chances of a prisoner's escape were good.

Then what about taking him along with the patrol? An awkward situation, with two full days and nights left to go, with every man's full attention necessary for security and observation, and with the ever-present possibility of the prisoner's attempting to escape or sounding the alarm. Also, he might, through clumsy fear or lack of understanding, give away the patrol.

How about leaving him in his position with a promise to see that he was later escorted to American lines? A terrific risk. The German could well be lying about his desire to remain a prisoner. Even if he were sincere at the moment, it seemed extremely doubtful that he would, upon release, deliberately violate his training and indoctrination and refrain from reporting the patrol in the hope that he would be led to safety. Also, he might soon realize that if the patrol were captured, and reported his dereliction of duty, things would go extremely hard for him.

Kill him? From the mission's standpoint, this was the best solution. There would be no danger of the German's talking as when left there alone. Likewise, there would be no danger of his giving away the patrol as when escorted forward or back, and there would be no need of splitting the patrol thereby greatly increasing the risk to both groups. If the body were hidden well enough, the Germans might think his absence was just another desertion, and they would not be alerted to the presence of the enemy in the area.

If the German were killed, the Pfc would, of course, have to do it. One quick knife thrust and it would be finished. But the German was a legitimate prisoner of war and, by the rules of warfare and of decency itself, he was entitled to the protection of his captors.

The Pfc, who had recently celebrated his 19th birthday, had not given much thought during his short life to the ethical course to follow in a clash between mission and morals. He considered it now, however.

The accomplishment of his mission might result in the saving of an appreciable number of American lives and might hasten victory. What, really, did the life of one German soldier weigh on the scale against accomplishment of such a goal? Could he reasonably spare the life of an enemy when that enemy's death might contribute toward the saving of many American lives?

On the other hand, when a man fights for certain principles, is he justified in disregarding those principles for the duration of the fight? All of these thoughts flashed through the Pfc's mind with a rapidity induced by the demands of the situation. It is doubtful that he considered consciously all of the factors mentioned. Nevertheless, the essence of the foregoing "estimate of the situation" guided the Pfc's decision, a decision formulated in a very few moments spent interrogating the German prisoner.

Initially frustrated by the complex and contradictory issues, the Pfc asked the American sergeant for his ideas. There was no help forthcoming, however. The decision was strictly up to him. A 19-year old Pfc had a decision to make which could conceivably affect the length of the war, a matter involving perhaps thousands of lives.

Finally, he made his decision. The German was told that the patrol would return that same night and that he would be picked up at that time and taken to the safety of American lines. He was further told that it was, of course, necessary to bind and gag him to ensure his good behavior pending the patrol's return. The Pfc hoped, somewhat forlornly, that the misinformation given the German might mislead the enemy as to the patrol's projected actions.

Upon leaving, the patrol cut the telephone wire and dragged it for several hundred yards. The Pfc felt that there was less danger in risking a wire crew's checking a break than in the German sergeant's freeing himself sufficiently to use the telephone. Hopefully, the Pfc also radioed the coordinates of the German bunkers back to the artillery battery shortly after his patrol cleared the area.

The patrol's movement to the hideout area was uneventful. The first rays of sunlight were beaming over the eastern horizon as the men took positions in a wooded area to spend the long day in anticipation of the night, at which time they would move again. Shortly after dawn, however, strong German patrols began searching the vicinity of the hideout. It was not long before the American patrol was found and taken prisoner. Even-

MAJ THOMAS H. JONES entered the Army in 1943 and served in Europe as an intelligence scout with the 78th Infantry Division. Since graduation from OCS in January 1946, Major Jones has served with the 1st Infantry Division in Europe, the 2d Armored Division in Texas and the 1st Cavalry Division. He has also had tours with G3 section of Army Field Forces, MAAG, to Saudi Arabia, and the Command and Staff Department of the Infantry School. Upon completion of Command and General Staff College in 1959, Major Jones was assigned to the Joint Brazil-United States Military Commission in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where he is presently serving.

tually, it was learned that the German had been discovered by his own troops. Unbound and released, he had immediately initiated a vigorous search for the patrol.

As the Pfc was later marched back toward friendly lines in a column of war prisoners, he realized that he had probably made the wrong decision. However, as the column passed the familiar area where the German bunkers had been, the Pfc was able to smile weakly at the sight of huge shell holes where once had been the German bunkers.

Although this was the end of this true incident, there seems to be more that could be said — and perhaps more that could be learned from this isolated, seemingly insignificant experience of fifteen years ago. Does it have any application today? I think it does.

In retrospect, it would seem that the Pfc made the wrong decision. But was there a "right" or a "wrong" decision? Perhaps not. The point is that a decision had to be made. In its own way, it was an important decision in its consequences. The question then arises, "Was the Pfc properly equipped to make that decision?" For that matter, are the other Pfc's and lower-ranking enlisted men in today's Army ready to assume the same kind of leadership if and when the time comes? Or is our training geared to that eventuality?

In many instances in the future, a key decision may again lie in the hands of a private or Pfc in the rear echelon. On a nuclear battlefield, this is more than a remote possibility. If the Pfc is the only survivor in a situation who is physically able to make a decision, the lives of many others may depend on how well he has been prepared for battlefield leadership.

The Army operates on the theory that leaders are made, not born. Leadership can, in part, be taught. To the extent that it can be taught, it *is* being taught to those whose normal position demands leadership. However, in view of the fact that any soldier may be called upon to exercise leadership (as it was exercised in this example), would it not be wise to teach and emphasize to *all* men the principles which we use as guidelines for leadership? Furthermore, would it not also be wise to give these men an opportunity to practice leadership and initiative in their daily duties and in tactical exercises? Or should we continue to limit our leadership training to NCOs and potential NCOs?

Even if the average private is never thrown into an abnormal situation requiring an important decision from him, an understanding of the principles of leadership—of the fact that it may sometimes be necessary to make difficult or unpopular decisions—will make him a better follower, and will help prepare him for the day when normal promotion demands that he assume leadership on the battlefield.

Violating the chain of command in establishing this patrol undoubtedly contributed to its failure, but perhaps more important was the apparent inability, or unwillingness, of the patrol leader to make sound and timely decisions. This article points out clearly the need for soldiers at all echelons to have that ability and willingness when functioning without specific orders. Such a characteristic can be of infinite value if and when our Army is confronted by a vastly larger enemy force whose soldiers depend heavily on detailed instructions from the highest authority.

In such a case, the ability of our soldiers—of all ranks—to make battlefield decisions can be the measure of our success.—*Ed.*

Answers to *Is It True?* page 7.

1. FALSE. Unless an ambulance has been formally reclassified by appropriate authorities, its use is restricted to transporting casualties, medical personnel, medical equipment and supplies. Covering the red crosses temporarily does not constitute reclassification.

2. TRUE. Both the arm brassard and weapon are authorized now for issue to field medical troops, but medical personnel must limit the use of their weapons to defending themselves and the casualties in their charge.

3. FALSE. No tactical convoy would be immune from attack because the commander decided to place ambulances with red cross markings in the middle of it. By the same token, protection for the ambulances would be lost under such an arrangement because they would be located too close to a legitimate military target.

4. TRUE. If the need arises, non-medical personnel who have received appropriate first aid training may be used as company aidmen or litter bearers and be entitled to the same protection of the Geneva Convention, providing the military authorities furnish each such person with a prescribed arm band and with papers which indicate his training, qualification, and the specific medical activity in which he shall engage.

5. FALSE. Medical personnel are armed only for the purpose of defending themselves and the casualties in their charge in time of war and therefore should not be used to guard non-medical activities, installations or supplies. Conversely, no Infantryman should be detailed as CQ of a medical dispensary just because he has had the benefit of first aid training.

6. TRUE. Only aircraft employed exclusively for medical purposes and which bear the prescribed markings shall not be subject to attack, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties to the conflict.

7. TRUE. The red cross marking does not allow medical ambulance helicopters to fly about a battle area at will. Routes are restricted and operation over enemy territory is generally avoided. Medical aircraft must obey every summons to land for inspection.

8. TRUE. Army Regulations prescribe that the design of the red cross overprint be stamped on the ID card of military medical personnel. The overprint conforms to the design specified in the present Convention.

9. FALSE. In place of the red cross emblem, certain Mohammedan countries, such as Turkey, use the red crescent, and Iran uses the red lion and sun on a background of white. All three are recognized by the Geneva Convention of 1949. Israel has reserved the right to use the red shield of David as the protective marking for medical units.

10. TRUE. The United States ratified the Geneva Convention on 2 February 1956 and the Soviet Union ratified it on 10 May 1954.

NIGHT TRAINING for the rifle company



In your unit, is night fighting a cliche or a capability?

by CAPT FERDINAND O. BARGER JR.

"Sufficient night training will be scheduled to achieve proficiency in night operations appropriate to the unit and its TOE mission."

That's what the Army Training Program says. But is it what your unit does?

One company commander asked himself that question recently, and came up with answers that may be of interest to all units. His was a fairly typical rifle company—let's call it Charlie Company. Stationed in Germany, it had experienced no major personnel changes for about eight months. The enlisted men's experience varied from eight months to four years, with an average of about eighteen months. The NCOs' service ranged from two to sixteen years, averaging about nine years. Almost sixty-five percent of the NCOs and fifteen per cent of the enlisted men had previous combat experience. It was much like hundreds of other rifle companies throughout the Army. But Charlie Company was different—it was to be put to the test.

To determine the night-fighting proficiency of his company, the Charlie Company Commander gave each of his platoons a night patrol mission. The patrol order was given at noon, allowing sufficient time for visual reconnaissance of the route. The terrain to be covered was generally level cultivated farmland, with a few low hedges and shallow ditches. The patrols' mission was route reconnaissance. The results?

Upon their return, the patrols could give little information about the ground they had covered. The men said that it had required all of their efforts to watch where they were going, leaving no time to observe the terrain. Patrol leaders reported difficulty in controlling their men. Observers along the route noted very loose formations and an excess of noise. All participants indicated that they felt ill at ease and strangely alone in the dark. Route reconnaissance was the mission—and the mission was *not* accomplished.

Recognizing these facts, the Charlie Company Commander decided to improve his unit's night-fighting capabilities. First, he decided to arrange for a series of night problems, one per week for six weeks. These problems were designed to increase in difficulty from the simple to the complex. For example, the first problem was an approach march over easily traversed, open, flat terrain. The sixth and last problem of the sequence, on the other hand, was a reconnaissance patrol through heavily wooded, marshy ter-

rain interspersed with numerous natural obstacles. Following each of the six problems, a critique was held to analyze critically the actions of each patrol.

The critique of the very first problem revealed that the men had encountered the same difficulties as on their earlier trial patrol. There was still excessive noise. Patrol leaders still had difficulty in controlling their men. However, the men did report that they were not as uneasy moving in darkness as on the earlier mission. Still, the results were not satisfactory.

To enhance the value of the patrols, the commander of Charlie Company instituted a one-hour class per week on the topic of night fighting techniques. The class served a threefold purpose: it prepared the men better for the practical work of the patrols which followed; it tied together things learned from previous patrols; and it answered unresolved questions on night fighting techniques of concern to the men. The result of this training program was a remarkably uniform, undeniable progress of all of the men in the company. By the sixth week, the men were ready for their most difficult mission.

Problem number six was given extensive planning. The ground to be covered by the patrols was walked in daylight and in darkness by the company commander. The terrain included a small hill with heavy underbrush, a marsh, and four canals varying in width from three to fifteen feet. The only extra equipment permitted was a grappling hook with 100 feet of nylon climbing rope. It was a rugged and challenging exercise designed to put to the test all that the men had learned during the previous five weeks.

At the critique following this patrol, results quite different from those of the first patrol were revealed. The men no longer felt strange or alone at night. They reported that there was really little difference between moving in daylight and darkness once they had become accustomed to the darkness. Obstacles no longer confused the men. They felt no apprehension when told of impending night action. Most important of all, the men had accomplished their mission and accomplished it well. The company could feel proud of what it had done. But could it rest on its laurels?

Charlie Company's Commander did not train his unit further at night for a month. Then he sent out a reconnaissance patrol similar to the one which had been so successful a month earlier. The results were eye-opening. A mere four weeks without practice had markedly decreased the unit's night fighting proficiency. The commander estimated that the men were forty per cent less effective than when they were at the peak of their training a month before.

Aside from this loss in efficiency, the men also felt some uneasiness about operating in the dark. Adding it up, what does this all indicate? For one thing, it seems to indicate that continual familiarity with night operations is necessary in order to put the men at ease. Without feeling at ease, the men cannot operate efficiently at night. *With* ease and confidence, however, they can concentrate on the techniques which help the unit accomplish its mission.

And what about those techniques? Certainly they are important, too. Night fighting is improved by practicing the *right* techniques. This implies two things: first, the men must *know* the right techniques in order to practice them; and second, the men must have the opportunity to put their knowledge into practice. It logically follows from this that little can be accomplished without spending considerable time (scheduled) on movement at night and night fighting

A unit's ability to move at night—by any means—can only be achieved by experience and training.

CAPT FERDINAND O. BARGER JR., graduated from OCS in 1951. After serving as an Infantry platoon leader and company executive officer at Fort Jackson, he performed the same duties and was also a battalion S2 with the 17th Infantry in Korea. Subsequently, he was operations officer and public information officer with the Seattle, Washington, recruiting service and regimental S2, missile command liaison officer and company commander with SETAF, Italy. He is a graduate of the Advanced Course and is presently assigned to the ROTC Instructor Group, North Dakota Agricultural College, Fargo, North Dakota.

Charlie Company's simple, progressive training program prepared the unit for even the most difficult night missions.

techniques.

Thus, until the general ideas of Department of the Army Training Programs become concrete realities to the lowest man in the squad, training programs remain just words. To make these words meaningful to the men in the ranks, a unit commander might well profit from the experience of Charlie Company. Weekly scheduled classes and critiques undeniably help to teach the men the correct techniques of night fighting. But there must also be command recognition (and emphasis) on fighting at night. Lip service won't do it.

Here again we come to the words of the Army Training Program: "Sufficient night training will be scheduled to achieve proficiency. . . ." As you look at your training schedule, remember the importance of putting these words into practice. Remember also that our potential enemies do not sleep. As our experience in Korea demonstrated, the Chinese Communists are skilled in night fighting. And during World War II, the Russians used night warfare with great success against the Germans.

We must be equally well prepared to fight at any time, day or night. We must make darkness an ally, not an enemy. Otherwise, ironically, there may well descend upon us what Winston Churchill aptly called "the long night of barbarism, unbroken even by a star of hope."

(Continued from page 3)

RSVP

● . . . I have one question on Infantry technique . . . In the Offensive Tactics Advance Sheet, *Platoon & Squads—Rifle Company*, Ft. Benning, Ga. 4 Dec 59, Appendix III, Combat Formations, Figures 24, 25, 26 show that the Alfa or Bravo team leaders, whatever the case may be, are acting as point men or leading men in the combat formations: Squad column with fire teams in column, variation of squad column with fire teams in column, modification of squad column with fire teams in column. . . .

In my opinion, the team leaders are not in the best *basic* position that they should be within these formations, for the following reasons:

1. The purpose of the team leader, basically, is to assist the squad leader in control of the squad and in control of the team leader's own team.

2. The team leader positioned as a point or lead man is in a very dangerous position. He is open to the first enemy fire and probably will be a casualty if the squad is hit by the enemy. If this is the case, one of the teams is out a team leader and the squad leader is out an assistant for control as soon as the enemy hits the squad. This team leader is an invaluable man to the squad leader . . . why sacrifice him so early in an action? . . . If the team leader becomes a casualty at some other time during the action, at least the squad leader will initially have his team leader for control purposes at the beginning of the action. . . .

SFC Thomas Pawluk
220-09 92nd Ave.
Queens Village, N. Y.

The following answer has been received from the Ranger Department and the Command and Staff Department, USAIS. —Ed.

The fire team leader does not *assist the squad leader in controlling the squad in the same sense as did the outdated assistant squad leader. The fire team leader is a fighter-leader. He initiates the squad leader's orders by setting the example and by positive aggressive action.*

In the diagrams depicting the squad combat formations, the fire team leader is shown as being in a position where all the men in his fire team can easily see and follow his example. It must also be remembered that no man's position within a combat formation is permanently fixed. The positions shown in the diagrams are only guides and the individual positions may be altered to fit the changing terrain and situation. Thus, while some of the diagrams show the fire team leader at the head of the fire team, he may be positioned anywhere *within the fire team where he can best control the fire team.*

Subscription Costs Rise on 1 January 1961.

(See page 25)

FALLOUT PREDICTION

The Army's New System.

by CAPT HENRY R. SHELTON

THE USE of nuclear weapons has presented commanders with an opportunity to use hitherto undreamed of firepower. It has also presented them with a problem, fallout, which accompanies every surface nuclear burst.

As a result, the tactical commander who plans to use a surface burst nuclear weapon, or who finds that his command has been attacked by a surface burst, must know the answers to the following vital questions:

- In what direction from ground zero will fallout occur?
- Over what area will fallout occur?
- When will fallout arrive in this area?
- What intensities or total dose can be expected?

Ideally all of these questions should be answered by a prediction system.

Therefore, let's examine each of the systems that have been used by the Army up to this time to see how each one fares in answering the preceding questions. The first system used by the Army was the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) System. This system, based on a fission yield, height of burst, and an effective (average) wind speed and direction, produced a so-called "idealized" pattern. This pattern gave dose rate prediction lines (contours) normalized to one hour after detonation, and gave the expected time of arrival (in hours) after detonation. Because this system did not compensate for wind variations and changes, the actual pattern, as determined by survey, would often fall a considerable distance outside of the predicted area.

The second system was outlined by TC 101-1, *Prediction of Fallout and Radiological Monitoring and Survey,* December 1958 (hereafter referred to as the Old Army System). By this system there was developed an "envelope" area that should contain all militarily significant fallout resulting from a given nuclear detonation. Wind variations and changes were compensated for in this system. However, the resulting "envelope" covered such a large area, a great deal of which would receive no fallout, that the system was deemed impractical.

Recently, the Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, has devised a new system of fallout prediction which incorporates the best features of the two previous systems, and also has added some improvements. This system has been adopted for future Army use, is presently being taught at the United States Army Infantry School, and henceforth will be referred to as the New Army System. Change 2 to TC 101-1 (14 June 60) describes it in detail.

A comparison of the three systems, using a 20 KT surface burst prediction from each system, under the same theoretical wind conditions, appears in Figure 1.

First, note the envelope of the Old Army System, with a length of 80 miles and an area of possible fallout of some 1100 square miles.

The AFSWP System shows the area of prediction for 100 r/hr at H + 1 and higher intensities. Note that this pattern is 11 miles long and covers an area of less than 20 square miles.

The New Army System is a compromise between the two old systems. Zone I delineates the area of primary hazard called the *Zone of Immediate Operational Concern.* This is defined as a zone within which there will be areas where *exposed, unprotected* personnel may receive casualty-producing doses (greater than 100 roentgens) in relatively short periods of time (less than four hours after arrival of fallout). Thus, major disruption of unit operations and major casualties among personnel may occur within portions of this zone. The actual areas of major disruption are expected to be smaller than the area



Figure 1

of Zone I, although their exact locations are not predicted. Note that this zone is about 13 miles long and covers an area of approximately 50 square miles.

Zone II delineates an area of secondary hazard called the *Zone of Moderate Risk* This is defined as a zone within which exposed, unprotected personnel are *not* expected to receive a total dose of more than 100 roentgens even though they remain in the zone four hours after actual onset of fallout. This is the maximum dose anticipated in this period of time; however, only a small percentage of exposed troops are expected to receive this dose. Personnel previously *unexposed* may be permitted to continue *critical missions* for as long as four hours after actual onset of fallout without incurring casualty-producing doses. However, if personnel in this zone have received significant previous radiation doses, serious disruption of unit missions and serious casualty-producing doses may be expected.

Outside these two zones, exposed, unprotected personnel are predicted to receive a total dose that is not in excess of 20 roentgens in the first six hours after actual onset of fallout. The total dose for an indefinite stay outside Zones I and II should not exceed 150 roentgens. Therefore, outside of these zones no serious disruption of military operations is predicted to occur for personnel previously unexposed to nuclear radiation. Appreciable previous exposure will require individual consideration. In either case, routine radiological defense measures, to include periodic monitoring, will normally provide adequate protection.

The predicted zones for fallout are usually considerably larger than the actual area of the ground covered by this fallout. These zones represent areas of hazard, somewhere within which, it is predicted, fallout will be found. Because of uncertainties of weather and nuclear burst data, precise locations of fallout cannot be reliably predicted, but must be ascer-



Figure 2

tained by monitoring and surveying after fallout has settled. The two zones, therefore, have been developed so that there is a reasonably high assurance that the expected fallout *will not occur outside* them. They represent an expected hazard area which can be predicted immediately after a nuclear explosion.

The lines enclosing Zones I and II are not to be construed as absolute boundaries for the location of fallout. It is emphasized that as one approaches these predicted zones from the outside, the likelihood of encountering hazardous fallout will increase, and the dose rates encountered will gradually increase.

To understand the fallout prediction process, recent changes in doctrine should be considered. At division level, the Radiological Center (RADC) has been changed to Chemical, Biological, Radiological Center (CBRC). At higher echelons, it is the CBR Element, or CBRE. The Chemical Officer who supervises the CBRC is assigned the responsibility for fallout predictions for both enemy and friendly detonations. The duties of the CBRC are complex and will not be covered here. However, we will discuss information disseminated to subordinate units and see how fallout prediction can be made by units smaller than division.

For direct use by battle groups and company-size units, a supplemental method, consisting of a simplified system, has been devised. The simplified system employs the Radiological Fallout Predictor, Department of Army GTA 3-30(Figure 2). Basis for issue will be one GTA per TC 101-1.

The fallout predictor is a transparent device which outlines the two zones of hazard for five preselected yield groups. The fallout predictor consists of four major parts—

(1) An azimuth dial for orientation.

(2) Cloud radius lines showing the area of contamination around ground zero for the indicated yields.

(3) A map scale calibrated in miles along two radial lines extending out from GZ.

(4) A nomogram (Figure 3) for determining the downwind distances of Zones I & II, having three scales:

(a) The left-hand scales is an "index scale" which is used when the yield, cloud-top height, cloud-bottom height or cloud radius is known. The cloud top and bottom values are listed on the nomograms in thousands of feet (X 10^3 ft).

(b) The right-hand scale is the "effective wind speed scale."

(c) The center scale is the "downwind distance scale."

Use of the fallout predictor requires knowledge of the effective wind speed and direction. This information is prepared by the CBRE of each major command and is transmitted as far as company level each time new wind data are received. Since the effective wind speeds and directions vary with weapon yield, five wind speeds and directions are transmitted, corresponding to the five pre-selected yield groups.

The format for the Effective Wind Message will be a series of 6- and 5-digit groups, preceded by the phrase "Effective Wind Message." Following is an explanation of the message.

Effective	Wind Message	
Zulu	DDtttt	D—Date
Alfa	dddss	t—Time
Bravo	dddss	d—Wind Direction
Charlie	dddss	s—Wind Speed
Delta	dddss	
Echo	dddss	

"Zulu DDtttt" is the date and time (Greenwich Civil Time) at which the winds were measured; Alfa is for yields of 2 KT or less; Bravo for yields in the range of 2 + to 5 KT; Charlie for yields in the range of 5 + to 30 KT; Delta for yields in the range of 30 + to 100 KT; Echo for



Figure 3

yields in the range of 100 + to 300 KT; "ddd" is the effective wind direction in degrees; "ss" is the effective wind speed in miles per hour.

A sample message might read: "Zulu 220600, Charlie 33618." Translated, this means detonation occurred on the 22d at 0600. The yield, Charlie, is between 5 + and 30 KT. The effective wind direction is *toward* 336 degrees; the effective wind speed is 18 miles per hour.

The downwind extent of the Zone of Immediate Operational Concern (Zone I) is determined from the nomogram on the fallout predictor (Figure 3). Connect the value of the effective wind speed (18) on the right hand scale by a straight line to a point on the index line of the left hand scale representing the yield (5 + to 30 KT). If actual yield is not transmitted in additional messages, the largest yield grouping is used. The value of the downwind distance of Zone I, in miles, may be read at the point of intersection of the straight line and the center scale as 15 miles. The downwind distance of Zone II is twice that of Zone I. An arc is struck on the radial line at 15 miles to reflect the downwind extent of Zone I. The area included by the "C" contour line and the arc constitutes Zone I.

Next, place the fallout predictor ground zero cross over the actual (or assumed for planning) GZ on the map and rotate the entire fallout predictor until the effective wind direction of interest (336 degrees) on the azimuth dial is pointing toward grid north. The predicted zones of hazardous fallout contamination for the yield under consideration consist of the areas enclosed by the two downwind areas and by the yield group contour lines.

This supplemental method gives each company-size unit the capability of making an almost immediate fallout prediction once a yield and GZ have been estimated, even though contact with higher headquarters may be temporarily lost. With units dispersed over large areas and performing independent missions, this prediction capability, coupled with unit monitoring, is a valuable aid to the commander's decision-making process.

We must realize that the simplified method was designed primarily for immediate predictions. Because of the need for speed, some accuracy has been sacrificed. For example, we are using yield *groups* instead of actual yield, and the input data as far as yield is concerned will primarily be estimates based on cloud size.

The primary method, or detailed fallout prediction, overcomes most of the deficiencies found in the simplified method. However, this detailed method requires much more preparation and consequently much more time, since actual yield and latest wind data are considered and the end product is thus more accurate. The result of this prediction, prepared by the CBRC/CBRE, will be forwarded to subordinate units in the form of a Fallout Prediction Message. The format will be a series of 6 and 7 digit groups.

For example, let us assume that a surface burst nuclear weapon had been detonated within the 10th Infantry Division areas. As S3, 1st BG, 87th Inf, you receive the following message from the division CBRC:

Fallout Prediction Message	
Zulu	240700
Foxtrot	340670
Golf	072112
Hotel	1201803

To plot the fallout area, it is best to follow a step-by-step procedure (Figure 4).

Note the Zulu line giving the date/time group.

Step 1: Locate ground zero at six digit coordinate shown in line Foxtrot.

Step 2: Draw the left and right radial lines beginning at ground zero. The first three digits from line Golf are the azimuth of the left radial line. The last three digits are the azimuth of the right radial line.

Step 3: Draw a circle around ground zero to represent the radius of the cloud (last two digits of line Hotel). Draw two tangents to this circle, parallel the bi-sector of the angle included between the two radial lines drawn in Step 3. These tangents will extend from the circle to the radial lines as shown in Figure 4.

Step 4: Draw in Zone I by striking an arc, between the two radial lines, equal to the distance shown in the three center digits of line Hotel. Double this distance for Zone II.

Step 5: Draw time-of-arrival arcs downwind at distances equal to the effective wind speed (first two digits of line Hotel) multiplied by the hour of interest. (H + 1, H + 2, H + 3,



Figure 4

etc.)

This completes the detailed prediction.

If the entire BG is located outside the predicted area, the S3 can assure the commander that the mission of the battle group will not be affected by this detonation. However, periodic monitoring in those areas closest to the predicted pattern must be continued. On the other hand, if a portion of the BG falls within Zone I or Zone II, an immediate evaluation must be made to determine which is the best course of action based on the mission, protection which troops either have or can obtain prior to arrival of fallout, transportation, and time and space factors.

These methods of fallout prediction are not infallible, nor do they meet all the needs of the Army. However, they are a great improvement over older systems, and will be used as standard methods until a prediction system which meets all the Army's needs is developed. In the meantime, commanders owe it to themselves and their men to learn all they can about the habits of this dangerous and deadly potential enemy, nuclear fallout.

CAPT HENRY R. SHELTON was commissioned upon graduation from Virginia Polytechnic Institute in 1951. He then served with the 101st Airborne Division until 1954. Subsequently he served as a battalion advisor and honor guard platoon leader with the Korean Military Advisory Group. In 1956 he was assigned as a battalion S3 in the 3d Infantry Division, and later became an instructor in platoon tactics at the Infantry School. Upon completion of the Advanced Course in 1958, Captain Shelton was assigned as an instructor in nuclear weapons employment in the Special Subjects Department, USAIS. He is currently serving as an ROTC instructor at Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.

This article is in consonance with current doctrine as taught at the United States Army Infantry School.—Editor.

Subscription Costs Rise on 1 January 1961

As it inevitably must to all things, the cost of living has caught up with us and forces upon us a distasteful decision. We must raise the subscription prices for **Infantry,** for the first time, we hasten to add, in many years when you consider per-copy cost. We are supported solely by your subscriptions and have little recourse in view of a new printing contract which starts with the next issue. We have barely "broken even" in the past year and a half, and have figured that the only way now to retain and improve upon our quality will be to increase the one-year subscription by 50c. The other subscriptions also go up, but on a sliding scale which makes the per-copy cost less. We still cost less than most other Branch and Service magazines!

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INFANTRY AROUND THE WORLD

CONUS

2d Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division

The "Rakkasans" are a tough outfit, but they'd have to be, for it is possible that even before this article is printed, the 2d Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, will be somewhere in this world fighting a war in the struggle to preserve freedom. This is STRAC, ready on a moment's notice to move anywhere in the world. This is Infantry, ready to fight *now*.

The 187th had its inception at Camp Mackall, N. C., in 1942, when it was designated the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment, a unit of the 11th Airborne Division. It did not have a long wait for its first "rendezvous with destiny," for in 1944 the 11th relieved the 7th Infantry Division on Leyte, and accounted for itself well by destroying two enemy divisions and splitting open the lines of the defending Japanese. There followed, in what seemed short order, a series of battles on Luzon where the 187th contributed to the liberation of Manila, and then entry into Japan with the first U. S. units to arrive for occupation duty. In 1949, the unit returned to Camp (now Fort) Campbell, Ky., for duty.

When the Korean conflict began, and a need was realized for an airborne unit in the Far East, the 187th was selected to go. It was reorganized as an airborne regimental combat team and air-lifted to the still-burning Kimpo airfield near Seoul, from which point it entered immediately into the Inchon Campaign.

Later, after extensive anti-guerrilla activities, the 187th was grouped to prepare for the first airborne assault of the war. Troopers were dropped into the Sukchon-Sunchon area, where they quickly consolidated their positions, and closed a trap on the enemy. During this action and the subsequent ground link-up, uncounted thousands of communists were killed and some 28,000 were captured. The Third Battalion received the Distinguished Unit Citation for the action.

Following a violent engagement at Wonju, an airborne assault was made at Munsan-ni in March 1951, after which the 187th was sent to Kyushu. It was during its Korean fighting that the regiment acquired its nickname "Rakkasans," which means in Japanese "man falling from sky with umbrella." The regiment also developed its present motto, "All the Way."

In 1955 the unit was garrisoned at Fort Bragg until called upon to help cadre the newly-activated 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, whereupon the regiment became the 2d Battle Group, 187th Infantry, and found its present home. Since that time it has engaged in many exercises and extensive training.

In March 1960, the battle group moved by strategic airlift to Puerto Rico during the joint exercise "Big Slam Puerto Pine." Two weeks later it parachuted and heavy dropped into Camp Breckenridge, Kentucky, at the start of the 101st Division exercise "Quick Strike." This was a rugged exercise over rugged terrain, and utilized 100% air lines of communication.

Next came a routine two-week tour as the Division Alert Force, when the battle group has the mis-

187th troopers rig ¾-tons for heavy drop during Exercise Bright Star/Pine Cone III.

Ready to go!

sion to move on a moment's notice anywhere in the world to fight. It's a demanding task to turn in your automobile, live out of a duffel bag, and be ready to load into aircraft in less than an hour's time, but the tense world situation makes this a mission of vital importance.

After Armed Forces Day demonstrations in several parts of the country, Army Training Tests, award of the USCONARC Superior STRAC Unit Award, and a company air-mobility exercise, the 187th was ready for the joint STRAC-Air Force exercise "Bright Star/Pine Cone III."

The battle group was deployed by strategic airlift to its marshalling area in South Carolina. Here followed a busy period of briefings, rigging equipment for heavy drop, and other preparations for the airborne assault. On "D-Day," 20 August, more than 100 C-119 and C-130 aircraft dropped the battle group and its equipment into an airhead at Camp Mackall. In all, more than 11,000 members of the 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions jumped in this exercise. After a three-day tactical ground exercise, during which the entire battle group was moved by helicopter, the 187th returned to Fort Campbell and normal field training.

Time is not confined to combat training, however. The "Rakkasan" athletic teams are good teams and are well supported by the battle group. In the past year in post competition, 187th teams have been post champions in the open and novice classes in boxing, and runners up in baseball, basketball, swimming and track. When the Army Champion "Screaming Eagles" take to the football field, more "Rakkasans" are on the team than are members from any other post unit.

Soldiering in this outfit is not a soft life in any sense of the word, but there are many compensations. A soldier walks tall when he wears the patch of the "Screaming Eagle" and the regimental crests of the 187th.

"All the Way" is more than a motto: it is a way of life.

Above, camouflaged Rakkasans participate in a platoon ATT, double-timing to their assembly point. Below, "moving out" is a familiar scene to the Rakkasans, with yearly training calendars being dotted with frequent air mobility exercises and parachute assaults.

To be effective, a company's reorganization

REORGANIZATION

THIN GRAY wisps of smoke eddied across the slopes of Hill 408. The acrid scent of powder and the pungent odor of phosphorous mingled with the fresh smell of the newly churned earth on this shell-torn hill, where the bodies of the dead lay in grotesque attitudes. The thunder of artillery and the rattle of small arms fire, which only minutes ago had created an inferno around the men on Hill 408, now seemed remote as the battle lumbered off somewhere in the distance. Temporarily, all seemed quiet, peaceful, orderly.

But in the distraught mind of Captain Joseph Grayson, ideas, observations, plans and fears churned in chaotic disarray. Sweat burned his eyes and ran dripping off his chin as he pulled off his helmet and sank into one of the many shell holes which pockmarked the face of Hill 408. Behind him, his radio operators and artillery forward observer melted thankfully into the earth. His company had taken its objective, all right. Now there would be a pause in the fighting and a chance to recoup and reorganize.

But Captain Grayson well knew that his respite would be brief. Shortly, the enemy would counterattack. He knew that they placed a high value on Hill 408, which had already changed hands three times in bitter fighting. Captain Grayson did not know how much time there would be before the enemy counterattacked; an attack could come within the half hour, or it might come the next day. Whenever it came, he had to be ready to hold the hill and prevent another costly offensive.

plan must be simple and flexible

by CAPT THOMAS S. MCLEAN

"Harper!" the Captain barked at one of his two radio operators. "Have you got the Battle Group CP yet? No? Well, damn it, keep trying and when you get through, tell them we're here and I'll give them more later. Got that? Get with it, then, and let me know as soon as you get through."

Fumbling for a cigarette, Grayson shouted back to his other operator: "MacGruder! Anything from the platoons yet?"

"No, sir, nothing since the first platoon reported capturing that knob down toward the center."

"OK, try to contact all of the platoons right now and find out what's up. Oh, did the exec get the message to move up? He did? Good. Get those platoons now. Hey! FO! Bill, get the hell up here!"

As Captain Grayson tried to make his lighter work, Lieutenant Tindall, the artillery forward observer, scrambled over and dropped into the hole.

"Bill, can you contact our fire support coordinator on that 'Mickey Mouse' radio of yours?"

"Yes, sir."

"Well, tell them that we have our objective. I can't seem to get through on my own radio. When you've done that, get back here and we'll start planning some concentrations in case of a counterattack."

At that point MacGruder spoke up: "Sir, I've got all the platoons now."

"Good," said the Captain, reaching for the head set. "Sierra six, this is Sierra one. Give me your report."

As he listened in turn to the reports of his platoons, Grayson's look of troubled anxiety deepened. Both the first and second platoons had occupied positions on the same small knob of the hill. Meanwhile, a ridge running off to the right had been left unprotected. The 106s were in the wrong place. Everywhere there seemed to be confusion and chaos.

Lieutenant Tindall slid back into the shell hole as the Captain finished his radio conversations.

"Bill, I'll be damned if I know how three perfectly good platoon leaders can get so screwed up when they take a hill, but these three manage to do it every time. Peters and Jackson were in their areas, but Burton moved his platoon right into Jackson's position on that knob at the center. He said it looked like the best terrain to defend so he grabbed it. Can you imagine that? Well, now he's moving over to guard that ridge off to the right. Jackson says the recoilless rifles wound up in his area too. Any fool can see from the map that the armor territory is on the left and that no tanks are going to go barreling up that knob. I've sent the 106s over to Peters on the left. They're moving now. I just hope they get there before things start popping."

But at that moment, ironically, things "started popping." A series of soft white clouds billowed up suddenly on the slope behind Grayson's CP, immediately followed by the fountains of large caliber phosphorous rounds.

"Here it comes," he muttered, and the torn and battered slopes of Hill 408 were once again rocked and shaken by the enemy's assault.

As the fighting progressed, a frantic radio message from the first platoon, holding the knob at the center, reported "They're coming, sir! We can see them on that ridge to the right—the one you told the second platoon to occupy. They're thick as flies. They'll be behind us in a minute. Request fire support in that sector!"

Then, from the platoon on the left came more bad news: "They have at least six tanks out there about 500 yards away. They're pounding us to pieces. Where are the 106s?"

The staccato of enemy small arms fire, the pounding of his artillery and mortars, and the raking fire of the long range direct fire weapons continued to take a heavy toll. In addition, many friendly fire missions, called, unfortunately, without a thorough knowledge of each platoon's position, were mingling with enemy fire in forward areas with devastating effect.

Meanwhile, there was no report from the ill-fated second platoon, which had been caught on an open slope while moving to its assigned position on the ridge to the

REORGANIZATION

right—and there would be no report. The platoon had been all but anihilated by the rain of jagged mortar fragments that blanketed the exposed slopes like swarms of angry bees.

In less than a dozen minutes, it was all over . . . the enemy once again held Hill 408.

To any combat veteran, the need for at least a simple reorganization plan is plain common sense. However, it often seems to be a waste of time to those whose only "combat experience" consists of a few closely controlled field exercises in which there is always plenty of time after seizing the objective to issue fragmentary orders, unhampered by the confusion and the devastating fire which, in actual combat, often makes movement, other than crawling, grounds for posthumous decoration. The difficulty in control that exists during the first few minutes following the seizure of an objective is the product of many factors. The loss of communications equipment, the loss of key leaders and weapons, the separation of squads and sections from their platoons, and the difficulty in organizing terrain seen for the first time all combine to make reorganization a difficult matter, even with a good plan which is known to all.

In reorganization of a unit upon the objective, strong, aggressive command leadership is, of course, important. However, a rifle company, under present doctrine, will be so widely dispersed over the terrain that distance alone will normally preclude a commander's visiting more than one or two of his elements prior to an enemy counterattack. This fact, plus the danger from incoming artillery fire to anyone above ground, makes the personal efforts of the commander to reorganize his troops only a partial solution. For the same reasons, runners are of limited use at this time. It becomes obvious, therefore, that *platoon leaders, squad leaders and key weapons personnel must know, prior to arrival on the objective, where they are to go and what they are to do.* This calls for a plan of reorganization.

To be effective, a rifle company's reorganization plan must be simple and flexible—simple to avoid misunderstanding, flexible to allow for changing conditions. It should, however, include the following elements as a minimum:

- Position areas for rifle platoons (the clock system is a good method of covering this).
- General areas for major crew-served weapons and attachments.
- Designation and location of units responsible for company security.
- A fire plan that supports the hasty support scheme by blocking likely approaches to the position.
- Tentative location of company installations.

Although many other details, such as the use of guides and special signals, all add greatly to the speed of reorganization, they should be a part of the unit SOP, and should not be included in plans for reorganization of each new position taken. The SOP may cover many points concerning reorganization, or the matter may be contained in a few words added to the attack order. The degree of detail in the prior plans depends upon the personality of the company commander and the experience and reactions of his junior leaders. The important thing is that there be a simple, flexible plan for reorganization of the company on the objective, for in combat even the most successful and faultlessly executed attack is wasted effort if a unit is not prepared to hold the ground that has been gained.

Even the most gallant efforts to hold an objective may be misdirected and confused if there has been no prior planning for reorganization of attacking forces into defensive positions. It would be well, therefore, if more emphasis were placed in our various tactical training exercises on the planning necessary to assure successful reorganization of a unit, even in a short time, even under the stress of combat. While a reorganization plan will not guarantee success, the lack of one almost guarantees defeat.

Thin gray wisps of smoke linger on the slopes of Hill 408. The acrid scent of powder and the pungent odor of phosphorus mingles with the fresh smell of the newly churned earth on this shell-torn hill, where the bodies of the dead lie in grotesque attitudes. An enemy soldier walks near the former command post of Captain Joseph Grayson. He passes on, unseen by the sunken, glazed eyes of the late Captain Grayson—a good soldier who did not plan.

CAPT THOMAS S. MCLEAN entered the Army in 1948 and received an OCS commission in 1951. He has attended the Associate Company Officers Refresher Course, the Airborne and the Advanced Courses. In Korea he served with the 27th Infantry as a platoon leader, a company commander and a battalion S2. Among his varied assignments have been service as an instructor with MAAG in Ethiopia, as a company commander with the 502d Airborne Infantry, and as adjutant and battle group S3 with the 1st Battle Group, 21st Infantry. At the present time Captain McLean is assigned to the Operations and Plans Section, The Infantry Center, Fort Benning.

INFANTRY FORUM

GRASS ROOTS TRAINING

Let's put training where it belongs—

in the hands of our squad leaders.

by 1ST LT WALLEN M. SUMMERS

"SIR, Lieutenant James, OIC Preliminary Marksmanship Committee, reports to the Inspecting Officer."—and with great dash and precision the first part of another training ritual began.

The Inspecting Officer took the visitors' folder from the Officer in Charge, glanced briefly through the pages of lesson plans, diagrams and reference memoranda and then turned his attention to the instruction in progress. Neat lines of aiming stakes were ranked around the well-rehearsed, crisp-khaki-clad instructor. AIs snapped brightly painted pointers at six-foot diagrams silk-screened in three colors, and yards of engineer tape marked break areas, parking areas and the route to the latrine. Under a nearby tree, cans of coffee were laid out in preparation for the next break. Along the lines of aiming stakes, five hundred young riflemen obediently went through the motions of marksmanship training. The setup would have done credit to the Infantry School, to say nothing of a line unit conducting its pre-range season training.

Superior instruction being conducted in a superior manner—or is it? Just how much are these riflemen learning? Learning, to a great extent, is a function of individual motivation, and individual motivation is geared to group attitudes and the nature of supervision given. With this in mind can we reasonably expect that our five hundred riflemen are achieving a significant improvement in their proficiency as marksmen? What is more, are training resources, man-hours, material and individual abilities being utilized with maximum efficiency?

In spite of the obvious investment in "eyewash," are there any positive benefits being gained other than a superior rating on the inspection report? There *must* be a better way.

Before going any farther, let's outline the scope of this discussion by making a few assumptions. First, what we have to say applies primarily to the line combat unit. Second, service schools, training commands and logistical and administrative sections are not considered. Further, we must recognize that although this discussion speaks of training in general, the nature of the specific subjects in a training program must be considered in determining the level at which maximum training efficiency will be achieved. Finally, and most important, let us assume that the measure of good training is the extent to which that training increases the unit's ability to perform its mission.

Granted, there are certain advantages to be gained by conducting

training at company or battle group level. The higher the level at which instruction is given, the greater will be the uniformity attained. Company or battle group level training affords economy of principle instructors for particularly complicated or technical subjects. When training is conducted at battle group level, especially, "fancier" formal instruction with more of the niceties is possible than when training is conducted at the grass roots, or squad, level.

On the other hand, training conducted at the squad level by the squad leader has its own advantages. If we assume the unusual case in which there is a full TOE rifle squad turned out for training, there would then be ten men for the squad leader to instruct—a small number of students for one principle instructor. Of these men, two are the fire team leaders who should be almost as proficient as the squad leader and who could well serve as assistant instructors. Of the remaining eight men, it will usually be found that only one or two experience great difficulty with any particular subject. The remainder will be distributed along the proficiency scale from barely adequate to expert. Thus, within the squad, there will be three instructors to supervise eight students, one or two of whom need the most individual attention. The squad and team leaders will know which of their men are weak on each particular subject and can give these individuals the attention they need without waiting for them to fall hopelessly behind the rest of the squad. Even the best of AIs at a battle group level class could not achieve the effectiveness of this immediate supervision.

As an instructor, the squad leader will have to learn the subject himself. And there is no better way to ensure that a man thoroughly understands something than to require him to explain it to someone else. Moreover, in the process of instructing and training his squad, the leader will exercise and improve his powers of expression. This in itself is a point of vital importance. If Erlon could misunderstand Napoleon at Ligny and so pave the way for Waterloo, then SP4 Bar can misunderstand Sgt Leader and so render ineffective the best laid plan of fire and maneuver. If we see fit to spark the upgrading of our NCO corps with super grades and proficiency pay, we can do worse than to exercise the professional knowledge and ability we are paying for.

When a squad leader habitually instructs his men, he is exercising, and hence strengthening, the first link in the chain of command. This is the level of the contact leader; the additional contact the squad leader has with his men in the instructor-student relationship carries with it important training benefits. From the leader's point of view, he has an important opportunity to learn about his men. And from the point of view of the squad members, they not only come to know their squad and fire team leaders better, but they have ingrained in them the habit of looking to these leaders to answer questions and give guidance. As thoroughly as a man may consciously know who and what his chain of command is, he must also develop the mental reflex of turning to his leader for guidance. Herein lie the roots of the individual soldier's sense of loyalty and discipline.

The average soldier reacts more favorably to instruction from his squad leader than he does to instruction received as an anonymous member of a large group. The esteem of his peers plays a large part in a soldier's motivation. If a squad has even the least feeling of esprit, the leader should have little difficulty in establishing a climate wherein a member can gain status by successful applica-

tion of training. Once this climate is established, individual motivation will increase, effecting in turn a proportionate increase in individual learning and proficiency. In effect, with some slight manipulation, the social pressures extant in any group of associated individuals can, in the case of a squad, be channeled to give impetus to the learning process instead of being left idle or permitted to obstruct the desired goal: effective training.

But there are also disadvantages to the conduct of training at the squad level. The one most frequently voiced is that some squad leaders are not qualified to instruct. This is a valid criticism and descriptive of a condition which exists in most units; but the solution is not to dodge the issue by removing the responsibility from the squad leader. Remembering that the measure of our training program is contribution to the unit's ability to accomplish its mission, can we rationalize the retention of a squad leader so lacking in professional knowledge and facility of expression that he is not qualified to train his squad? The answer is not to shift the responsibility to a higher level; it is to light a fire under the squad leader. Given the responsibility, there are few NCOs who will not produce the goods. Those few who do not produce will have to move over and make room for a man who wants the opportunity and can do the job.

Closely related to the qualification of squad leaders is the question of uniformity of the quality of instruction within the battle group. Unavoidably, the quality of instruction given by individual squad leaders will vary greatly, but no matter how uniformly excellent battle group level instruction might be, each squad will be only as good as its leader. Since training at the squad level has the desirable side effect of improving the squad leader, a net gain in training efficiency will be achieved in spite of a sacrifice in uniformity.

Another objection to training at the squad level is that a duplication of training aids would be necessary; superficially this might seem so—many separate classes would be given instead of one or a few. However, a subject which would require several large and expensive training aids for an assembled battle group might, for a squad, require no training aids other than the actual hardware. Also, the use of home-made expedients frequently accomplishes just as much for a small group as expensive fabrications.

The advantages of squad-level training provide an immediate and desirable direct bearing on a line unit's ability to perform its mission. The advantages inherent in training at company and battle group level appear to be somewhat remote in effecting this capability. As a guiding principle, then, each particular subject and lesson should be taught at the lowest level consistent with the limitations of available facilities and Army Subject Schedules.

Let's do away with wasted money and time—with eyewash and lip service. Let's put training where it belongs: in the hands of our ready, willing and capable squad leaders.

1st Lt Wallen M. Summers received his commission upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in June 1957. He has attended the Basic Infantry Officer, Airborne, Ranger and Pathfinder Courses. Lieutenant Summers has served as a platoon leader and company executive officer with the 101st Airborne Division. In March 1960 he joined the 2d Battle Group, 21st Infantry in Hawaii as assistant S2. He later served as a platoon leader and is now the Executive Officer of Company E.

LONG RANGE PATROLLING

by CAPT JOSEPH H. DEVINS JR.

"MEN, I just got word. Another recon patrol. A deep one. You guys start the wheels turning. I'm gonna see the lieutenant and find out when our briefing will be!"

The time: 1400; the scene: an improvised airstrip a few miles from the front lines; the speaker: the leader of long range patrol team number three. The Sky Cavalry Reconnaissance Company had just received orders to investigate an area some 20 miles behind enemy lines. Although aerial photographs vaguely indicated the possibility of an enemy troop concentration at that point, enemy anti-aircraft fire and clever use of camouflage did not permit close scrutiny from the air. Furthermore, our highly touted electronic gadgets—television, radar, infrared devices—were useless at this range and in this rolling, wooded terrain. In short, the Army had to turn once again to man himself—in this case, to the highly trained Infantrymen of our long range patrol teams.

A long range reconnaissance patrol is similar to a routine Infantry reconnaissance patrol, but it operates so far within enemy territory that it has to be transported to and from its area of operations. It also differs from a routine patrol in that it has the means to send information back to headquarters instantly. Sometimes the patrols themselves don't get back.

There's another difference. The training of these long range patrols is much more complex than for normal Infantry patrols. Everyone must be proficient in low attitude parachuting, collecting information, scouting, communications, land navigation, first aid and, naturally, escape and evasion. There is a lot of training with aircraft and their crews; the men always work with the same air crews so that they're sure to operate smoothly. They receive a special orientation on foreign armies. All of this training is reflected in the calm, deliberate attitude of the men. Their experience is seen in the painstaking care and extreme caution with which they undertake each step of the mission. Every team member knows every job which he might have to do when the time comes.

When the Sky-Cav Company received orders requiring use of a long range patrol, the reconnaissance platoon leader had alerted the leader of patrol team number three and told him that the job was his. Immediately, the patrol leader and his men had begun preparations for their mission. In one sense, however, preparation had begun months earlier when the patrol members were undergoing their highly specialized training. It had continued with the selection of the patrol's equipment, where emphasis was placed on dismounted, cross-country mobility and speed rather than on firepower. Finally, preparation included selection of the men for the patrol team. The team's leader was carefully chosen for his general leadership ability, initiative, and maturity of judgment. The rest of the team had also demonstrated great proficiency in basic Infantry skills and, in addition, physical endurance, self-confidence, aggressiveness, initiative and quick thinking. Thus, even as the team leader began the task of preparing his men, much had already been accomplished.

But much remained to be done in the five hours before the patrol was to move out, and, during every step of the planning and execution of the mission, there was infinite attention to every detail. Always there was the idea of avoiding unnecessary risks, of checking and double-checking every angle. The men studied both large-scale and small-scale maps of the area. The terrain favored a parachute drop, and the leader, deciding to infiltrate by this means, chose a drop area in a fold of hills several miles from the nearest known or suspected location of enemy troops. After consulting his men, he decided on a west-to-east route, calculating that the patrol's mission would require two days to complete. The plan called for them to be picked up along a stretch of canal about eight miles beyond the suspected enemy concentration on the second night after landing. The platoon leader agreed to this and told the patrol to be within signalling distance of the canal at 1700 hours on the pickup date, at which

time a helicopter would come for them.

Feverish preparations continued until 1600 hours, when the entire team assembled along with the platoon leader and the crew of the U-1A *Otter* which was to carry them to their objective. Also present was an emergency crew, the pilot and co-pilot of one of the unit's helicopters, whose mission was to stand by for a possible rescue while the *Otter* was behind enemy lines.

The platoon leader briefed the assembled patrol members and air crews. He told the patrol members that they would be dropped at 1910 hours, just ten minutes before total darkness. If no radio contact had been made by 1500 hours on the following day, the team was to proceed to any suitable point near a predesignated stretch of dirt road. An L-19 would make a low pass down the road looking for their signal, prepared to make a message pickup.

By 1700 of the second afternoon, they were to establish themselves in the pickup area, ready to attract the attention of the helicopter as it flew along on a route parallel to the canal. The patrol had a signal mirror and violet smoke grenades to use for signalling. It was decided that the team would monitor its radio at ten minutes after every even hour, for five minutes each time. The base station, on the other hand, would be open continuously to receive messages from the patrol. A simple code allowed very brief transmissions. The platoon leader ended his briefing with information on the current location of the front lines.

Immediately after chow the men made a final check of their gear.

The pilot of the *Otter,* who had worked out his flight plan, took over the briefing next. The patrol was told to board the *Otter* at 1810 for takeoff at 1820. The plane was to "contour" to its destination at a low altitude, pulling up to parachuting altitude two minutes before reaching the drop area. The pilot would give them the signal to jump, judging the wind from its effect on his flight path. After a few questions had been answered, the briefing was ended and the men went to supper.

Although there was plenty of time before they were to board the plane, the men ate hurriedly. Almost immediately after chow, they went to the takeoff area, made a final check of their gear and watched the rigger inspecting their parachutes. At the last minute before takeoff, the platoon leader rushed up with a slip of paper in his hand. He rapidly explained that headquarters had added another mission. Because it was expected that the enemy would blow up a certain bridge in the area, head-



The patrol boarded the plane at 1810, right on schedule.

quarters wanted to know whether the small stream it crossed was fordable by tanks anywhere near the bridge.

After a quick look at his map, the patrol leader noted that the bridge was near the patrol's scheduled route. It would therefore not be necessary to alter their plans concerning the pickup time and other matters. That settled, the patrol boarded the plane. At 1820, right on schedule, the *Otter* roared down the airstrip and took off.

About two minutes before jump time, the gentle slopes of the hills in which the patrol was to operate appeared beneath the aircraft, then fell away as the pilot began a steady climb. The drop area, mostly cultivated fields with woods running down the hillsides to the valley floor, could be barely discerned in the gathering dusk.

As the plane levelled off, the pilot gave the signal and the men jumped. While they floated slowly earthward, they strained their eyes for signs of any enemy troops in the drop area. There were none. Landing in a cornfield, they hastily gathered up their chutes, hid them in the nearby woods, shouldered their packs and rapidly evacuated the area.

By 2140 the patrol had passed through two miles of wooded hills. Feeling that the danger had lessened somewhat, they took a break and notified company headquarters of their safe landing.

Around midnight, the patrol reached the vicinity of the bridge. Two men were briefed on the information desired, and they slipped off into the darkness. The other two stretched out for a nap as the team leader took the first security watch. At 0130, he woke one of the others so that he himself might rest, stating that he wished to be awakened at 0300 if the two scouts had not returned from the bridge area.

He had almost dozed off when the two men returned, having found the river fordable by medium tanks about 150 yards above the bridge.

The team had now completed one of its two missions, and had definite information to report. For a moment the team leader toyed with the idea of waiting until he had more to report. He had been told that this phase of the mission was secondary in importance. After pondering the matter, however, he decided to send the information immediately since there was no guarantee that he would be able to transmit a few hours later. While the operator set up his radio to transmit, the patrol leader wrote the message on a scrap of paper and double-checked it, insuring its accuracy, brevity and security.

At dawn, the patrol was within two miles of the suspected enemy concentration area. After searching for a good hiding place, they selected as their first base of operations a thickly wooded cluster of small hills which did not seem to be crossed by any roads or trails. The radio would be left, rations and personal gear would be cached, and one man would be detailed to stand by to guard the equipment and monitor the radio. Scouting parties would go out, reconnoiter as assigned by the team leader, and return with information.

Before the first scouting foray, however, an alternate patrol base was selected in the event that the present base were compromised. Every man fixed its location firmly, both on the ground and on the map.

The patrol was then ready to begin its scouting mission. The assistant team leader was instructed to take one man and scout the enemy position, working his way along the south side of the valley in which the enemy was thought to be located. The patrol leader announced that he would take another man and scout along the north side of the valley. The two groups were to compare notes upon their return to the patrol base.

Moving cautiously and taking advantage of all concealment, the team leader and his companion reached a point about a mile from their goal. They had crossed what appeared to be a supply route, and made notes on vehicle density and directions. From a concealed position they watched the suspected area for five minutes before moving forward. The sound of heavy motors reached them, giving them a direction in which to search, and when they reached a small rise, they found what they had sought.

For several hours the team observed the activity. There was a roadblock on a paved road which ran through the valley. A few enemy soldiers were visible in the edge of thickets. Twice, accompanied by the

sound of tank engines, clumps of bushes moved, leaving tell-tale twin tracks. Small groups of soldiers followed, skillfully obliterating the tracks. No wonder visual observation from the air showed so little!

After gradually piecing together a picture of their "target," the men withdrew from the area and made their way back to the base camp, where they would complete their notes and sketches. Arriving at the base, they were informed that there had been no messages from the company headquarters during the 1410 listening period.

At 1617 hours, the other two men still had not returned. The radio operator had completed his five-minute monitoring period and was dismantling the set when an old man with a walking stick appeared on the crest of a nearby hill. A shabby-looking bird dog ambled ahead of him, poking curiously around in various clumps of bushes. The interloper was passing a few yards from the patrol's hiding place when the dog evidently caught their scent and came over to investigate. He wagged his tail happily and whimpered with excitement as he saw the men crouched in the bushes.

The old man, who had a full sack of game slung over his shoulders, glanced at his dog impatiently and called for him to follow. He then walked on for a few yards. Hesitating, he turned and looked oddly at the clump of bushes. Resuming his pace, he slapped his side and the dog sidled reluctantly a few strides and then romped away.

One member of the patrol followed the old man until he was sure he had really left the area. Chances were that the old man had not seen them. However, characteristically, the men did not wish to leave the slightest matter to chance. The three patrol members who were present shouldered their equipment and that of the two absent men and hurried off to the alternate patrol base.

At 1830, the assistant team leader and the other scout joined them in the new area. Having returned to the original base and found both the men and equipment gone, they had immediately known to move to the alternate base. To prepare for any future situations which might arise, the team leader now designated another alternate patrol base as the men settled down to compare notes on what they had seen.

The team on the south side of the valley also had a good view of the enemy troops, and confirmed what the team leader and his companion had seen: that there were at least 22 enemy tanks in the area.

The team leader had estimated that about 300 enemy troops were in this area; the assistant team leader, however, estimated 500. Since neither was certain, it was decided to report enemy troop strength as "approximately 400." None of the men had seen any signs of prepared positions which would give overhead cover to troops or vehicles, but five antiaircraft positions had been located in and around the enemy concentration. A large number of wheeled vehicles had been seen entering and leaving during the day. The CP had been located by watching the movements of command-type vehicles and by the antennae of communications equipment grouped nearby.

Using a special format which allowed each type of military activity to be counted and located precisely, and its relative vulnerability and dispersion to be assessed, the patrol leader transmitted an accurate, detailed picture of enemy dispositions in a fairly short message.

The team leader now wanted to put as much distance between the group and the enemy as possible, just in case of a nuclear strike or a message interception and position fix. Accordingly, the team wearily started off toward its pickup area.

During the 0210 monitoring period, company headquarters notified the patrol that it should be picked up as early as possible, preferably at dawn. The patrol leader reported that he could reach the area on time by making a forced march and skipping the 0410 monitoring period. The company agreed, and established the rendezvous for 0545 in the manner and place originally planned.

It was almost 0530 when the five tired men caught sight of the canal in the distance, a gleaming band of silver in the faint light of dawn. Noting an open area behind them which would provide a suitable landing place, the team halted near the top of the hill and prepared the equipment to signal the helicopter.

It was 0600 and the sun was well above the horizon when they finally heard the faint sound of the "chopper" in the distance. In another

As the plane leveled off, the pilot gave the signal and the men jumped.

minute, the craft was sighted, a small spot moving above the canal. The team members flashed their mirrors toward the oncoming aircraft, an H-34 *Choctaw* flying at treetop level on a route parallel to the canal and four or five hundred yards to the east. Regardless of which side of the canal the patrol was on, the helicopter would be on the sunward side, ready to receive mirror signals.

As the helicopter drew abreast of the team's position, the pilot indicated he had spotted the mirror flashes. After a cloud of violet smoke confirmed the team's location, the copter blinked its lights several times and the figures on the ground gave the agreed recognition signal. The pilot swung around downwind and swooped in to a landing, and before the helicopter had stopped rolling, the first members of the team were throwing their rucksacks in the door and diving in after them. In less than ten seconds, the craft was airborne again with the patrol safely aboard. And as the door of the helicopter slid shut, the men saw the early morning light augmented by a tremendous flash as a glowing mushroom cloud rose above the enemy position. Mission accomplished.

The pick-up.

NOTE: A prototype long range patrol unit, now designated the Airborne Reconnaissance Platoon, 110th Aviation Company (Surveillance), was organized in the fall of 1957 by the Army's Southern European Task Force, and has developed a firm operational doctrine during its three years of operations in the rugged Italian Alps and the flatlands of the Po Valley. Ed.

BATTLE GROUP MEDICAL PLATOON

In the October-November 1959 issue of INFANTRY, there appeared an article entitled "Modernized Medical Support" by Lt Col George T. Britton, which included a listing of the personnel of the Medical Platoon, Infantry Battle Group. The article was based, in part, upon a draft of TOE 7-12D, which has since undergone modification. The current organization of the Medical Platoon is shown below.

The term "Company Aidman" has been a source of much confusion. The fourteen men so designated were originally called "ambulance aides" by the new TOE, a term which probably describes their duties more adequately. Assigned to the evacuation section of the platoon, these men are not company aidmen in the traditional sense, nor are they usually attached to the rifle companies (although they may be physically located in the company rear area). On the contrary, the company aidmen pair off with the 14 ambulance drivers to form 14 separate evacuation teams. It is the *Senior Aidmen* who are "company aidmen" in the traditional sense; that is, medics available to the company to provide emergency medical care. There are five of them, one per rifle company, assigned to the treatment section of the medical platoon. These five men represent a marked reduction in strength from the 22 company aidmen authorized under the old TOE (7-12R).

The redesignation of ambulance aides as company aidmen occurred very soon after the appearance of the new TOE, when it was felt by the Office of The Surgeon General that failure to identify a "Company Aidman" would have an adverse psychological effect on the personnel of combat companies. Admittedly, the term is a misnomer as it is now applied to members of the evacuation teams, although it is felt by OTSG that their MOS training prepares them so that they *could*, if called upon, act as company aidmen.

MEDICAL PLATOON
INFANTRY BATTLE GROUP
(BG Surgeon, a Major, is assigned to BG Hq.)

OFFICERS

Platoon Leader 1	Captain
Asst. Platoon Leader 1	Lieutenant

ENLISTED MEN

Headquarters	
Platoon Sergeant	1 PSG (E7)
Medical Supply Specialist	1 SP4
General Clerk	1 PFC
Evacuation Section	
Section Sergeant	1 SSG (E6)
Company Aidman	14 SP5
Ambulance Driver xx	14 SP4

Treatment Section	
Section Sergeant	1 SSG (E6)
Medical Assistant	1 SP6
Senior Medical Aidman	5 SP5
Medical Aidman	6 SP4
Aid Station Attendant xx **	4 PFC

** Also light truck driver
xx Also radio operator

PEDOMIC MOBILTY

If you don't need it, why carry it?

by CAPT EDWARD L. ZUVER

Captain Fred Stilwell watched his company make their assault on the hill. From the valley floor to the top of the hill was only about a two hundred meter climb. Some ten minutes later he was on top of the hill, reporting to group, moving his weapons forward, consolidating . . . and taking a good look at his company. The men were plainly tired; some were slumped against trees, some flat on their backs, and even a few were bent over, vomiting. One thing was certain: they were in no condition to repel a counterattack, nor to continue the attack, at least not for a while. He was tired, too. Maybe just a short rest. . . .

Fred wondered about this for quite some time. Has American youth gone soft to the extent he's read about? Anyway, he's had a PT period scheduled at least three times a week, and it was very seldom cancelled. It's the weight of the equipment, that's what it is. Why don't they make it lighter?

Lighter equipment, Fred? Why did you have your men wearing a combat pack, with sleeping bag attached?

Who — ?

Never mind who I am, Fred. Just answer the question.

Well, what do you think they issue it for — appearances? They need everything that's in that pack, and they damn sure need the sleeping bag!

I agree, Fred. But do they need it in the assault?

Well, no. Say, who did you say you were?

I didn't. OK, so if they don't need it in the assault, why did you have them carry it?

Well, they're going to stop some time and they'll need the stuff then. Besides, I learned it in basic course . . . or maybe it was in the movies. Say, I've got an idea. I'll have the men drop their packs at the line of departure and then send a detail back after them when we consolidate. Just like in World War II.

I wouldn't do this unless I had to carry the packs, Fred. It would take a lot of men and a lot of policing.

Had to carry? You mean you wouldn't have your men carry packs at all?

That's right—except in case of certain type task operations. Do you know what Sergeant Bacach is saying to your first sergeant right now?

No . . .

Well, listen!

"Hell, Top, what's the old man have us carry all this stuff for? I'm 42 years old, and this is about to beat me! Why, in Korea we all agreed that we didn't need all this stuff—only our clothes, helmet, weapon, poncho, first aid packet, intrenching tool, canteen and sleeping bag. They can junk the rest of it until I get to a rest area."

What does that sound like, Fred?

Like the usual griping!

No, no; now be serious.

How can I be serious? I hear voices!

You mean me?

Yeah, I mean you.

I'll be gone shortly. Now—do you think what Sergeant Bacach said has merit?

Yes, I do, but there are certain other things that the men must have. And besides, he included the sleeping bag, remember?

Right. I intend to see that the bag is available.

I get it. You'll have one or two sleeping bags brought up for each squad at night. Squad rolls, isn't that what they call it?

That's what they call it, Fred, but forget it. The squad roll is unacceptable. It's not only unsanitary; you'll find more than half your men will refuse to sleep in a common bed.

You mean they'd go cold?

Exactly!

What's so important about the sleeping bag, anyway?

Well, Fred, I think it's the fact that the day doesn't seem quite as cold; that no matter how cold he gets the soldier can go on, if he can look forward to a warm place to sleep. In fact, in extremes, the sleeping bag could be a life saver.

Well, that makes sense. You've eliminated the pack but you still have the sleeping bag, plus other essentials. How are you going to work it?

Relax a minute, Fred, and I'll tell you. First we'll dress the soldier according to the season. Then we'll attach his combat pack suspenders to his pistol belt and have him put that on. Next we'll attach the intrenching tool, canteen, cup and cover, first aid pouch and packet, bayonet and the poncho.

You think the poncho is really essential?

You bet! Don't forget, in the atomic age the poncho serves another purpose besides keeping the rain off your back. So, to go on, we'll add the helmet, gas mask, weapon, and bandoleers of ammo, and that's it.

What about the sleeping bag?

We're going to make a bed roll for each soldier. And we're going to add a little more than might be absolutely essential, just to allow for flexibility. We'll use the shelter half as an envelope.

OK, let's have it.

First, lay a shelter half out flat and fold the triangle ends in. Fold a blanket in half along its long axis and place it in the center along the long axis of the shelter half. Lay the air mattress on top of the blanket, and the sleeping bag on top of the air mattress. Inclose one or two changes of socks and underwear, a towel, and the toilet articles. If it's a seasonal transition period, add the field jacket liner and trouser liner.

Wait—if these liners are in this bed roll, what do you do if it turns cold and the soldier needs them, and the bed roll isn't available?

I intend to deliver the bed rolls at times when the soldier has stopped long enough to be able to use them. After all, if he's moving, he'll stay warm. It's when he stops that he adds layers of clothing. For this same reason, I can even squeeze in the "Mickey Mouse" boots. So what have we got — a fast-moving soldier, lightly dressed; a soldier consolidating on the objective for the night, adding liners to his clothing and putting on his Mickeys. May I continue?

Be my guest.

Next, I'm going to add the tent pole and pins to the bed roll—

Aw, now, let's hold it right there. We're getting too fancy now. You going to form for shelter tents to the left of the FEBA?

No—but suppose we were in a forward assembly area. We'd have shelter.

You'd also have your duffel bags. You could get your shelter halves out of them.

You might, but it would mean a lot of unloading, searching and reloading. I'm trying to eliminate going into the duffel bag except on rare occasions. I've got a good reason and I'll explain later. Besides, these few extra items don't increase the size appreciably, and weight won't matter because we don't intend for the soldier to carry the bed roll.

OK, what next?

That's all. Now we roll it by folding in the long sides to the width of two tent pole sections, and rolling the roll along its long axis. Then secure the roll with the GP strap or the tent rope; it should be just over one foot in diameter. If it needs waterproofing, place it inside the waterproof bag and tie it as a roll.

I just thought of something. What about the mess kit?

Put it in the duffel bag, Fred.

You going to feed the troops C rations all the time?

Nope — I'll use trays. Yeah, I know, it's not exactly kosher, but no one ever holds you to mess kits. They're too awkward and too bulky to carry back and forth from the kitchen to the line. Besides, in peacetime the soldier wants his own mess kit back. In combat, if you can't get trays, well, then you'll have to use mess kits. But what did the troops use in Korea? From what I saw, all units had trays.

Fine. Now, let's go back to the bed roll and duffel bag. How do we load and use the equipment?

Fred, it will take one deuce and a half with trailer to carry it all. All duffel bags will fit on the truck. If personnel who ride in company organic vehicles load their bed rolls on these vehicles, then the rest of the bed rolls will fit on the ton and a half trailer. Now, as to how we use them

CAPT EDWARD L. ZUVER entered the Army in September 1945 and was commissioned upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in June 1951. In Korea he served with the 15th Infantry, 3d Division, as platoon leader of a rifle platoon, the division honor guard platoon and the 81mm mortar platoon. He later served as a rifle and a heavy mortar platoon leader and as a support and tank company commander with the 511th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 11th Airborne Division, and with the 19th Infantry as a company commander, S3 and S4. He has attended the Basic, the Airborne and the Advanced Courses at USAIS. Captain Zuver is now an ROTC Instructor at the University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon.

Forgotten anything?

. . . In the attack, bed rolls would be brought up whenever consolidation took place, and there was sufficient time for troops to clean up and sleep. They would be picked up prior to continuation of the attack. In the defense, they would be delivered and left on position until a move were made.

Looks like you don't gain a thing using the bed roll system in defense.

You don't, Fred. A combat pack with horseshoe roll would be almost as good. It's in attack and retrograde actions, actions where you'll have to move fast, that you gain. If you plan on moving back, it's a simple matter to pick up the bed rolls ahead of time and get them to the rear. If you have to move off position rapidly, you can carry the bed rolls off. If your rear were overrun, all you would lose would be your duffel bags. You would at least have the essentials until a resupply could be made.

It's just a little difficult for me to picture a soldier pulling off a position with a bed roll under his arm, Cuz. Mind elaborating a little?

Well, first, if you had, say, half an hour's warning, you could roll the bed roll a little differently and carry it off.

How's that?

Roll it along the short axis. Make a big horse shoe out of it and tie the open ends. Throw it over your shoulder.

Why, you'll look like a soldier fresh out of the Spanish-American War. They'll laugh you off the line. And the battle group commander will probably have something to say about it, too.

It's been done; they've been laughed at, and there's not too much the battle group commander can do. Remember, Fred, there's no policy on how to load or carry clothing and equipment. You're the guy who decides. Any arbitrary SOP higher than yours, if one exists, relieves you of explanations.

But suppose you didn't have as long a warning? Suppose it were rolled as you stated earlier.

In this case, just place your hands inside the roll as though it were a muff, and pull the edges of the shelter half out. Tie each end with the rope or the GP strap and sling it over your shoulder. It would look something like you were carrying a mail bag.

Well, I guess we've about eliminated the need for going into the duffel bag very often, haven't we?

Yes, we have. And for good reason. Since the company has to rely on getting a baggage truck from an outside source, there may come that time when the outside source won't produce. Now, if the duffel bags are well to the rear, there's no sweat. If you move into a position where you can enjoy a few days rest, you won't have to wait for the duffel bags to be brought up. You've got your immediate needs, including tents.

Looks like we've covered everything except getting the bed rolls to the platoons.

Not too difficult, Fred. You could make delivery at the same time a meal were being fed, using one company ¾ ton vehicle per platoon. Pickup would be the same. By proper scheduling of ammo runs, this wouldn't be difficult. When the company baggage is on the ground in the trains area, the ¾ tons could combine an ammo run with a bed roll pickup or delivery. If the situation allowed, and the company baggage were on a vehicle, the vehicle could be kept at the company distribution point where the ¾ tons could make pickup or delivery.

Boy, I'll bet the weapons platoon leader won't like all this extra use of his vehicles.

Of course he won't. But he'll have to live with it. Once those vehicles dump the mortars and crews, they don't do anyone any good parked. They're on the move for chow, ammo, what have you, and it takes good coordination to use them effectively.

Yes, it does . . .

Wait a minute—I've got you figured out. I've just been talking to my—

Sure. But it's time for another attack now. Do it the easy way this time.

I will, I will.

Hey, Top! Get all the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants over here. We're going to take this hill again—my way. *That's right—my way.*

INFANTRY FORUM

When ground weapons bog down, armed helicopters could do the job—*if* we had them.

WHERE ARE OUR SHOOTING COPTERS?

by Maj Owen R. Grogan

THE helicopter *can* survive on the battlefield. The French proved it in Algeria, where for three years helicopters served as aerial weapons platforms engaging in combat operations against the rebel army. During this time, the helicopters were subjected to a substantial volume of small arms fire. Frequently they were hit, but they went right on fighting. Often, it was French ingenuity which kept them in the air. Hits on rotor blades were temporarily covered with tape. Self-sealing gas tanks helped greatly in reducing losses. But eye-witness accounts of aerial firepower operations in Algeria are unanimous in reporting that the helicopter could and did survive on the battlefield when skillfully employed.

In this country, the Army Aviation School at Fort Rucker, Alabama, has conducted extensive experiments which prove that the mounting of weapons on helicopters is, despite some drawbacks, practical. Despite this fact, no positive steps appear to have been taken to implement such a program. That is most unfortunate, for on the battlefields of a future conflict, troops and equipment will probably be widely dispersed. Firepower which depends upon ground mobility to move from one location to another will not give a commander the responsiveness, speed and flexibility he needs to cover a large area adequately.

The solution to the problem is airmobile firepower in the form of weapons mounted on helicopters. Weapons so mounted could be employed quickly to influence a critical situation at any part of the battle area. Further, such airborne fire support has many other unique advantages which, if properly used, will serve the Infantry well. For example, the aerial weapons system can cover gaps created by threat of nuclear attack. It can strike targets which are inaccessible to present ground weapons. Enemy tactics which rely on armor or upon numerical superiority will merely result in lucrative targets for the aerial fire system, which can provide suppressive fires to kill the enemy and destroy his equipment.

It should be noted that the "shooting 'copters" aerial fire support system is intended to supplement ground fire, not to replace the fighter-bomber type of aerial support. The helicopter's mission will be to provide suppressive fires and to act as an augmentation to ground weapons. Currently, weapons employed in aerial support include, but are not limited to, machine guns, rockets, and antitank guided missiles. It is hoped that in the future, there will be weapons

and aircraft specifically designed for such missions.

Since the aerial weapons system is expensive and is demanding of great skill and courage from the pilots and crews, its application should be restricted to high priority targets. In approaching such targets, pilots must exercise caution, attacking the enemy from a concealed position. They will fly as low as possible during movement to the attack position, following ground contours which offer the best cover and concealment. Arriving at the target, they will quickly lift, fire and drop back out of sight. If required to fire again, they will reappear, but in a different firing position. Throughout the attack, the pilots will be in direct communication with the ground commander, assuring coordination with the ground weapons system.

In using helicopters to supplement his firepower, the ground commander must keep several factors in mind if he is to employ this aerial weapon without prohibitive losses. First, targets must be chosen carefully so that they are amenable to the "hit and hide" maneuver of the attacking helicopters. In this respect, terrain must also be studied carefully, even though the helicopters will be moving through the air. A final vital consideration is the enemy's air-defense capability. Sending helicopters against a strong air defense would be suicidal. Any weapon has its limitations, and the armed helicopter is no exception. In spite of its limitations, however, there will be many occasions when the ground commander could successfully employ the helicopter for fire support—could, that is, if the Army had any "shooting 'copters." The sad fact is that it does not, for as I have indicated, "no positive steps appear to have been taken to implement . . . a program (of helicopter fire support)."

In one way, perhaps, this situation is fortunate, for it affords the Army an opportunity to develop an aerial vehicle with an integrated

Enemy armor would present lucrative targets for an aerial weapons system.

weapons system designed to locate and destroy enemy targets. But even if such a vehicle were under consideration, it might take years to get off of the drawing board into the sky. In the meantime, we need the increased mobility of firepower offered by the employment of helicopters in an aerial fire support system.

To meet this need for the time being, we should mount present weapons on our aircraft, by field expedient methods, with the least possible delay. We should standardize and develop kits, uniform mounting devices, and sighting equipment for present and future weapons. Kits developed should, so far as possible, be universal to all appropriate weapons and to all aircraft in Army inventory. We must develop a simple aiming system applicable to as many weapons as possible, and a sighting system to link the armed aircraft accurately with a point target. All of these programs should be implemented simultaneously and immediately in order that we gain, as soon as possible, vitally needed training experience prior to actual combat use of such a system.

The time for initiating these programs is now. We have already hesitated too long. The French in Algeria have proved that the helicopter can survive on the battlefield. The Army Aviation School has confirmed helicopters' usefulness as a powerful supplement to ground weapons. Army Training Circular 20-1 authorizes the use of aerial fire support in several types of missions. We finally have the authority to proceed. What we need now is the means to use that authority. Where are our shooting copters?



". . . We should mount present weapons to our aircraft by field expedient methods. . . ."

YOUR INFANTRY CAREER

This department provides important information on policies and personnel actions which affect your Infantry career. Material for Active Army officers is furnished by Infantry Officers Division, OAD, DCSPER, DA. Information for USAR officers and enlisted Infantrymen is obtained from other Department of the Army agencies.

FROM INFANTRY OFFICERS DIVISION

HOW IMPORTANT IS YOUR SCHOOL RECORD?

Inasmuch as it is early in the academic year, it is appropriate to reflect for a moment on the matter of military education and its importance.

Many officers have asked the question, "Just how important is my military school record?" There are some who feel that "since the class standing doesn't really matter," a feeling of relaxation and limited application or participation is an appropriate school attitude. The hard, cold facts are that anything having to do with your *record* is extremely important. Your Academic Report, in effect, takes the place of your Efficiency Report for the period you are in school and becomes a part of your permanent record.

Our greatest military leaders are those who not only have proven themselves in varied assignments, but also have graduated from our senior service schools. Selection to attend these schools is a tremendous career advantage and opens the gate to assignments of greater responsibility.

Your Army career is largely dependent on your overall record, and your success or failure while engaged in academic pursuits is a permanent part of this record.

EFFECT OF STABILIZED TOURS ON SCHOOL SELECTION

Officers often express concern about the effect of stabilized or long tour overseas assignments on their availability for schooling.

In explanation, each assignment is carefully planned by Infantry Officers Division to ensure that it will not interfere with an officer's service schooling. In some cases, however, military necessity will require that an officer be assigned duty which will delay his attendance at a service school for one or more years. For example, if an officer is selected for a Command and General Staff College level school in his last year of eligibility and his assignment precludes attendance, he is notified by a letter of his deferred principal status and the fact that he will attend when next available.

Those officers in their last year of eligibility selected for War College level schools will attend regardless of tour status.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF SCHOOL LISTS

The target dates for announcement of school lists are as follows:

School Starting Date	Course Title	DA Announcement Date
Sep 61	Infantry Officer Career Course	Jan 61
Aug 61	Regular Command & General Staff College	Late Dec 60
Jan 61	Associate Command & General Staff College	Oct 60
Feb 61	Armed Forces Staff College	Late Aug 60
Aug 61	War College	Dec 60

AVAILABILITY CRITERIA FOR IOCC, CGSC, AFSC, AND WAR COLLEGE CONSIDERATION

In the past, a minimum of 12 months on station in non-stabilized assignments was required to permit consideration for Infantry Officer Career Course, Command and General Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College, and War College attendance.

Recent DA policy now precludes consideration of those officers who would have had less than 24 months on station as of the school starting date. Thus, a number of Infantry officers who would have been considered for school attendance in August 1961 are now programmed for consideration in August 1962 or later. Exceptions or waivers have been very rare.

ARMY AVIATION TRAINING

With continued emphasis on modernization of the Army and with the increased reliance on Army Aviation to improve mobility, the Army Aviation Officer Career Program described in AR 600-105 offers excellent career opportunities to junior officers in this growing field. Eligible officers who are interested may apply under the provisions of AR 611-110.

LANGUAGE TRAINING

The world-wide commitments of the United States and the deployment of Army personnel in over 80 foreign countries emphasize the growing importance of foreign language training for the Infantry officer. Evidence of the importance the Army attaches to language qualification, and the emphasis which the Chief of Staff places on it, is contained in the following extract from a recent speech by General Lemnitzer, now CJCS:

> "I should like to say a few words concerning the matter of language. The language of any country is an important key to its culture. Added to this consideration are the obvious advantages deriving from knowledge of the language of a country in achieving closer cooperation and more complete understanding when dealing with its officials and private citizens. Consequently, the Army has placed great emphasis on the study of foreign languages by its personnel."

Infantry officers may apply for attendance at the Army Language School, Presidio of Monterey, California, under the provisions of AR 611-82.

FINAL SEMESTER PLAN

Recent DA action permits Infantry Division to select a greater number of qualified officers for Final Semester Plan training. To provide greater flexibility for selection, the officer should ensure that his application and college letter of acceptance specify at least *two* acceptable periods of attendance. The applications should be submitted through channels so as to reach Infantry Officers Division at least four to six months in advance of desired attendance date.

The first step in determining eligibility is to obtain a college evaluation of all previous college work, to include USAFI, correspondence and extension courses, military service schools, and military service. Any accredited college or university may be attended under the Final Semester Plan, providing the degree requirements can be completed within a regular semester or two quarters (in certain circumstances, a summer session may be added).

The Final Semester Plan also provides for training time to obtain a degree at the graduate level. A recent change now authorizes a limited number of officers, who have only the thesis to research and write, to complete this requirement under this program.

The Army's goal is a college degree for all commissioned officers. Therefore, officers who do not possess at least a baccalaureate degree should contact a college or university as soon as possible to determine their status of eligibility. Eligibility requirements and procedures for submission of applications for the Final Semester Plan are found in paragraph 11c, AR 621-5.

FOREIGN AREA SPECIALIST TRAINING

Training for Foreign Area Specialization is outlined in AR 350-23. Several new world areas have been added to the program. The list now includes the following languages and areas in which training will be conducted: Arabic, Chinese, Greek, Hindi, Japanese, Persian, Russian, Turkish and Urdu; Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Thailand and Vietnam. Training phases include the following: language training (six to twelve months), university study (one year), overseas area training (two years). Eligibility requirements and application procedures are listed in paragraphs 3 and 4, AR 350-23.

Applications may be submitted to Infantry Officers Division at any time; however, officers can be accepted only after the eligibility requirements are met and the Career Course (Advanced Course) has been completed. *See* The FAST Program *by Capt Roy R. Severin in this issue—page 66.*

BRANCH TRANSFERS

Infantry Officers Division has been asked whether an officer who is physically disqualified for Infantry should transfer to another branch. The answer to this must be qualified; although there are numerous branch immaterial assignments which are filled by Infantry officers and could be performed by an officer with certain physical limitations, it may be well to consider a branch transfer. Certain of the technical and administrative services can completely utilize an officer who is limited in a combat arm. However, the individual should carefully consider how his military and civilian education or experience qualifies him for the branch under consideration prior to making application. As a general rule, the gaining branch, prior to accepting an officer for transfer, is desirous of an indicated or demonstrated aptitude for the specialities involved in their career pattern.

WHERE ARE WE NOW?

Perhaps a note of explanation as to proper agency titles is in order. There is sometimes confusion as to the

exact nomenclature of the various elements of OAD since their move from TAGO to ODCSPER. Below are listed some agencies and changes showing old and new designations:

OLD

1. Chief, Officers Assignment Division
2. Officers Assignment Division
3. Chief, Infantry Branch

NEW

1. Director of Officers Assignments
2. Officers Assignment Directorate
3. Chief, Infantry Officers Division

PCS AND TDY RULINGS

The Army has further curtailed permanent change of station (PCS) moves due to budgetary limitations for Fiscal Year 1961. As a result, this will mean less frequent moves between stations within the United States for both officers and enlisted men.

Until recently, officers and enlisted men were limited to one PCS a fiscal year. Under the new ruling, officer reassignments within the continental United States "will be allowed only to meet certain requirements." Enlisted men "will not be moved from one station to another within the continental United States in less than 18 months, except those undergoing initial basic and advanced individual training."

The Army also clamped down on temporary duty travel (TDY) in conjunction with PCS. Effective in August 60, such TDY was reduced from a maximum of seven days to one. This does not preclude TDY for the purpose of schooling, the Army said.

Also curtailed on 1 August was the utilization of commercial sea and air transportation except to those overseas not adequately served by the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) and the Military Air Transport Service (MATS).

NEW POLICY FOR RESERVISTS

The Department of the Army recently announced that Reservists who on and after 30 September 1960 complete 20 years or more of active duty and are retired under Title II, Public Law 810, will be placed in the Retired Reserve.

Pending the full implementation of this policy in the field, those persons already retired under Title II, PL 810, will not be ordered to active duty for training.

ENLISTED CAREER INFORMATION

P-2 PROFICIENCY RATINGS

The Army has moved to put some 7000 enlisted personnel in P-2 proficiency pay status by the end of this fiscal year, June 30, 1961. The P-2 pro-pay is $60 per month.

The number of P-2 ratings by MOS will be established by Department of the Army. These advanced ratings will be awarded in MOSs that are most critical to Army requirements as determined by training time, reenlistment rates and shortages of qualified personnel. MOSs authorized P-2 payments and awards of P-2 ratings will be announced on a monthly basis until year-end objectives are reached. Award of P-2 ratings will depend proficiency scores under the Enlisted Evaluation System.

Evaluation of enlisted personnel for proficiency purposes under the Enlisted Evaluation System will continue as scheduled Mandatory testing of all eligible individuals is reemphasized inasmuch as awards of P-1 and P-2 proficiency ratings are both based on the same evaluation period.

Unit commanders have the authority to award P-2 proficiency ratings to individuals who have held a P-1 rating continuously since January 1960 and who are assigned and utilized in accordance with paragraph 9b, AR 611-208. Unit commanders retain the authority to withhold or to award P-2 proficiency ratings.

Personnel in the following MOSs are eligible for award of P-2 proficiency ratings: 988.1, 988.2, 988.7, P-2 payments will be announced monthly. Retroactive payments are not authorized.

SPEED UP IN PROMOTIONS

The Army anticipates that enlisted promotions will be speeded up over the next few years. In a recent Army announcement it was stated that there "certainly will be more advancements in pay grades E4 and E5."

Personnel authorities based these optimistic predictions on the fact that a number of senior grade enlisted men will be retired in the coming years.

The Army reiterated that the number of EM in NCO or Specialist grades cannot exceed authorized ceilings and emphasized to enlisted men that they should understand these two cardinal promotion policies: first, that the organization commander has final authority to select personnel for promotions; secondly, that the senior man in grade is to be promoted if all other considerations are equal.

Although the personnel program is complicated by the large number of people affected, personnel authorities are constantly studying procedures in order to ensure an equitable, efficient system. To give soldiers a comparative basis for estimating the current average time in service at time of promotion, the Army has published the following table:

To Grade	Average Time-in-Service At Time of Promotion
E4	18 months
E5	3 years
E6	10½ years
E7	14 years
E8	17 years
E9	19 years

PRO-PAY

Questions and Answers

by Capt Robert A. Sullivan

THE Enlisted Evaluation System (Pro-Pay) has been in operation since January 1959. All of the Infantry MOSs (111, 112, 113, 115, and 311) have been tested, and all personnel who have qualified are currently drawing pro-pay. Still there remain many questions concerning the system.

Here are some of the typical questions asked about the system. The answers are furnished in a brief, authoritative manner.[1]

Q. Are proficiency test results going to be utilized for personnel actions other than pro-pay in the future?

A. Yes. Department of the Army has recently announced that the results of the proficiency tests will be used to determine if a soldier is actually qualified in his MOS. Further, if required, classification and reclassification will be based on these results. It is conceivable that promotion may be based partly on proficiency test results in the future.

Q. Is there any indication of how the new facets of the program will be implemented?

A. Department of the Army has not officially released the particulars of the new implications. It is expected that a cut-off score will be established for each 4-digit MOS above which a soldier must score to be considered qualified in his MOS. If this score is not attained on the first test, he will be required to appear before a classification board. It is anticipated that the board will be authorized to recommend one of three personnel actions:

(1) Retraining and reclassification to another MOS appropriate to the soldier's current pay grade. This may be a shortage MOS.

(2) Reclassification to a lower skill level for 1 year until retesting is accomplished under the system.

(3) Retention in the current MOS and skill level for 1 year until annual retesting is accomplished.

[1] Sullivan and Gause, *Preparing for the MOS Proficiency Test*, Stackpole Publishing Co., 1960.

Personnel failing to attain a qualifying score on the *second* evaluation may be reclassified to another skill level or MOS and reduced, if necessary, to a pay grade appropriate to the new skill level.

Q. Will the determination of whether or not a soldier is "Qualified in his MOS" be based solely on his proficiency test score?

A. No. The Commander's Evaluation Report plus the Proficiency Test Score will provide the basis for this determination. If the combined score of the CER and the test meets the minimum established qualifying score, the soldier will be considered qualified in his primary MOS. It's as simple as that.

Q. Will the "pro-pay" cut-off score and the "MOS Qualification" cut-off score be the same?

A. No. The cut-off established for pro-pay will not affect the score established for qualification. Hence, a soldier may be considered qualified in his MOS and still not qualify for pro-pay. Although not definitely established, it is expected that MOS experts will determine the qualification cut-off scores based on the test questions and the job requirements of the MOS as shown in AR 611-201.

Q. If a soldier transfers to a new unit, how will they know whether he is considered qualified in his MOS?

A. It is expected that an entry will be made on the Form 20 to the effect that the soldier has a qualified or verified primary MOS. This system of identification will help unit personnel officers and commanders to determine, by screening records, those men in their unit who are actually qualified in their MOS.

Q. What are the advantages to the soldier of this new concept?

A. Skill level digits will be brought into line with pay grade, and overclassification will be reduced. The alignment of pay grade with primary MOS will insure

that personnel possess the rank required for proper utilization. It will also permit individuals to compete for pro-pay on a more equitable basis and will identify individuals best qualified for selection for career programs.

Q. Can a soldier who is not enlisted in the Regular Army qualify for pro-pay?

A. If a soldier is serving on active duty in other than a Regular Army enlistment, and meets the other eligibility criteria, his commander may recommend him for proficiency testing. However, before award of pro-pay, the soldier must enlist in the Regular Army.

Q. What is the Commander's Evaluation Report, and what effect does it have on the overall proficiency score?

A. When a soldier takes a proficiency test, he reveals what he knows. But there remain some unanswered questions. For example: How effective is the soldier on the job? How does he perform under varying conditions? What is his attitude?

The CER is used to answer these questions. It is a direct method of judging a soldier's performance on the job, and is completed by a soldier's immediate superior. Although the relative value of proficiency score and the CER is not announced by DA, it is assumed that with a poor report, it is almost impossible to qualify for pro-pay.

Q. Does a unit commander have the authority to recommend withdrawal of pro-pay?

A. Yes. The Enlisted Evaluation System was carefully designed not to usurp the prerogatives of the commander. Retention of pro-pay is contingent on the maintenance of proficiency and outstanding efficiency. If a soldier does not maintain this proficiency, a recommendation for withdrawal of pro-pay may be initiated by the unit commander. However, withdrawal or withholding of pro-pay by commanders for disciplinary reasons as a substitute for action under UCMJ is not the intent of the system.

Q. If a soldier does not qualify for pro-pay, should it be assumed he has failed the test?

A. No. This is a misconception of many officers and enlisted personnel in the field. The proficiency test is not a "pass" and "fail" test under present concepts. Award of pro-pay in a particular 4-digit MOS is based on the criticality of the MOS expressed in percent. This percent is applied to the current authorized strength of an MOS to determine the number of pro-payments authorized. DA establishes this criticality based on the time it takes to train a soldier in the MOS and on the current reenlistment rate in the MOS. A soldier may score well on the test and still not qualify for pro-pay because of the low criticality of his MOS.

Q. Who establishes the cut-off score for pro-payments?

A. DA establishes the cut-off score for each 4-digit MOS based on test results, MOS criticality, authorized strength of the MOS, and current budgetary limitations.

Q. Can an enlisted man who meets all testing qualifications refuse to take the proficiency test developed for his MOS?

A. No. If a soldier meets the qualifications shown in par. 4, AR 611-208, he is required to take the test developed for his 4-digit primary MOS. However, under current regulations, he may refuse the award of pro-pay.

Q. What is the schedule for Infantry MOS Testing for the remainder of 1960 and calendar year 1961?

A. MOS 311, Infantry Communications Specialist, is scheduled for testing in November 1960.

MOS 113, Infantry Operations and Intelligence Specialist, is scheduled for February 1961.

MOS 112 and 115 are scheduled for May 1961.

MOS 111 is scheduled for August 1961.

Q. Are the proficiency test questions evaluated for possible improvement after the test has been administered?

A. Yes. Each test question is analyzed for possible improvement based on how it performed during testing. The Enlisted Evaluation Center, in conjunction with the service school responsible for the test question, performs this very extensive evaluation. A thorough analysis of each question is conducted at the Evaluation Center by automatic data processing machines. The question is revised or replaced as required to meet the testing standards in subsequent tests.

Q. Have the proficiency tests revealed a common lack of knowledge in any Infantry subject?

A. Yes. Those questions which seem to be missed the most often deal with current tactical concepts at battle group level, new weapons and the effects of nuclear weapons.

CAPT ROBERT A. SULLIVAN received his RA commission upon graduating from the University of South Dakota in 1952. He completed the Basic Infantry Officer Course that same year and was subsequently assigned to the 52d Armored Engineer Battalion at Fort Leonard Wood. Captain Sullivan served as a company commander and staff officer with the 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, in Korea and Japan from 1953 through 1955. Upon his return from the Far East, he was assistant PMST at Eastern Michigan College, Ypsilanti, Michigan. Among the service schools he has attended are the Advanced Infantry, Airborne, CBR and Mountaineering Courses. At the present time he is chief, Army Training Program Branch, Editorial and Pictorial Office, the Infantry School.

PRELUDE TO BATTLE DRILL

The rifleman's sequence

is the foundation

for success on the battlefield.

by 1ST LT EDWIN W. MARTIN JR.

BATTLE DRILL is coming of age! Not only does it now develop the individual confidence and aggressiveness necessary on the dispersed battlefield of today, but it also gives a sense of *esprit* and teamwork unequaled since the mounted Infantry scouting forays of a century ago.

However, battle drill is not a panacea or a magically easy approach to squad offensive tactics. The basic foundation must still be there. Until the fundamentals of speed, teamwork, firepower and control are all second nature to the rifleman, the squad is not fully effective and the individual can be neither confident nor aggressive when he first meets enemy fire.

One method of building and mastering these fundamentals is by training Infantrymen in the use of a technique known as the *rifleman's sequence*. By definition, the rifleman's sequence is everything a rifleman does from the time he begins one rush forward to a new position until he jumps to his feet again for his next advance. By training the rifleman to perform this service correctly by habit, the squad leader can build the charging confidence that causes a man to close with the enemy and destroy him. Again, it is the basic foundation we are working on.

Troop leaders of the 24th Infantry Division in Germany worked on this problem and developed four simple exercises—which will be outlined here—to put punch and drive into the rifleman's sequence. It was found that once these exercises were mastered by each rifleman and fire team, the squads exhibited a much more spirited effort in learning the more complex battle drill maneuvers. The results were so productive that other units may find the techniques of use in their training.

Essentially, here's how the exercises are run:

When the exercises are presented,

each one must be enthusiastically demonstrated and explained; emphasis is placed on enthusiasm since the instructor and demonstrators are selling the importance of drive. One other basic rule always applies: Instruction and practice in battle drill, as in all combat skills, must be presented on as low a level as possible. A fire team leader must train his own team members, and a squad leader must train his fire team leaders. In addition, before any work begins in training in the rifleman's sequence, each rifleman should review these basic Infantry skills: selecting a covered position, rushing, taking advantage of terrain, slamming into a firing position and selecting targets.

THE FIRST exercise is designed to teach speed and teamwork. Two men move by alternating rushes to a selected objective. At the instant when the first man hits the ground and opens simulated fire, his buddy automatically and without hesitation jumps up to rush (Figure 1). When the second man hits his firing position and begins simulating fire, the first man, without any spoken command, rushes. The manner of movement for the automatic rifleman is the same as for any other rifleman. Later, the exercise can be done by a fire team: first, with one rifleman at a time rushing (each member moving after another designated rifleman in either a piston pattern or right to left pattern); subsequently, this movement can be made simultaneously by pairs.

When pairs are training, they may rush by one of two patterns: inside pair, then outside pair; or, right pair, then left pair. The fire team leader should not be a part of any pattern. By varying his movements and moving independently, he can confuse any enemy as to the order of movement. Moreover, the fire team leader must not call names to initiate the movement of men. Their moves must be automatic and unhesitating.

For variation, one rifleman may be suddenly designated as a casualty. It is then the job of the others to realize the situation and continue the pattern without him. Because of the strenuous effort expended in rushing, all squads, even those in the best physical condition, will require breaks of from five to 15 minutes between every 15 minutes of running exercise.



Figure 1. As one rifleman ① hits the ground and opens simulated fire, his buddy ② rushes forward until he can take up a firing position ③ to cover the advance of his teammate as he moves forward.

THE SECOND exercise is designed to teach individual response to control. At the start of this exercise every man must understand that whenever any leader must utilize voice or movement to attract any one man's attention in order to pass him instructions, control is weakened.

In this second drill, two men act as riflemen while a third acts as a team leader. The men follow the same procedure as in the first drill except that during each sequence each man must additionally look quickly at his fire team leader, who should be moving tactically, slightly behind the two men. The sequence runs as follows: rush, begin fire, look at the fire team leader, fire, and when the other rifleman has hit the ground and opened fire, rush again. When every man has developed the firm



Figure 2. After rifleman ① assumes the firing position, rifleman ② bounds forward to a firing position. He is followed in turn by other members of the fire team who move forward in either a piston pattern or left-to-right pattern.

habit of looking at his fire team leader during each sequence, the drill may be run by complete fire teams, then by squads.

At no time should control pass outside of the fire team, as when the far left man from the right fire team moves in response to the right man from the left team. This tends to take control away from the fire team leaders. And again, it is emphasized that the leader must not call names. He can control the pattern by direct contact with the two men nearest to him in the fire team, whether they are moving singly or by alternating pairs.

In this battle drill there are three possible situations for the fire team: halted, as when acting as a base of fire for another fire team or squad; rushing, as pairs; and rushing, one man at a time. During this exercise, no one can be allowed to slow the speed of his rush or to delay during his sequence. Each man's single-minded purpose must be to continue through to the objective, gaining maximum benefit from supporting weapons and shock action.

THE THIRD exercise teaches movement control. The entire fire team will move as in the second exercise, except that each man will set his direction of movement (and relative position in the fire team) on directions from the fire team leader (Figure 2). The fire team leader will use hand signals only for abrupt shifts in direction, as when avoiding an obstacle or mined area. When the fire teams are later joined into a squad, the fire team leaders should practice looking at the squad leader between their rushes in order to guide their direction of movement on his.

THE FOURTH and final drill of the sequence is designed to develop firepower. Where range facilities permit, it should be run with live fire. Initially, fire teams should remain in one place to practice rapid reloading. Men should be taught to fire shots in pairs, which will make them conscious of the number of rounds left in a clip at any time. One rifleman should also be designated to mask the changing of AR magazines. He can practice holding his fire until he senses his teammate's magazine is near exhaustion; then he begins firing rapidly while the magazine is changed.

After stationary practice of these techniques, the fire teams should perform the second exercise with the added objective of controlling clip ejection to avoid having the clip eject just before a teammate leaves the ground and needs fire support the most. The rifleman's sequence for movement by pairs will now be: rush, fire two rounds (clip ejects), reload clip, glance at fire team leader, fire two rounds, rush, fire two rounds, glance at fire team leader, fire two rounds, rush, etc. When men are moving by a single-man pattern, a full clip may be fired, with ejection and reloading, during every movement. Although this may sound like a complicated sequence, with practice, the actions become second nature to the men.

When the fire teams are proficient in the above drills they are ready to begin practicing the squad maneuvers outlined in FM 7-10 (1959). Here again definite principles must be observed. No fire team should ever get beyond the control of the squad leader. Every maneuver must be simple, understood by every man (loud oral commands may be necessary) and carried through to its conclusion. Once these basic maneuvers have been rehearsed, the squad assault course is an easy step away.

As a result of these four simple drills, the squad should be displaying some of the cocky confidence and finesse of a crack infield in major league baseball—all a result of their newfound skill as a team. Moving and firing rapidly in patterns of pairs, the speed of the squad should now force the platoon leader observer, if he wants to keep up, to crank along in double time.

Squad members should be so responsive to control that the squad leader can change their direction as readily and soundlessly as if he were driving a truck. By other silent signals, he can direct the team leaders to change single-man patterns to patterns with pairs moving or vice-versa.

Infantry squads in the 24th Division took special pride in their "Groundpounders Rock and Roll," and frequently challenged other teams to races, maneuvering through the chow area (just to show the cooks), practicing figure eights, or setting their own distance records. When a training drill results in this type of *esprit,* its value in preparing troops for combat cannot be overemphasized.

For although it is well for the individual Infantryman to know the patterns of movement, in the end it is this *esprit*—this feeling of belonging to the team—which will cause him to rush forward in the face of enemy fire, to close with the enemy and destroy him.



1ST LT EDWIN W. MARTIN JR., a 1956 graduate of the United States Military Academy, has attended the Basic Infantry Officers Course, the Airborne School and the Ranger School. In 1957 he was assigned duty in Germany where he served with the 11th Airborne Division as a platoon leader, 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, and as a platoon leader and assistant S1, 2d Airborne Battle Group, 502d Infantry. He has also served as a platoon leader, assistant S1 and aide-de-camp to the Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division, and aide-de-camp to the Commanding General, XXI U. S. Army Corps. Lt. Martin is currently on orders to the Eighth Army.

INFANTRY FORUM

FLASHBACK

by Sgt Buckhorn

FOLLOWING a desperate foraging expedition to the refrigerator during the station break, we return to our TV set where, following two commercials and a word from the alternate sponsor, the sound of gunfire signals the start of our favorite western.

It is a typical day in the dusty little western town of Leavenworth. From one end of town's only street, the grim U.S. Marshal treads determinedly toward the saloon at the middle of the long row of wooden facades. At the other end of the street, the villain strides stealthily toward him. Suddenly, after an appropriate exchange of insults, the villain draws his single-shot weapon and fires eight rounds in rapid succession. The marshal reacts quickly and also discharges a bevy of bullets. A cloud of dust obscures the scene. "Who got shot?" we naively ask ourselves.

As the dust settles, we do not see the streets of Leavenworth. Instead, there appears a scene which took place weeks earlier. In it, we see the villain robbing a stagecoach and shooting the marshal's brother; or, in more recent "adult" westerns, the villain is seen at the age of four, being rejected by his mother. In any event, we're hooked. We have to find out who got shot, and how it all came to pass. Our curiosity will carry us through four commercials and 21 minutes of bad acting, right up to the end when the dust settles and we make another dash to the refrigerator.

Often, in fiction, authors use the "flashback" to create interest. In the very first scene the hero is found in a situation sufficiently interesting to excite our curiosity. In popular mystery novels, the corpse is often discovered on the first page, generally in the first paragraph, sometimes in the first sentence. Even in music, composers often present the main theme or melody at the beginning of their composition and then proceed to variation, embellishment and detail.

MOTIVATION of interest is the idea behind all such devices. Further, the application of these techniques is not limited to entertainment. In fact, their most significant use has been in the field of education. Pioneered by Pestalozzi in Europe and John Dewey in the United States, the idea is to arouse the students' interest in a subject so that they *want* to learn the details. This concept is the foundation of "progressive education," the philosophy which dominates the American school system.

Even the Army has made some concessions to the idea of motivating students by obliquely attracting their interest to a subject. The training film on the use of a map and com-

pass, for example, does not begin with a list of teaching points about grid lines or an explanation of how iron ore deposits in the Hudson Bay region make the compass needle point north. Rather, it begins with a lost GI who wants to find his way back to camp. It continues his story throughout the film, skillfully working in necessary "teaching points."

Yet, in one vitally important area, the Army is missing an opportunity to apply this proved educational technique. That area is the basic training program. In that program, as it now stands, the trainee spends weeks learning a tiresome, *apparently pointless* succession of details about tactics, weapons, map reading, and other subjects. Only late in his basic training does he have a chance to see how all the details fit in and thus realize the significance of the subjects. By then, it is too late.

I contend that in basic training, the soldier should "find the corpse" at once. After all, the purpose of basic training is to prepare a soldier for combat; to march, use his weapons, fight and survive. We should give him a taste of this at the very beginning of basic training. The rest of the program should be "flashback," in which details are related to this initial adventure which provides a frame of reference for all subsequent instruction.

IN IMPLEMENTING this program, we should reduce to two days the administrative preliminaries which now compose the beginning of a recruit's army service. Formal instruction should be limited to the rudiments of close-order drill and military courtesy. After initiation of important personnel records, issuance of weapons and clothing and administrator of physical exams, the trainees would be taken to the field to live, move and fight for three weeks, without benefit of roofs, beds, automobiles, theaters, comic books and all of the other attempts by the Army to duplicate civilian conveniences. Completely detached from civilian life, the trainees learn to do by doing, always with a pressing logical reason. They learn to clean a rifle because they have fired it and it is dirty; they dig a latrine because they need a latrine. Classes are held in the field. The countless man-hours now lost in transporting men from place to place would be saved by taking the instructors to the men as they bivouac near appropriate training courses and ranges.

For a schedule for the first two days in the field, which provides a picture of how this program would work, see Figure 1.

So it would go for three weeks. Camps would be set up near improved training areas. Wheeled vehicles would be used only to move camping equipment, food and water. During this period, all subjects normally taught in basic training would be covered—but not in a classroom, isolated from reality. Rather, they would be taught in their natural setting at the natural time to achieve maximum interest and motivation.

You will notice that the last item on the schedule, sleep, completes what is, in effect, a round-the-clock program of planned activities. Scheduling the entire 24 hours of the day would give uniformity of content control to large blocks of time now left to the discretion—or whim—of persons not always qualified to direct the training and achieve the motivation of recruits.

CURRENTLY, a recruit may look forward to several days of relative idleness after being sworn into the Army. During this time, the pallid imitations of civilian life to which he is treated only serve, regretably, to remind him of his home. Activities consist of endless waiting in lines, signing of papers, and disagreeable chores reminiscent of punishment. In this atmosphere, the recruit easily forms a negative opinion of the Army. The Army's attempts to provide realistic training through a bivouac are too little and too late. A week is hardly sufficient time to adjust to the conditions of outdoor life. Further, by the time bivouac comes, attitudes and habits are well-established. Not only that, most of the instruction has fallen upon deaf ears, for it is psychologically unsound to wait until the end of a period of instruction to make clear the significance of the subject matter being taught.

Educational psychology has made great strides in recent years. Indeed, in the field of educational testing, the Army itself has made significant contributions to those advances; but the basic training program is one important area in which improvements can yet be made. Let's allow the recruit to "find the corpse in the first paragraph" by adopting a program such as I have outlined. If we do, we may motivate our basic trainees to solve the mysteries of basic military subjects with a brilliance befitting the jazz-syncopated sleuths of television's leading crime shows.

FIRST DAY:

0530	Reveille.
0600	Hot breakfast in mess hall.
0700	March three miles cross-country, with frequent breaks for rest and instruction in terrain features, water discipline, first aid, etc.
1100	Noon meal: field rations.
1230	March one mile cross-country to point adjacent to rifle range. There receive camping equipment.
1400	Pitch tents, dig latrines, set up headquarters tents, etc.
1700	Mess: heated field rations.
1800	Sick call; mail call.
1830	Free time for cleaning gear, etc.
2100	Taps; sleep.

SECOND DAY:

0530	Reveille, etc.
0730	Assemble at rifle range; watch demonstration of expert marksmanship.
0800	Break; opportunity for informal mingling with trained soldiers.
0830	Instructions in range safety; firing of a clip of live rounds by each man.
0930	Introduction to rudimentary mechanical training with weapon, especially proper cleaning.
1100	Noon break: hot rations.
1230	Hike cross-country with rifle and pack; athletics upon return.
1700	Same as first day.

EQUIPMENT: Field uniform with steel helmet; light field pack including toilet articles; one ration meal; entrenching tool; rifle.

Figure 1

Soviet Land Mine Warfare

by MAJ LEON N. UTTER, USMC

IN JUNE 1941, the survival of the Soviet Union hinged on stopping German armored advances by any and all available means. A way of doing this, borne of desperation, was created, and in the years since that crucial period, the Soviets have become masters in the employment of that means: land mine warfare.

Even today, certain characteristics of the Russians' employment of mines can be traced to those times early in World War II. Initially, the Soviet Army had used standard patterns in laying minefields, their philosophies and doctrines on mine warfare being outgrowths of Anglo-American thoughts on the subject. In the desperate days of holding back the Germans, however, the need for speed and the use of inexperienced troops led to a practice which brought unexpected success. Instead of laying neat, systematic, recorded minefields, the Russians "just put 'em out." The Germans began to come upon haphazard areas laden with mines. Not only were the patterns of the minefields varied, the mines themselves were unpredictable. Even today the outstanding characteristic of Soviet mines is their almost total lack of safety devices. It was random fields of these mines which finally halted the German onslaught. This the Soviets never forgot.

By the time the Red Army had regained the offensive, they had special Mobile Obstacle Units (POZ) of battalion size which were well organized and highly trained. It was only natural, therefore, that these units be employed in offensive actions to install temporary defensive or protective minefields.

Currently, Soviet land mine warfare doctrine embraces an extensive and quite varied use of mines. Usage extends down to and includes the platoon level, where each strongpoint is completely surrounded by minefields in defensive situations. During the offense, the Soviet rifle regiment commander has three special Mobile Obstacle Units (POZ) attached, the strength of these units varying from 25 to 30 men each. These units quickly seal off all possible approaches to the regiment's flanks by the lavish use of mines. As the regiment makes further gains, the Mobile Obstacle Units quickly retrieve the hastily emplaced mines for future use. For this reason, it is often said that the Soviets employ mines as an *offensive* weapon. Although the regiment itself may be on

an over-all offensive, in reality the POZ units are laying mines to *defend* battalion assembly areas, the flanks of advancing columns, and vital terrain subject to counterattack. Attack positions and intermediate objectives, when seized, become sites for hasty minefields capable of being quickly removed for re-use of the mines.

The Soviets also make maximum use of enemy mines captured in the field. In World War II, German units reported losing entire minefields overnight to Russian "mine pickers." This technique was also used by the Chinese Communists in Korea. The removal, breaching, clearing, and theft of enemy minefields is an Engineer task in the Soviet Army, as is the over-all responsibility for the development of mine warfare tactics, techniques and equipment.

Every Soviet division (or higher) commander has the authority to order the laying of minefields. He may delegate this authority to his company commanders. While maintaining a purely defensive posture, the Soviet commander will employ mines much as we do, with the added technique of sending the special Mobile Obstacle Units to infiltrate the enemy rear for the purpose of emplacing mines on lines of communications.

A look at the Soviet field manuals reveals that some of the Russians' minefield techniques are similar to our own. For example, antitank and antipersonnel mines are often mixed in the same field, antitank mines are laid with a density of one per yard of front, and recording of all minefields is required. But here the similarity ends, for no standard minefield pattern is used. German experience in World War II indicates that although the Soviets' rear area minefields were extensively marked and recorded, their front-line minefields were simply planted. Soviet doctrine does not specify a standard form of minefield marking other than to state that a single strand of barbed wire fencing *or any other system* may be used. German experience was that "any other system" was likely to be things such as notched trees, rock monuments, narrow ditches only a few

inches deep, lines of rock or piles of brush. Sometimes they used only a single strand of wire, standing about 30 inches above the ground. At any rate, markers were likely to be on the Russian side only, or at the most, on that side plus the left and right boundaries.

The primary mine warfare countermeasure of the Soviets is minefield reconnaissance, a subject strongly emphasized in training and in field manuals. In World War II, minefield reconnaissance by the Russians often reached deep into German territory well before the Germans realized that a Soviet offensive was in the making.

Also mentioned in the Soviet manuals are methods for breaching safe lanes through enemy minefields. One technique involves the use of creeping or rolling barrages, concentrated in a narrow channel through the minefield. However, this is considered costly, time consuming, wasteful, and not too reliable. A more common method of breaching minefields was inadvertantly revealed by Marshall Zhukov. Speaking to General Eisenhower at the end of the war in praise of the courage of the Russian troops, Zhukov said, "When we come to a minefield, our infantry attacks exactly as if it were not there. The losses we suffer from mines we consider only equal to those we would have gotten from machinegun and artillery fire had the enemy chosen to defend with troops rather than minefields."

In essence, what we know about Soviet mine warfare doctrine may be summarized as follows:

- The Soviets employ mines extensively in all types of operations.
- Specialized Engineer and Mobile Obstacle Units are available to carry out the bulk of mining tasks and countermeasures.
- Soviets usually attempt rapid emplacement of mines on all objectives or critical terrain, when seized, as a means of stopping counterattacks.
- Soviet mines are varied in type and size, and are equipped with few or no safety devices.
- Soviet minefields have no standard pattern and are poorly marked.
- Extensive reconnaissance of enemy minefields is attempted by the Soviets.
- Enemy minefields are subject to removal and subsequent employment against the enemy by the Soviets.
- The Soviets will sometimes accept heavy personnel losses in exchange for the rapid breaching and crossing of minefields.

Someone once said, speaking figuratively, "You have to watch your step when you're dealing with the Russians." Now, with the extensive and expert use of land mine warfare by the Soviets, this statement becomes literally true on the battlefield. Russian willingness to sacrifice personnel in order to permit liberal employment of mines makes their use of these devices doubly dangerous to us. It took a national crisis and a desperate military predicament to turn the attention of the Soviets to the use of mines. Let us hope that we will not wait for such a crisis before embracing this vital—possibly decisive—battlefield technique: land mine warfare.

MAJ LEON N. UTTER, USMC, entered the Marine Corps in May 1942 and was commissioned from enlisted status in September 1948. He served with the 1st Marine Division from July 1943 until November 1945 at Guadalcanal, in Australia, New Guinea, New Britain, Peliliu and Okinawa. Major Utter attended Basic Course, Marine Corps School, Quantico, Virginia, in 1948, the Naval Gunfire Support School, Little Creek, Virginia, in 1949, and the Infantry Officers Advanced Course in 1957. From October 1955 until July 1957, Major Utter was assigned as a company commander and battalion S3 in Marine Corps Test Unit No. 1. He is now serving in the Training Branch, G3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.

THE OPPOSING FORCES TEST

by CAPT ROBERT D. NEWTON

A realistic new approach to the ATT

EVERY unit commander at one time or another has said to himself, "When I'm Chief of Staff, things may not be any better, but they're surely going to be different." Well, I am not the Chief of Staff (yet), but I would like to suggest a simple change in our tactical training: a different way to organize a company's Army Training Test. For convenience, we may call the altered version an "Opposing Forces Test."

Figures 1 through 4 describe the general conduct of the test. However, a few samples of the orders, when coupled with the illustrations, might give you a better idea as to the various missions that may be assigned to the tested companies. So let's go through the routine a company would follow in this test.

It is two o'clock in the morning. The Chief Controller (deputy battle group commander) has just handed the first order to the Blue Company Commander. "First Battle Group, First Infantry, will move from present location [base camp] to forward assembly area, coordinates 1111, and prepare for future operations." It is worthy of note at this time that the other tested company (Red) will receive essentially the same message, but will move to an assembly area at the opposite end of the maneuver site. It is also of interest that the company commanders will not be sure of their initial mission—be it offensive or defensive—until they have moved to their forward assembly areas.

But let us follow the Blue Company Commander through the maneuver, keeping in mind that Red Company is also being tested and that both units, at the completion of the test, will have performed the same missions. In the forward assembly area the Blue Company CO receives his next order: Delay. By 0800, we find that the Blue Commander is nearing his first delay line. The messages he receives from battle group indicate that Red Company has air supremacy, and will attack in force across the entire front. By 1045, the momentum of this attack has forced Blue Company off delay lines 1 and 2. Late in the afternoon, Blue receives a new mission: "Defend in zone until 2200 hours." At 1700 Blue receives further orders to conduct a night withdrawal commencing at 2200. Until that time, Blue's position is sufficiently strong to hold Red long enough to permit, concealed by darkness, withdrawal to a battle group blocking position. As darkness falls over the battlefield the men of the Blue force quietly prepare to withdraw. The detachments left in contact assume control at 2200 hours, and by 0100 hours the company has broken contact.

Meanwhile, at the battle group CP, which controls the companies during the test, a glance at the situation map (being maintained by the S2/S3 section) makes it obvious that Red Company's position is not sound. Blue Company now has air superiority. The controller has indicated to Blue that nuclear support is now available. Blue's next mission: attack. Red's mission: defend.

During the remainder of the night Blue Company aggressively patrols, and locates the flank of the Red Company. On the basis of this and other information, Blue Company prepares to attack at 0830. First, however, they hit Red Company with a nuclear strike which, although on time, is not as successful as planned. Blue finds that the Red force is still able to muster a strong defense. However, by 1600 hours Blue secures the objective and receives orders to continue the attack in darkness. Conversely, Red Company is now conducting various delaying actions.

By now you have been able to see the various roles that both tested units are required to perform. We will, therefore, leave the Blue forces as the company commander is preparing his plans for—you guessed it—a night attack.

You will note that although the test is basically simple, it requires a lot of communications in order to control things properly. You can see that wire communication must be established prior to the start of the maneuver for the use of group headquarters and the exercise's control personnel. The control wire is not utilized by the tested companies.



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

Time	Red Force	Blue Force	Issued By
0200		Issued warning order and movement order, moves to forward assy area.	Chief Controller
0300	Issued warning order and movement order, moves to forward assy area.		Chief Controller
0400		Crosses IP.	
0500	Crosses IP.		
0630		Issued order to move to delay line.	Co Umpire
0730	Issued order to move to contact.		Co Umpire
0800		Moves to delay line.	
0915		Closes delay line.	
0945	Moves to contact.		
1045	Contacts Blue Force.		
1100	Red attacks.	Blue delays.	
1215	Red continues to attack.	Blue continues to delay.	
1630	Seized obj 3. Issued order to consolidate and prepare for night attack. Issued night attack order.	Blue ordered to hold until 2200. Issued night withdrawal order.	Co Umpire
2200		Commences night withdrawal.	
2300	Crosses LD night attack.		
0100	Secures obj.	Closes blocking position.	
0130	Patrol activities.	Patrol activities.	
0300	Issued delay order.	Issued attack order.	Co Umpire
0800	Enemy nuclear wpn on flank.	Friendly nuclear wpn (to flank of Red).	
0830	Commences to delay.	Attacks.	
1000	Continues to delay.	Continues to attack.	
1400	Issued order to hold Blue south of delay line 4 until 1600.		Co Umpire
1600	Issued order to defend until 2200.		Co Umpire
1700	Issued order for night withdrawal not prior to 2200.	Issued night attack order.	Co Umpire
2200	Commences night withdrawal.		
2300		Crosses LD night attack.	
0100	Occupies blocking position.	Secures obj.	
0130	Patrol activities.	Patrol activities.	
0500	TEST TERMINATES.		

However, the battle group does attach wire teams to each rifle company. The company commanders may request wire communications as the need arises, a process which also provides training for the battle group wire teams. In the conduct of the operations, the companies use radio communication extensively. Each rifle company is assigned a different command frequency. This allows both companies to communicate with battle group simultaneously. The Red and Blue control personnel are assigned two frequencies: one so they may communicate with group, and one so they may communicate with each other. There are enough frequencies assigned to the battle group to establish all necessary radio nets.

Control of the exercise originates at two locations: the tested companies are assigned umpires at all levels down through the platoons and battle group, in operating a field command post, issues orders, instructions and intelligence information for the two companies. It is important that these umpires and control personnel be chosen carefully, for the very purpose of this or any Army Training Test is to gauge accurately the unit's proficiency, serving as an indication of the degree of combat readiness achieved by the unit. The control personnel must be able to interpret and communicate what the test indicates in this respect. The opposing forces test helps them to do this in several ways.

First, it forces the commander to perform missions which he would have to do if his unit were to enter combat. Second, it is a *realistic* means of instruction. Next, the units being tested go into the exercise with the same previous training, unlike training situations in which experienced, seasoned "aggressors" oppose green recruits. Further, the battle group commander can, by observing this exercise, determine the level of proficiency that his company-size units have reached, note weak points which may have been previously overlooked, and prescribe additional

training to be conducted before battle group begins to train as a unit. Finally, the morale of the men and the *esprit de corps* within the companies will be high during this type of training.

Incidentally, not only do the trainees benefit from this exercise, but control personnel and cadre do also, gaining valuable experience in communications, operations, intelligence and logistics. This training pays dividends later when the entire battle group is tested as a unit.

The ultimate goal of any unit is, of course, success in combat. Reaching that goal in peacetime depends almost entirely on tactical training. There are many ideas about the conduct of that tactical training, but I believe that the opposing forces test is one of the best ways that you, as commander, can reach that vital goal.

Proposed Umpire Personnel

1. Chief Controller—Deputy Battle Group Commander
2. Company Commander Umpires—Battle Group Executive Officer
   Battle Group S2
3. Rifle Platoon Umpires—
   Red—1. Lt, XO, Hq Co
   2. Capt, Ln Off, Hq Co
   3. Lt, XO, Cmbt Spt Co

   Blue—1. Capt, Ln Off, Hq Co
   2. Lt, Radar Sec, Cmbt Spt Co
   3. Lt, Asslt Wpns Plt, Cmbt Spt Co
4. Weapons Platoon Umpires—
   Red—Lt, FO, Cmbt Spt Co
   Blue—Lt, FO, Cmbt Spt Co

CAPT. ROBERT D. NEWTON received his commission through OCS in 1951. During World War II he served in the European Theater, and during the Korean War was with the 223d Infantry Regiment as platoon leader, executive officer, and company commander. He has also served as a battalion S4, company commander, assistant BG S3 and BG S4 in subsequent assignments. Captain Newton attended the Advanced Course in 1960. He is now an ROTC instructor at Southwest Missouri State College.

COMBAT LESSONS

Following are extracts from *Combat Lessons* (World War II Combat Reports) and *Combat Report from Korea*. They are brief, pertinent and worthwhile to Infantrymen.

Weapons Platoon Section Leader: "The bazooka and recoilless rifle should be bore-sighted before each combat mission and rechecked during lulls in fighting. . . ."

Squad Leader: "A good foxhole should be about four feet deep. . . . If a man is lazy and digs only a foot or two, he's not digging a foxhole—he's only digging his grave. . . ."

Squad Leader Rifle Platoon: ". . . . Let's have more preparation and reconnaissance before the attack. . . . There were too many five-paragraph field orders abbreviated to 'there's the hill, let's go'. . . ."

AR Gunner: ". . . . I personally carried extra firing pins and gas cylinder plugs for my weapon . . . also oil and patches . . . most of my stoppages came from lack of lubrication."

Rifleman: ". . . . I used two pocket warmers to dry my boots out at night. . . . That is, when I was able to take my boots off. . . ."

Assistant AR Gunner: ". . . . If I were doing it over again, I would say that I should have learned in training how to get along on nothing. As a part of the battle hardening course, why not let the men do without sleep and food for a day or two? Then knock out a few of their leaders and see how they function. . . . That's how it happens in combat. . . ."

Rifle Platoon Leader: ". . . . I had my squad leaders carry sniper's rifles with several clips of tracer ammunition for the designation of targets. . . ."

Heavy Weapons Company Commander: ". . . . I wish there were some way to make the supported elements, particularly the platoons, efficiently use supporting weapons . . . too often we have found platoon leaders placing their riflemen in position, and then emplacing the supporting machineguns, more or less as an afterthought. . . ."

Rifle Platoon Leader: ". . . . In the assault, my platoon runner carried the panel set. . . . Whenever we needed it, we always had it. . . ."

Radio Operator: ". . . . We improvised a waterproof cover for our radios by using a salvage poncho. . . . This will keep the radio from shorting out during a rainy spell. . . ."

Solution

OBJECTIVE: POLNA

(Continued from page 11)

MAJOR HALLIGAN stepped out of his chopper and made his way to the S2-S3 tent. He thought for a moment about what sort of planning guidance the battle group commander would have for this operation. Then he realized that there was no point in speculating. With the old man, you never could predict which way the wind would blow.

Fortunately, Halligan didn't have to wait long to find out. As he entered the S2-S3 tent, he found the battle group commander poring over the situation map. The rest of the staff had been assembled in the room, and Halligan noticed a tense feeling of anticipation, as if they sensed what was coming.

The Colonel called the staff over to the map board and then gave them the word about the division operation. When he dropped the bombshell about the airmobile assault on POLNA, there was a long, low whistle from the rear of the room. Evidently, someone else shared Major Halligan's opinion that this wasn't going to be a cake-walk.

After a few comments about the division plan, the BG CO issued his guidance; it was simple and direct: "We are going to have to seize and hold these bridges (A, B, C and D, Map C) for at least nine hours until the 2d BG, 7th Inf, coming up from the south, links up with us. We will have to push out to high ground and hold it in order to secure the crossing area . . . and we should land the units on or as close to their objectives as possible." The Colonel then mentioned that he had unsuccessfully requested attachment of another rifle company to "beef-up" our reserve for this mission. "In spite of this request," he emphasized, "I want you to understand that we have the stuff to do the job." Then he dismissed the staff—and Major Halligan and his assistants in the S3 section went to work on the operation plan.



Map C

After the S3 dispatched a warning order to subordinate units, he sketched out the "backward" planning sequence he would follow. Starting with a choice of objectives and boundaries, he worked progressively back to the loading area.

The choice of objectives was not too difficult. Objective 1 (the bridges) was virtually assigned by division. It was imperative that these four bridges be quickly seized and secured. Halligan realized that the enemy engineer platoon in the town posed the greatest threat to the bridges. Since the civilians in the area were friendly, but passive, they did not influence this choice of objectives.

Objective 2 and 3 were selected because, being high ground, they dominated the bridges and their approaches. If the enemy were to con-

trol Objectives 2 and 3, they could probably prevent the seizure of Objective 1; therefore, early seizure of 2 and 3 was required.

Halligan

Objective 4 was chosen to block the valley approach from the south. The most imminent enemy threat (aside from the engineer platoon in POLNA) was from the south, and early establishment of defensive positions astride this avenue was considered vital. Major Halligan located this objective in such a way that Company A would be required to seize a portion of the buildings on the outskirts of POLNA. Captain Taylor could integrate these buildings (most of which were of stone construction) into his defense, thus considerably increasing his company's defensive strength while awaiting link-up.

The S3 also selected Objectives 5, 6 and 7 which were on dominant terrain controlling avenues of approach from the west, north and southwest respectively. Further, Objective 5 (Hill 405) dominated Objective 3.

When Major Halligan reviewed his choice of objectives, he was satisfied that their seizure was within the capability of the battle group and that control of them would materially assist the accomplishment of the mission. To ensure that no stone was left unturned in this planning, the S3 reviewed aerial photos of the objective area and verified his original analysis of objectives. He also arranged to make a reconnaissance flight over the area later that afternoon.

The S3 then worked on the designation of boundaries and assignment of responsibilities for seizure of objectives and for clearing the enemy as necessary from within each sector. He determined that it would require one company to seize the bridges and dispose of the enemy engineer platoon in POLNA. The remainder of the objective area was divided by a natural boundary (the ORVAY River) which influenced the distribution of tasks to the remaining four rifle companies.

Two rifle companies were located generally north of the ORVAY, each with fairly equal zones, but with Co. C responsible for securing two objectives. Essentially the same situation existed south of the river, where Co. A was responsible for securing two objectives. Major Halligan was

Kovac

not happy to have an unfordable river splitting his objective area, but by placing an adequate force on each side of the river, he was convinced he had made the most of a bad situation.

Once the S3 had firmed up most of the details for the assault, he turned again to the problem of defending the objective area. He knew, even at the very outset of his planning, that his defensive scheme would be basically the same as a perimeter variation of the position defense. He also recognized that the boundaries selected for the assault would, in this case, work equally well in the defense. Before he selected the limiting points, however, Major Halligan again looked at the terrain to review its impact on his defensive scheme (Map C).

He noted, first of all, that the HONETA River on the east provided a natural obstacle which was overlooked by excellent defensive terrain. On the north and west, the high ground, steep slopes and generally open terrain afforded good observation and long-range fields of fire. The terrain to the south was flat and open. Based on these terrain considerations, the S3 located limiting points in such a way as to establish the FEBA on the most defensible terrain within the objective area.

When Major Halligan checked his recommended FEBA, he noted that it measured about 8500 meters, of which about 2000 meters were shielded by the HONETA River. Considering that the terrain was generally open and that the link-up with the division task force was anticipated before dark, it appeared that the perimeter was not excessive for the battle group to defend.

At this point, Major Halligan reviewed his assignment of objectives and boundaries. He mentally evaluated each company against the tasks he had given it. All in all, it looked about right. Since all companies were at about the same strength, he had given the toughest jobs to the three best company commanders, Taylor, Kovac and Walters.

The S3 then turned his attention to the source, location and strength of the forces for the RSP (Recon-

Walters

naissance and Security Position). Since these forces would have to provide early warning of an enemy attack and prevent enemy ground reconnaissance and close observation

into the perimeter, the S3 located the outposts on terrain which afforded observation of enemy avenues of approach (Map D).

In all, Major Halligan selected 10 outposts, including four roadblocks (1, 2, 6 and 10). As he sketched the location of the outposts and roadblocks on his overlay, he tried to place them well forward of the FEBA in order to give the earliest possible information of the enemy's approach. He was also influenced by the range of the battle group radios (AN/PRC-10s [8 km] and AN/VRQ-3s [16 km]) and the maximum range of supporting weapons within the battle area (4.2" mortars @ 5500 meters). He realized that in the assault and early stages of the defense he would be without most of the normal artillery support.

The forces employed on the RSP were designated from the Engineer Platoon (less a three-man detachment attached to Co. B and less all vehicles larger than ¼ ton), and from the Reconnaissance Platoon (less the tank section and all APCs). The Engineer Platoon (-) was initially attached to the Reconnaissance Platoon.

In deciding to recommend use of these platoons on the RSP, the S3 was influenced by their capabilities and the requirements to construct and man roadblocks and to prepare bridges for demolition on roads leading into the FEBA. He also felt there was an immediate requirement for a small detachment to assist Co. B in detecting and removing any demolitions which may be fixed to the ORVAY River bridges. Lastly, these outposts, if still held, would facilitate link-up with the 2d BG, 7th Inf.

Initial control of the RSP was retained by battle group, because the assault companies would have their hands full in the early stages of the attack. Once the assault was completed, however, the RSP would be reinforced by assault company elements, and control of the RSP would pass to the company commanders. (This change in control of the RSP is shown by dashed boundary lines from the FEBA to the RSP. These boundaries become effective on order.)

The source, location, and size of the reserve posed similar problems for the S3. He was torn between maintaining a strong reserve to influence any action, and giving the assaulting companies sufficient force to perform their difficult tasks. The river in the middle of the defensive area also posed a problem as to where the reserve should be positioned.

Major Halligan decided to recommend an initial reserve of two platoons, one on each side of the river. This would complicate control, but it was essential that each side have an immediately available reserve, since the bridge could conceivably be blown. This two-platoon reserve was designated from Companies D and E, each of which had only one objective; this was accomplished by having the battle group commander place a "string" on the employment of these two platoons by the companies.

Once the assault was completed, these platoons would revert to their parent units, and Company B (-) would be designated battle group reserve. At the same time, the boundary between Companies B and C would be eliminated, and Company C would receive attachment of one platoon from B in order to strengthen the position. Thus, the reserve mission for Captain Kovac relieved him of responsibility for a sector of the FEBA *after* the assault.

Although Captain Walters (Co. C) questioned whether he could stretch his unit to cover the additional frontage when he took over Co. B's sector, it was pointed out that most of



Map D

the sector was along an unfordable river and the attached platoon from Co. B could undoubtedly handle it. In this phase of the operation, the S3 recommended positioning the new BG reserve in the vicinity of the bridges so that it could perform its missions either north or south of the river.

Although the S3 recognized the undesirability of splitting his reserve, he knew that he had the dual threat from the north and the south. Additionally, he reasoned that, should the need arise to mass the reserve, he could use helicopters to shift either platoon across the river. He had made a specific point of obtaining four H-34s and two H-13s from division to assist him in such problems within the battle area.

Once the scheme of maneuver was completed, the S3 considered how to land the force in the objective area. The S3, S2 and the liaison officer from the 132d Tac Trans Avn Bn worked together on this problem.

The first step in this process was accomplished by the S2 who, assisted by the liaison officer from the helicopter unit, determined suitable landing areas based upon technical requirements of the helicopter. Then, based upon requirements to support his scheme of maneuver, the S3 recommended the exact locations (landing zones or LZs) at which his units were to be landed (Map E).

The selected LZs could be easily recognized from the air and would favorably dispose of the troops for seizing initial objectives. Following the CO's guidance, an attempt was made to land troops on their objectives. Where this could not be done, a zone was selected which provided the best and closest approach to the objective. In addition, consideration was given to placing LZs far enough apart to prevent 'copters from landing in overlapping patterns and to ensure accurate ground orientation by pilots and transported troops. Major Halligan wanted to avoid repeating the sad experience of the 93d Infantry, which landed units in the wrong areas because of inaccurate orientation.

Essentially, the selection of LZs for the airmobile assault stacked up like this:

- Co. A: LZs Q-2 and K-1
- Co. B: LZs Q-1 and P
- Co. C: LZs H-1 and H-2
- Co. D: LZ H-3
- Co. E: LZ K-2
- Hv Mort Plat: LZ I was centrally located on the large flat area in the ORVAY River valley. It was decided that this would also be the location of initial firing positions for the 4.2-inch mortars. All ammunition was to be landed at this same LZ, thus minimizing hand carrying.
- Aslt Wpn Plat: LZ Q-1 and LZ K-2 were selected so as to land the Assault Weapon Platoon on the most dangerous avenues of approach into the FEBA. In view of the shortage of antitank weapons and the need for flexibility in their use, the Assault Wpn Plat was given a GS (general support) mission.
- HQ & HQ Co and R&S Forces: LZs N, F and L, on the RSP, placed security forces on their objectives, thus expediting construction of roadblocks and early establishment of security. The remainder of the R&S forces landed on, or as close as possible to, their objectives. Since, in some cases, only a small number of personnel was to be located at a given position, it became necessary for these choppers to land at more than one LZ.
- HQ Co (-) landed at LZs J and K-1. The BG CP was located in the vicinity of LZ J.



Map E

Headquarters and logistical installations required south of the river landed at LZ K-1.

- Cmbt Spt Co (-): The short-range radar teams were attached to the rifle companies and were therefore transported with them. One medium-range radar team was transported with Co. D so that the radar could be located in the vicinity of Hill 405. The second medium-range team was transported with that portion of HQ Co. (-) which was landed at LZ K-1. From this position it was able to provide surveillance in the southern part of the objective area. Cmbt Spt Co. Hq (-) was transported with Co. B and landed on LZ Q-1. From there it established an alternate BG CP on the outskirts of POLNA.

Even after the detailed thought given to the selection of landing zones, the S3 found that additional work was required on landing control measures. He reasoned that since the entire operation was to take place in one lift, with good visibility and wide deployment on many landing zones, there appeared to be no critical need for pathfinders. Even if there were, the need was far outweighed by the risk of losing surprise. In any event, the BG commander had the capability of employing BG personnel as pathfinders for subsequent resupply missions if the need arose. This operation was relatively simple and there appeared to be no need for TOE pathfinder teams.

Even with all of these major planning steps completed, Major Halligan still found a need for additional work on the airmobile assault plans. There remained a requirement to organize the helicopters into serials, choose loading areas, and designate flight routes and air control points (ACPs).

Organizing helicopters into serials posed no difficult problems. Basically, it involved drawing up a table (Figure 1) which showed how the units would take off and land. To facilitate preparation of this and other air movement details, the subordinate units had already prepared loading SOPs which helped to determine aircraft requirements.

The S3 worked closely with the aviation liaison officer and the BG S2 on the selection of flight routes. Route RED (Map F) was selected as the primary route for both the approach and the return of the helicopters, since it avoided enemy strength, provided deception, and took best advantage of terrain.

Of course, using this route required coordination of plans for movement and fire support with the adjacent 72d Inf Div, since the boundary with this division was in the center of the HONETA River. Further, attention had to be given to flak suppression missions to be fired and coordinated in the 72d Div zone just across the LC (line of contact) and the river.

Route BLUE was selected as the alternate route for approach and return. It, too, was easy to follow, but was not selected as the primary route because 'copters following this route would be endangered by fire from the enemy AA position. Also, since Route BLUE included terrain most suited for the attack of the 2d BG, 7th Inf, any flight of helicopters would restrict artillery fires supporting the attack of the 2/7 Infantry.

Selection of the same route for the approach and return was made because it simplified delivery of supporting artillery fires for the air movement. While it would have been desirable to lay a carpet of fire along any and all flight routes, artillery support was limited. Therefore, the S3 placed great stress on close coordination of fires along the selected route during the air movement. To aid in this, an air corridor, located astride the flight route and extending



Map F

Serial	Trans Avn Unit	Trans-ported Unit	No Hel	Load Area	Load Time	IP	RP	Destination (LZ or Obj)
1	132 Tac Trans Avn Bn	Recon Plat Engr Plat	14	G	0451	0459	0506	5-LZ N, 4-LZ F 2-LZ L, 3 to RSP Positions 3, 4, 5, 7, &8
2	132 Tac Trans Avn Bn	Co B Cbt Spt Co (-)	16	B	0453	0501	0508	16-Obj 1
3	132 Tac Trans Avn Bn	Co D Med Rg Radar Tm	12	D	0455	0503	0510	12-Obj 5
4	132 Tac Trans Avn Bn	Co E Aslt Wpn Plat (-)	15	E	0457	0505	0512	15-Obj 7
5	132 Tac Trans Avn Bn	Co C	12	C	0459	0507	0514	5-Obj 6, 7-Obj 3
6	132 Tac Trans Avn Bn	Hv Mort Plat Hq Co (-)	16	H	0501	0509	0516	6-LZ I, 10-LZ J
7	132 Tac Trans Avn Bn	Co A Hq Co (-)	19	A	0503	0511	0518	11-Obj 4, 8-Obj 2

Figure 1

from the loading area to the No Fire Line in the objective area, was designated for this operation.

Air control points (ACPs), including an initial point (IP) and release point (RP), were selected for routes RED and BLUE to ensure control of the air column and to help define flight routes. ACPs were designated at clearly identifiable terrain features.

Within the assembly area, loading areas were selected so that units could quickly load the choppers with a minimum of movement. After the loading areas were selected, the S3's attention turned to the plans for link-up. First of all, liaison officers were exchanged between the 1/87 and 2/7 at the beginning of the planning, and these officers remained with the other unit until the link-up was complete. Personnel in the 1st BG, 87th Inf, were directed to wear a white arm band on the right arm and link-up forces wore one on the left arm.

Radio contact between the 1/87 and 2/7 was established as early as possible. This was facilitated before the operation by an exchange of call signs, frequencies and SOIs. Fire support plans of the two battle groups were similarly exchanged. At the direction of the division commander, over-all control of the link-up was vested in the CO, 1st BG, 87th Inf.

Plans were made to have the 1/87 fire a red parachute flare when the advancing link-up force was sighted. A green parachute flare fired by the advancing force was the planned acknowledgement. RSP positions 2, 4 and 6 were chosen as link-up points.

Plans were also made for quick passage of Task Force STARR after link-up between the 1/87 and 2/7 Battle Groups. Units in the 1/87 were directed to furnish guides along the highway to expedite passage of TF STARR through POLNA.

After this planning had been accomplished, the S3 reviewed every aspect including the use of supporting fires. With the assistance of the FSC, plans had been prepared for fires in the objective area during the attack and defense. Additionally, plans were made for supporting fires to clear and isolate the flight routes. Major Halligan noted that there was extensive use of smoke planned to mark the flight routes, to aid in navigation and to partially screen the air movement. No fires were planned in the objective area before the attack, as this might compromise the element of surprise. The S3 gave particular attention to the use of close air support and fire support by Army Aviation aircraft. The latter were used in delivering suppressive fires during the air movement, just before landing, and during the assault and defense of the objective area.

The S3 then analyzed his plan to check on the vulnerability of the unit to CBR and nuclear attack. Even though neither of these weapons had yet been used by either side, consideration had to be given to this possibility.

After this analysis, the S3 was convinced that he had done as much as possible to reduce unit vulnerability to these weapons. In this operation, it was to be accomplished in the following manner: after seizing their objectives and clearing the enemy from within their assigned portions of the objective area, the rifle companies were directed to dispatch approximately two-thirds of their strength forward to the RSP, at which time the RSP passed to company control. Reconnaissance elements, in turn, reconnoitered forward of their previous positions on the RSP. In the face of a determined enemy attack, it was planned to withdraw to the FEBA.

As the S3 completed his study of unit vulnerability to CBR and nuclear weapons, it appeared that every aspect of the operation had been considered. At this point, Major Halligan thought again about how much airmobile operations had changed since his schooling at Leavenworth. He was also struck by the complete simplicity of these operations. There was no longer an airhead or airhead line (the FEBA and battle area are used as in normal land combat), no assembly areas were required (the troops can now land as a cohesive unit on or near the objective), and no manifests were needed. If you're going, just get in.

Major Halligan reflected on the basic simplicity of airmobile operations, and he was grateful for it. In this case (as in most operations) there simply wasn't time to produce a large volume of written plans. It had to be done "off the cuff" and

that was the way he liked it—flexible, but not limp. He was satisfied that the plans were thorough and yet simple. As an example, he noted with satisfaction that his order was abbreviated to two overlays showing the scheme of maneuver, ground link-up, air movement (showing the loading area, flight route, altitude, speed, LZs, IPs, RPs, etc.), and the aircraft allocation plan including aircraft numbers and the time and place of loading. Moreover, subordinate units were given missions which they were capable of completing. There was no doubt in his mind that the battle group could do its job.

Only a few hours after the division order had been issued, Major Halligan presented his plan to the battle group commander for approval. The colonel accepted the S3's solution, and minutes later it was in the hands of troops. By noon of the next day, the link-up was completed with the 2d BG, 7th Inf. And even though the enemy had put up a stiff fight in an effort to destroy the bridges, the 1/87 accomplished its mission without a hitch. By nightfall, elements of Task Force STARR were pouring across the ORVAY River, on schedule and on their way to the division objective.

That same night, as Major Halligan stood on the outskirts of POLNA and watched the tanks rumble across the bridges, he thought for a moment about the activities of the past two days. It had been hectic at times, but the planning for an airmobile operation had proved to be no more difficult than for any other ground combat operation. It was, he thought, still the same old story—all you have to do is plan your work—then work your plan. The Battle Group would do the rest.

This article is in consonance with current doctrine as taught at the United States Army Infantry School.—Editor.

The FAST Program

by CAPT ROY R. SEVERIN

THE FOREIGN AREA Specialist Training Program (FAST PROGRAM) gives selected officers training related to one of the nine major geographical areas of the world. The program normally extends for four years, the first being spent at the Army Language School, Monterey, California, where the student acquires a working knowledge of the basic language of his area of specialization. The next year is spent at a civilian university, either in the United States or the objective area, to learn the geography, politics, economics, history, anthropology, music, literature and art of the area. The remainder of the program time is spent in or near the area of study, where the student studies further, travels extensively, and lives among the citizens of the country. Thus, the student is able to learn of the total culture of the area, not only through study, but also through experience.

The FAST Officer's training represents an Army investment of about $30,000. Upon graduation, he is normally assigned to duties with one of these agencies: Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; Psychological Warfare; Civil Affairs/Military Government; Judge Advocate General; the Corps of Engineers; Office of the Chief of Transportation; Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence; the Attache System; or military advisory groups and missions.

It should be mentioned that the FAST Officer is not a collector of intelligence data. Rather, he is interested in a more general type of information. One way he obtains such information is by meeting people—not only influential leaders, but the common people. This, coupled with his academic studies, gives him a broad understanding of a nation and its culture.

Some officers fear that the FAST Program might "channelize" their career and prevent their attaining high rank. Although it is true that the FAST Officer is a specialist in the geographic area of his choice, this fact in no way channelizes his career. A look at some of our recent Army leaders proves this. Numbered among the ex-FAST students are Generals Maxwell D. Taylor, Willard G. Wyman, and Thomas S. Timberman. The FAST Officer, after the four-year training period, normally has an implementation tour of three years. He then follows a normal career pattern, attending the regular course of his basic branch and going on to higher schools if his overall record warrants it. No prefix is attached to his MOS to automatically distinguish him from his fellow officers. The only mark is a certificate of graduation and, of course, a notation on his service record.

Officers interested in applying for the FAST Program should be 36 years old or younger; must have a degree from an accredited college or university; must be a first lieutenant, captain or major with at least three years of troop duty; and must have completed less than twelve years of federal service. In addition, Reserve Officers must have been accepted for extended active duty. AR 350-23, C-3 (15 October 1956), contains complete information on the FAST Program.

TERRAIN SEARCHING

by Col Henry E. Kelly (USA Ret.)

During research in the target detection phase of Trainfire I, an interesting sidelight was uncovered. The time-honored method of searching belts of terrain parallel to the observer's front in increments of 50 yards, as described in FM 21-75, became suspect. One major weakness is that an initial hasty overall search for obvious targets is not prescribed. And an observer who begins his visual search in the systematic manner prescribed could well overlook a target at a slightly greater range than the initial belt of terrain surveyed. This "self-preservation" search of an area, taking about 30 seconds, was therefore included in FM 23-71, *Trainfire I*.

Also, the prescribed method requires focusing upon a series of suspected localities within the narrow strip under scrutiny. It is apparently based upon the concept that careful visual examination can detect motionless, properly backgrounded targets. During the research it was determined that such is not the case. Few properly backgrounded motionless targets could be detected even at ranges under 100 yards.

Those who were the most successful observers appeared to achieve results largely through use of their peripheral rather than their focused vision. Suspicious indications of something moving or unnatural would be caught "out of the corner of their eyes." Once attention was thus attracted, direct examination would confirm and mark the location relative to a visible ground object, making detection complete.

Figure 1

Detection aids included unnatural movement of grass or other vegetation, small indications of dust or smoke, and fleeting shine or flash. Other clues were unnatural outlines, color contrasts or the artificial appearance of supposedly natural objects. In nearly all cases, however, initial attention was attracted through peripheral rather than focused observation.

Since peripheral vision constitutes an important factor in the detection of Infantry combat targets, it seems desirable to capitalize upon an individual's wide visual field for the observation of movement. According to a report prepared by the Navy Electronics Laboratory, the field of vision which can detect movement is approximately 188°, or 4° to the rear on either side of an extension of the observer's front. Thus, it would seem that the direction of scanning should be perpendicular to the observer's front. An axis down the center of the sector of observation, followed by two or more parallel searches which further subdivide the sector, would appear to afford the best coverage (Figure 1). In every instance an initial indication would of course be confirmed by subsequent careful focused observation. This appeared to be the method used by many of the more successful observers in the Trainfire research, in some instances unconsciously.

Detailed practical tests of the two conflicting procedures should be conducted to determine beyond question which method is best suited to the Infantryman's combat task. Meanwhile, individual Infantrymen should try the "perpendicular search" to determine whether it improves their powers of terrain observation.

MONTHLY LIST OF INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIAL

The Monthly List, an official publication of the Infantry School, is produced to facilitate the coordination of Infantry doctrine among Army service schools and to offer Infantry School instructional materials to Army agencies which conduct, support or monitor school-type instruction. *The Monthly List* is distributed under the provisions of USCONARC Memorandum Number 48, dated 14 October 1958, and each authorized addressee is furnished one gratuitous copy of any item listed which he specifically requests for official use.

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***Methods of Instruction,** 2203-USAR(RDT). Integrated conference and practical exercise covering the principles and techniques of military instruction and the selection of training aids. $.10

***New Concepts of First Aid,** 2311-USAR(RDT). Integrated conference and demonstration emphasizing the importance of complete, realistic, and continuous training in first aid; introduction to new techniques in the application of first aid; special stress in the use of field expedients to preserve life on the battlefield under conditions of modern warfare. $.10

***Preventive Medicine,** 2312-USAR(RDT). Conference presenting the classification, control, and military importance of disease in modern warfare, emphasizing the relationship of command and medical supervision of preventive medicine aspects to the conservation of manpower. $.10

***Medical Aspects of Nuclear Explosions,** 2314-A2-USAR-(RDT). Conference covering the effects of nuclear weapons upon both military and civilian populations to include nature of injuries, requirements for self-aid and medical support, and the role of the military relative to medical support of civil defense in time of disaster. $.10

***General Considerations of Offensive Combat,** 6035-A6. Conference and practical exercise utilizing sketch maps to cover the basic concepts of offensive operations at the battle group level to include the combat support company. $1.00

Army Aviation Guide, 6105-A2/6106-B1. Introduction to the mission, staff relationships, limitations of army aircraft covering Division, Field Army and future aviation.

***Introduction to Combat Intelligence,** 6205-A2-USAR(RDT). Integrated conference and practical exercise covering the duties of the battle group S2 and organization of the infantry division and battle group intelligence section. $.35

***Combat Surveillance,** 6232-A2-USAR(ADT). Integrated conference and practical exercise including the organization and employment of the infantry division battle group radar section and the infantry division aerial surveillance platoon. $.65

***Counterintelligence Planning,** 6234-A1. Integrated conference and practical exercise covering counterintelligence planning and safeguarding military information. $.60

***Estimate of the Situation,** 6310-A4-USAR(RDT). Integrated conference and practical exercise covering the form and use of the commanders estimate and the operations estimate. $.50

***March Planning,** 6325-A6-USAR(RDT). Practical exercise covering the calculation of time and space factors and related problems involved in the planning of foot and motor marches. $.40

***Command Aspects of Patrolling,** 6335-A2-USAR(RDT). Integrated conference and practical exercise on the fundamentals and techniques of planning, supervising, directing, coordinating and executing patrols. $.35

***Signal Operation Instructions,** July 1960. $.60

***Standing Signal Instructions,** July 1960. $.60

Pamphlet, **Notes on Military Justice.** The preliminary inquiry, rights under article 31, non-judicial punishment, Administrative nonpunitive measures.

TRAINING FILMS

The following training films have been approved for release to requesting units:

GF 10-46, Warehousing Series—Part VI—Fire Protection of Supplies, 28 minutes.

MF 20-9024, Giving a Shop Demonstration, 17 minutes.

TF 3-2880, Radiological Surveys, 22 minutes.

TF 10-2846, Disaster Feeding, 27 minutes.

TF 11-2852, Fundamentals of Radio Trouble Shooting—Part II—Trouble Shooting a Radio Receiver, 29 minutes.

TF 11-2853, Fundamentals of Radio Trouble Shooting—Part III—Trouble Shooting a Radio Transmitter, 25 minutes.

TF 11-2854, Fundamentals of Radio Trouble Shooting—Part IV—Additional Devices and Techniques, 29 minutes.

TF 16-2885, Group Living, 9 minutes.

TF 16-2886, The Golden Rule, 7 minutes.

TF 16-2981, Heritage, 5 minutes.

TF 19-2966, Processing of Evidence—Part I—Preservation and Collection, 36 minutes.

TF 19-2967, Processing of Evidence—Part II— Handling, Evaluating, and Identifying, 18 minutes.

TF 44-2891, The Hawk Battery Launching Platoon—Part III—Loader Operation, 14 minutes.

TF 46-2869, Introduction to Army Aviation, 21 minutes.

TRAINING LITERATURE

The following manuals and other training literature have recently been printed by Department of the Army and are available to instructors through normal publications channels:

Change No. 1 to ROTCM 145-41, Crew-Served Weapons and Gunnery.

ASubjScd 7-21, Weapons Squad Tactical Exercises.

ASubjScd 21-26, Squad Patroling.

Handgun Shooting. Publication of a manual on the art of handgun shooting has been announced by U. S. Army Advanced Marksmanship Unit Headquarters at Fort Benning. The manual, 30 pages in length, explains in great detail—but in layman's language—such subjects as pistol marksmanship fundamentals, shot analysis and coaches' duties, with each portion written by a highly qualified shooter-instructor from AAMU.

The new handbook will be distributed at all clinics conducted by the AAMU. In addition, copies may be obtained by submitting requests to the Commanding Officer, U. S. Army Advanced Marksmanship Unit, Fort Benning, Ga. Applications must contain a statement of need for the manual and the use intended for it.

ARMY RULES FOR IMPOSING ADMINISTRATIVE NONPUNITIVE MEASURES

(Par 128c, MCM, 1951; AR 624-200)

WHO IMPOSES	Any commanding officer who has power to impose appropriate measures.	
UPON WHOM	1. Any military person of his command whose conduct warrants admonition or reprimand, imposed as corrective action, not as punishment (par 128c, MCM, 1951). 2. Any enlisted person whose inefficiency (the definition of which includes misconduct); conviction by civil court; failure to complete training; or impending undesirable discharge warrants reduction in grade (par 28, AR 624-200).	
HOW IMPOSED	Orally or in writing (except that reductions must be announced in orders of the headquarters of the reduction authority) (par 31, AR 624-200).	
	PROCEDURE FOR IMPOSING	
DETERMINE THAT	IF ADMONITION OR REPRIMAND IS TO BE IMPOSED	The person has conducted himself in such a manner as to warrant the admonition or reprimand contemplated.
	IF REDUCTION IS TO BE IMPOSED	1. The reduction you intend to impose is authorized (see maximum reductions authorized, below); 2. That you are authorized to impose the reduction. [NOTE: A commander is not authorized to reduce an enlisted person who is a permanent E5 or above for inefficiency, until he has referred the case to a board of at least 3 officers, and has given due consideration to their findings and recommendations. The commander is not, however, bound by the board's recommendations (par 27e, AR 624-200; 59 JALS 13/10, 8/8).]
ADVISE THE PERSON	1. Of the measures you intend to impose; 2. That he may submit matter in mitigation, extenuation, or defense, but that he is not required to make a statement; 3. In writing, if reduction is contemplated, that he has a right to tender a resignation under paragraph 5, AR 635-220, in lieu of reduction, if he is an enlisted person who has served 3 or more years on an unspecified enlistment (par 27d, AR 624-200); 4. Of the exact measures, if any, which you finally decide to impose; 5. Of his right to appeal to the officer exercising General Court-Martial jurisdiction, in accordance with Article 138, UCMJ.	
AFTER IMPOSING NONPUNITIVE MEASURES	1. In the case of enlisted persons, announce any reduction in orders of your headquarters and forward correspondence and documents regarding such reduction to Personnel Section for inclusion in the person's 201 file (par 9, AR 640-10). 2. In the case of officers and warrant officers, forward any correspondence and documents to Personnel Section for inclusion in the officer's 201 file (temporary records: par 11, AR 640-10; DA Form 201a; par 5d, AR 640-93; AR 600-31). 3. Process any appeal that is made (Art 138, UCMJ). (NOTE: After processing is completed, appeals must be forwarded to Department of the Army.)	

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MAXIMUM NONPUNITIVE MEASURES	
FOR OFFICERS OR WO	Reprimand or admonition.
FOR ENLISTED PERSONS	1. For Inefficiency: a. E5–E9: Reprimand or admonition, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade,* if imposed by the commander of a regiment, battle group, separate or detached battalion, or any similar or higher is authorized and a field grade officer is actually in command, provided that such commander has authority to promote to the grade now held by the person to be reduced (par 27b, AR 624-200). b. E4 and below: Reprimand or admonition, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade,* if imposed by a commander (including a company or comparable commander) who can promote to the grade now held by the person to be reduced (par 27a, AR 624-200). [NOTE: Inefficiency includes not only technical incompetence but misconduct, and failure to graduate from NCO academy (par 28b, AR 624-200; 59 JALS 19/5).] 2. For Conviction by Civil Court: a. E5–E9: Reprimand or admonition, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade,* if imposed by a commander of the type defined in 1a, above, subject to note below. b. E4 and below: Reprimand or admonition, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade,* if imposed by a commander of the type defined in 1b, above, subject to note below. [NOTE: Reduction must be made within 30 days after notice of conviction is received by the commander effecting the reduction. Reduction may be made without regard to whether the conviction is being appealed; however, if conviction is later reversed, the person concerned will be reappointed to the grade from which reduced or such higher grade to which he would have been appointed had he not been reduced. Consideration will be given to the discharge of persons reduced under this authority (par 26c, AR 624-200; AR 635-200).] 3. Who, As Student, Fail To Complete Course Successfully: a. Helicopter pilot trainees who were appointed 2Lt or 3Lt upon entrance into course: Reduction to grade held upon date of entry will be imposed by school commandant (par 26d, AR 624-200). b. Officer candidates: Reduction to the grade held upon entrance into OCS, or such higher grade as the school commandant considers appropriate (par 25, AR 624-200). c. Other students: Reduction to a grade commensurate with his ability, but not below Private E-2, or the grade held upon entry into the school, whichever is higher, if imposed by the school commandant or the authority who can promote to the grade from which reduced (par 25, AR 624-200). 4. Who Are Awaiting An Undesirable Discharge: Reduction to the grade of Private E-1 will be imposed by the officer who has authority to reduce, upon the direction of the officer exercising General Court-Martial jurisdiction (par 25, AR 624-200).

*NOTE: A noncommissioned officer may be reduced to a specialist grade for inefficiency or civil court conviction, provided the latter grade is authorized in the specific MOS of the person's qualification (par 28, AR 624-200).

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MOUTH TO MOUTH AND MOUTH TO NOSE RESCUE BREATHING

Get victim on his back immediately.

Clear throat	of water, mucus, food or foreign objects.
Tilt head back	to open air passage.
Lift jaw up	to keep his tongue out of air passage.
Pinch nostrils (or lips)	to prevent air leakage when you blow.
Blow	until you see his chest rise.
Listen	for snoring and gurgling — signs of throat obstruction.
Repeat	10-20 times a minute.

Continue rescue breathing until he breathes for himself.

NUCLEAR WARFARE INFORMATION
Effects of a Nuclear Detonation

BLAST	SUDDEN SHOCK		Shock pressure from the burst is not usually sufficient to kill. Flying objects and falling debris cause almost all injuries. Keep down, close to shelter.
HEAT	FLASH HEAT		Bare skin can be burned at a great distance from a detonation. Clothes or any other material which will cast a shadow will give some protection. Keep minimum amount of skin arear exposed.
HEAT	FIRES		Flash heat starts forest and brush fires. Fuel ignition and short-circuits start others. Fight these fires in the normal manner.
NUCLEAR RADIATION	INITIAL RADIATION		Most radiation occurs in the first minute after the detonation. By the time objects have stopped falling, there is no further danger from initial nuclear radiation.
NUCLEAR RADIATION	RESIDUAL RADIATION	INDUCED	From a low air burst. Persistent nuclear radiation, localized circular pattern around ground zero. Difficult to decontaminate.
NUCLEAR RADIATION	RESIDUAL RADIATION	FALLOUT	Militarily significant from a surface or subsurface burst. Nuclear radiation found in an irregular pattern downwind from ground zero. Relatively easy to decontaminate.

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Protective Measures Against Nuclear Explosions

BEFORE		If ALERT is sounded, follow unit SOP. If warned before detonation, pick strongest shelter you can find. Underground shelters, deep foxholes, tanks and personnel carriers give good protection.
DURING	TAKE COVER	If you see a BRILLIANT LIGHT, brighter than sunlight, DIVE FAST to put something (dirt, tree, a wall) between you and the detonation. FALL FLAT on the ground if you cannot reach shelter. CLOSE EYES and keep head covered. Protect face and hands. Stay until blast effect is over or until heavy material has stopped falling.
AFTER	STAY CALM	Re-form your unit. Establish contact with subordinate, adjacent and higher units. Be ready for orders and instructions. Your life and your unit depend on you doing the right thing at the right time.
AFTER	CONTINUE MISSION	The nuclear burst is only part of the enemy's plan. If you are in a forward area, be prepared for an enemy attack after the detonation. Be prepared to attack following a friendly detonation on enemy positions.
AFTER	MONITOR AREA	Have unit monitor check area for residual nuclear radiation. If nuclear radiation is detected, report this to your commander, then follow steps outlined on the following page.

Protection Against Residual Nuclear Radiation

1. INDUCED RADIATION. If the area in which radiation is detected appears scorched and blackened in a roughly circular pattern, you are probably in the area around ground zero which has been burned by the thermal effect and in which radiation has been induced. Consistent with the mission, move away from the center of the circular pattern to an area where nuclear radiation intensity is less than 2 roentgens per hour.

2. FALLOUT.

a. Fallout may not arrive in your unit area until some time after a surface or subsurface burst has taken place. If you are warned that fallout will probably arrive in your area, take action to:

(1) Dig or improve foxholes.
(2) Provide for some type of overhead cover.

b. If nuclear radiation is detected in an area that does not appear to be scorched and blackened by a nuclear detonation, or when predicted fallout begins to arrive in your area, take the following action:

(1) Take cover.
(2) Use shelterhalf or other material as overhead cover.
(3) Wear protective mask.
(4) Keep clothing and exposed skin as dust free as possible.
(5) Do not evacuate area until ordered to do so.
(6) Start decontamination procedures as soon as possible.

Staple

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

Military Justice Information

THE PRELIMINARY INQUIRY

When a commander exercising Article 15 jurisdiction (e.g., a company commander) is informed that a member of his command is accused or suspected of committing an offense against the Uniform Code of Military Justice, he will make an informal preliminary inquiry into the matter immediately, sufficiently thorough to enable him to make an intelligent disposition of the case.

In so doing, the commander will identify, apprehend, and if necessary, restrain the accused or suspected person; interrogate witnesses; make searches and seizures; examine and preserve evidence; and do anything else necessary to collect all relevant facts in the case. (See par 32, MCM, 1951.) In conducting the preliminary inquiry, the investigator must respect the rights which accused and suspected persons have under Article 31, UCMJ.

RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 31

No person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice will interrogate, or request a statement, from another person subject to the Code, regarding an offense of which the latter is accused or suspected, until the interrogator:

FIRST:	Reads Article 31, UCMJ, to the accused or suspect;
SECOND:	Explains the provisions thereof to him, to include: 1. The nature of the accusation; 2. That he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense; and 3. That any statement made by him may be used against him in a trial by court-martial;
THIRD:	Insures that the accused or suspected person fully understands these rights. (See Article 31(b), UCMJ.)

Finally, the interrogator must assure that no coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement is used to obtain a statement from the accused or suspect. (Article 31(d), UCMJ.)

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE

After completing his preliminary inquiry, the accused or suspected person's immediate commander must then decide how best to dispose of the case. In so doing, he has four choices of action. He may—

1. Dismiss the matter; or
2. Impose nonpunitive measures (administrative reprimand or admonition, or reduction under provisions of AR 624-200); or
3. Impose non-judicial punishment (Article 15); or
4. Prefer charges.

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ARMY RULES FOR IMPOSING NON-JUDICIAL PUNISHMENT (ARTICLE 15, UCMJ)

WHO IMPOSES	Any commanding officer who has power to impose appropriate punishment (except that, customarily, officers and WO will be punished by no one lower than the officer exercising Summary Court-Martial jurisdiction). (NOTE: Warrant Officers are not authorized, under any circumstances, to impose punishment under Article 15.)		
UPON WHOM	Any military person who does not demand trial by court-martial.		
HOW IMPOSED	UPON OFFICERS OR WO	By written communication, through channels. (See Appendix 3, MCM, 1951.)	
	UPON EM	Orally or by written communication; but a written record is always made in the Unit Punishment Book. (See Appendix 3, MCM, 1951.)	

PROCEDURE FOR IMPOSING

DETERMINE THAT

1. The accused committed the offense;
2. The offense is properly punishable under Article 15, that is,
   a. The offense is minor (par 128b, MCM, 1951, and the Army Pocket Part);
   b. The person has not been tried in a civil court for the same act for which Article 15 punishment is being considered. If the person has been tried by a civil court he will not be punished under Article 15 (or tried by court-martial) for the same act or acts unless the officer exercising General Court-Martial jurisdiction over the person personally gives his approval to such action (AR 22-15);
3. Non-judicial punishment is appropriate under the circumstances;
4. You have the power to impose the punishment which you deem appropriate.

ADVISE THE ACCUSED

1. Of the nature of the offense;
2. That you intend to impose punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, unless trial by court-martial is demanded;
3. That he has the right to demand trial by court-martial;
4. That he may submit matter in mitigation, extenuation or defense;
5. In writing, if reduction is contemplated, that he has a right to tender a resignation under paragraph 5, AR 635-220, in lieu of reduction, if he is an enlisted person who has served 3 or more years on an unexpired enlistment (par 27d, AR 624-200);
6. That he is not required to make any statement regarding the offense, and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in the event of a trial by court-martial (Article 31, UCMJ).

(In writing, if the accused is an officer or WO; orally or in writing if accused is an EM.)

Flame Illuminator

Description. The flame illuminator is a field expedient effective for limited illumination of selected areas of the battlefield. It consists of a container (5- to 55-gallon) filled with thickened fuel to within 3 inches of the top, a WP hand grenade to ignite the fuel, an explosive charge, and a firing system. Burning time is affected by many factors, including viscosity of the thickened fuel, size and shape of the container, and size of the opening. A thick fuel burns longer than a thin fuel. A narrow container functions longer than a wide container. For example, the burning time for a flame illuminator made from an 8-inch howitzer propelling charge container and filled with a 4 percent thickened fuel can vary from 2 to 4 hours depending upon the restriction of the size of the opening.

Assembly.

a. **General.** Fill the container with thickened fuel and seal it tightly.

b. **For electrical firing.**

(1) Wrap three turns of the detonating cord on top of the container along the inside of the top rim. Pack moist earth or mud against the detonating cords. (This packing holds the detonating cord in place and acts as a tamper.) Attach an electric blasting cap to one end of the detonating cord.

(2) Prepare an electric blasting cap-WP hand grenade assembly and attach it to the top of the container or in a small hole nearby in such a manner that the functioning of the explosive charge and the grenade assembly will be simultaneous, thereby igniting the fuel.

(3) Connect the lead wires from the electric blasting cap assembly and tape the blasting cap to the detonating cord. Emplace the igniter.



Type napalm illuminator with nonelectric firing system.



Comparison Fan, Artillery Weapons and Mortars

THE ARMY SUMMARY COURT-MARTIAL

IT CONSISTS OF ONE COMMISSIONED OFFICER (SHOULD BE A CAPTAIN OR HIGHER)

IT CAN TRY ANY NONCAPITAL OFFENSE MADE PUNISHABLE BY THE UNIFORM CODE

IT CAN TRY THESE PEOPLE:

WITH ACCUSED'S CONSENT	WITHOUT ACCUSED'S CONSENT
Any enlisted person.	Any enlisted person who has been permitted, and has elected to receive, punishment under Article 15, UCMJ.

MAXIMUM PUNISHMENTS

UPON NCO'S AND SPECIALISTS ABOVE SPA	UPON SPA, PFC, PVT AND RECRUIT
1. Reprimand or admonition; and 2. Reduction to the next inferior grade*; and 3. Forfeiture or detention of 2/3 of one month's pay; and 4. Restriction to limits for two months.	1. Reprimand or admonition; and 2. Reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade*; and 3. Forfeiture or detention of 2/3 of one month's pay; and 4. a. Confinement at hard labor for one month; or b. Restriction to limits for two months; or c. Hard labor without confinement for 45 days; or d. Any apportionment of 4a, 4b, or 4c. (See Table of Equivalent Punishments, Page 315, MCM, 1951.)

* NOTE: A noncommissioned officer cannot be reduced to a specialist grade, or vice versa, under Article 15, UCMJ, or by court-martial (58 Cirron Ltr 15/14).

Husch Flare

Description. The Husch flare is a specific type of flame illuminator that permits thickened fuel to be vaporized and expelled as a burning jet through a small hole. It consists of one or more metal cylindrical tubes, such as propellant or shell containers, filled with thickened fuel and inverted into a larger metal container also containing varying amounts of thickened fuel. The illustration shows an example of a Husch flare consisting of a metal container, two 81mm mortar round metal containers, thickened fuel, and an illuminating hand grenade. Assembly details listed below relate to a Husch flare consisting of these components; however, Husch flares can be constructed by using other similar components.

Assembly.

(1) Remove any metal crossbars from the inside of the metal container. Punch three ¾-inch holes in each side approximately half way between the top and bottom. Fill the container one-third full of thickened fuel.

(2) Punch a hole no larger than one-eighth inch in the bottom of the 81mm mortar metal containers.

(3) Temporarily stop holes and fill the containers approximately three-fourths full of thickened fuel, apply heavy grease to the mortar container caps and fasten the caps on tightly to make the mortar shell containers leakproof.

(4) Place the 81mm mortar round metal containers in the larger metal container with caps down. Use large stones in the latter to wedge the smaller containers firmly in place and upright. Remove temporary stop from the holes in the 81mm round containers.

(5) Tie an illuminating hand grenade between the 81-mm mortar round containers just above the top level of the outside metal container.

(6) Attach a suitable length of pull or trip wire to the pull ring of the grenade. Lead pull wire to point selected for activation (at least 25 yards from the device when normally operated).

(7) Press the tips of the grenade cotter pin together so that it can be released easily.

Effects. When ignited, this particular Husch flare burns for approximately 90 minutes, illuminating an area up to 50 yards in diameter.

GIVE THE ACCUSED A REASONABLE TIME TO MAKE UP HIS MIND AND REPLY	
IF CM IS NOT DEMANDED, ADVISE THE ACCUSED (In writing, if the accused is an officer or WO; orally or in writing if accused is an EM.)	1. Of the exact punishment imposed; and 2. Of his right to appeal in writing to the next higher commander, in accordance with paragraph 134, MCM, 1951. (See Appendix 3b, MCM, 1951.)
AFTER IMPOSING PUNISHMENT	1. In the case of enlisted persons, the immediate commander will complete the Unit Punishment Record (DD Form 789). Correspondence relating to punishment will be attached to the Unit Punishment Record in lieu of entries therein, and a copy of such correspondence will be forwarded to Personnel Section for inclusion in the individual's 201 file (par 9, AR 640-10); 2. In the case of officers and WO, the correspondence relating to the imposition of punishment will be forwarded to Personnel Section for inclusion in the individuals 201 file (par 10, AR 640-10); 3. Enforce or modify the punishment; 4. Announce any reduction in orders of the headquarters of the reduction authority (par 31, AR 624-200); and 5. Process any appeal that is made. [NOTE: Article 15 appeals are not forwarded to Department of the Army. The commander who acts upon the appeal will return it to the person who appealed, with direction that he forward the papers to his immediate commander for file with the record of the case (par 134, MCM, 1951).]
MAXIMUM PUNISHMENTS	
FOR OFFICERS OR WO	Reprimand or admonition, and any one of the following: a. Withholding of privileges for two consecutive weeks; or b. Restriction for two consecutive weeks; or c. Forfeiture of ½ of one month's pay, if imposed by a commanding officer who can convene a General Court-Martial.
FOR NCOS AND SPECIALISTS (E4-E9)	Reprimand or admonition, and any one of the following: a. Withholding of privileges for two consecutive weeks; or b. Restriction for two consecutive weeks; or c. Two hours per day of nondegrading extra duties for two consecutive weeks; or d. Reduction to the next inferior grade*, if imposed by a commanding officer who is a major or higher, and who can promote to the grade from which reduced.
FOR OTHER EM (E1, E2, & E3)	Reprimand or admonition, and any one of the following: a. Withholding of privileges for two consecutive weeks; or b. Restriction for two consecutive weeks; or c. Two hours per day of extra duties for two consecutive weeks; or d. Reduction to the next inferior grade, if imposed by a commanding officer who can promote to the grade from which reduced; or e. Confinement for seven consecutive days, or confinement on diminished rations or bread and water for three consecutive days, if imposed on a person attached to or embarked on a vessel.

Field Expedient Flame Devices

Flame Fougasse

Description. The flame fougasse consists of an empty 8-inch howitzer propelling charge container filled with thickened fuel and equipped with an explosive charge (propellant), a wood disc (piston), two Hercules Herco-tube electric blasting caps, an M15 WP hand grenade (igniter), wire and blasting machine or battery.

Assembly. *a.* The flame fougasse should be assembled in a vertical position. A one-fourth pound piece of composition C4 explosive is formed around an electric blasting cap and placed in the bottom of the container. Wires from the electric blasting cap are brought out of the case through a small hole punched in the side of the case near the top rim.

b. A wood disc approximately 2 inches thick and 8 inches in diameter (one-fourth inch less than the inside diameter of the container) is placed in the container. The disc should fit into the container easily with approximately a ⅛-inch clearance and should lie flat in the bottom of the container and rest on top of the explosive and blasting cap. (It is not necessary for the disc to be round; irregular shapes are more satisfactory.)

c. The case is filled with a 5-percent thickened fuel mixture (approximately 5 gallons).

d. The metal cap is replaced on the container. The rubber gasket should be on the cap and should be seated firmly to prevent thickened fuel from spilling. The spider of the cap is engaged in the slots for transporting only.

e. Prepare firing assembly as follows: Remove the fuze assembly from a WP hand grenade and insert an electric blasting cap in the fuze well, wrapping the wires around the grenade to secure the blasting cap in the grenade. A cork insert may be used in the fuze well as a bushing and the connection wrapped with friction tape. Then the inserted blasting cap may be made moisture proof by coating with a cap-sealing compound. The WP hand grenade is placed approximately 6 inches in front of and below the mouth of the flame fougasse and the spiders of the cap are disengaged from the slots so that the cap will blow easily.


METAL CONTAINER FOR 8-IN. HOWITZER PROPELLING CHARGE
ELECTRIC BLASTING CAP WIRE BROUGHT OUT THROUGH HOLE
COVER
TO SWITCHBOARD, BLASTING MACHINE, OR BATTERY
ELECTRIC BLASTING CAP-WP HAND GRENADE ASSEMBLY
THICKENED FUEL
EXPLOSIVE ENCASED IN PLASTIC BAG
PISTON OR PUSHER PLATE

Flame fougasse.

TRICKS OF THE TRADE

HOW WIDE THE WILD MISSOURI?

by 1st Lt Dudley L. Fry

There are numerous occasions when a soldier may be required to calculate, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the width of a river and its rate of flow. For example, knowledge of the width and rate of flow of a river assists greatly in planning the construction of an expedient footbridge using a log or rope; or, a patrol might be required to obtain such river data to assist higher headquarters in planning a river crossing.

Two methods of determining the width of a river are the pace-measuring method and the 45-degree right triangle method. The pace-measuring method consists of six steps as follows (Figure 1):



Figure 1

1. Spot a landmark on the far shore (point A).

2. Place a stake on the near shore (point B) exactly opposite the landmark on the far shore. The line of sight from this stake to point A is called line AB.

3. Walk along the near shore at a right angle to line AB for any even number of paces. At this point (point C) place a second stake. The line of sight from point B to point C is line BC.

4. Continue walking along the same line for half as many paces as on line BC. At this point (point D) place a third stake. The line of sight from point C to point D is line CD.

5. At the third stake (point D), turn away from the river and walk at right angle from line BCD until you can see stake C and the landmark, point A, on a straight line of sight. At this point place a fourth stake (point E). The line from point D to point E is line DE.

6. Count the paces from the fourth stake, point E, to point D, convert your paces to feet or meters. *Double the distance of line DE for the distance across the river.*

Thus we have the first of the two methods of measuring the width of streams, the pace measuring method. The other method is the 45-degree right triangle method. It requires an angle measuring device such as a prismatic compass, and is based on the fact that the two legs of the isosceles right triangle are equal (Figure 2). This method consists of four steps as follows:

1. Spot any landmark on the far shore (point A).

2. Place a stake on the near shore (point B) exactly opposite the landmark on the far shore.

3. Using an angle measuring device such as a prismatic compass, walk along the near shore at a right angle to line AB. The line you are walking will be line BC.

4. Walk along line BC until you can see the landmark on the opposite shore (point A) so that line AC intersects the line you are walking, line BC, forming a 45 degree angle. At this point (point C) place the second stake.

5. Count the paces from point C to point B and convert the paces to feet or meters. The distance of line BC is equal to the distance of line AB, the width of the river.



Figure 2

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